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#rezist: Lessons from the 
Romanian 2017 Protests
Darren G. Lilleker and Ana Adi
Protests occur all the time. Most nations of the world 
witness periodic protests. Some are dealt with using 
repressive measures. Some are dismissed as representing 
minority views. Some lead to political change. Some go 
largely ignored. The latter is, perhaps, the least likely 
scenario. It is hard to ignore large, loud crowds acting 
in unison for common cause. Petitions, the peaceful 
equivalent, are signed one by one, increasingly online, 
and delivered to a government quietly. Protests are 
noisy, vibrant, they are a spectacle. They provide the 
images that people want to see, they are picked up by 
media, by passers-by, they are hard to ignore. When 
facing a protest a government has a choice, send in riot 
police or troops, attempt to play down the significance 
in numbers or support, or to listen and act. Acting may 
be more about amelioration than submission, but a 
protest can have the power to exact change.
The #rezist protests in historical perspective
Over the course of the last thirty years protests 
and protest movements have grown in prominence. 
French President Francois Mitterand observed, in a 
speech1 at the international summit meeting in Paris in 
November 19_9_0, a meeting including the then leaders 
of the European Community members who laid the 
foundations for the Charter of Paris for a New Europe: 
“for the first time in history we witness a change in the 
European landscape which is not the outcome of a war 
or a bloody revolution”. He was of course referring to 
the events that led to the fall of the Soviet Union and the 
Communist empire. While there are debates regarding 
the agency which led to the collapse, and the extent that 
elites’ machinations were the key determining factor, a 
role was played by civil society (Daniels, 2000).
It is easy to overplay the peaceful aspects, as 
well as the agency of civil society within those revolutions 
and many subsequent and similar events from Moldova 
to Georgia, Tunisia to Egypt (McDermott & Stibbe, 2016). 
However when masses unify with a common aim, 
and that aim is to provide a visible indication of their 
desire for change, there is a likelihood that political 
consequences will follow. The ineptitude of latter days 
leaders of Soviet satellite states, the unwillingness of 
state powers to act against the people, the obvious 
crumbling of the authority of a state all contribute to a 
positive outcome. But people have to act. 
The fall of the communist regime in Romania is 
an example of how a simple act of repression can act as a 
trigger. Ceaușescu’s pseudo-fascistic regimes’ combination 
of personality cult, iconography and brutality is well 
documented (Sweeney, 19_9_1) as well as the extraordinary 
control he exerted over the nation he ruled (Behr, 19_9_1). 
Yet it was not a broadly-held feeling of dissatisfaction 
with his autocratic rule that triggered a revolt. Rather it 
was his government’s attempt to evict a priest, Hungarian 
László Tőkés, part of a state crackdown on the Hungarian 
minority in Timișoara, that led to protests: firstly to protect 
the priest, then to call for his reinstatement. Faced with 
indifference by the evening of 16th of December 19_89_ 
the mood of the Hungarians grew ugly, this was met with 
repression by the state and tensions mounted. Defiant 
protestors sang the pre-communist anthem2 “Awaken 
thee, Romanian!”. But this was all largely contained within 
Timișoara, the state media failed to report any of these 
events. It was only when fireworks or gunfire interrupted 
a speech by Ceaușescu, an attempt to calm the people 
of Timișoara which was met by jeers and boos, and the 
bangs were mistakenly assumed to be troops firing on 
the crowd that had gathered did the protests spread 
to other cities. The repression of individual dissidents 
was a natural state of affairs, firing indiscriminately into 
crowds while a television audience of millions watched 
was deemed unacceptable. The repressed seized their 
moment and the regime collapsed.
The revolution might be televised… it might be 
 Facebooked
Media provide the crucial oxygen for protest 
movements. The publicity given that would spark the 
19_89_ revolution was accidental, Ceaușescu attempted 
to ameliorate the concerns of the people of Timișoara, 
who proved harder than expected to pacify, someone 
attempted to quieten the crowd by firing a gun, the crowd 
reacted in fear and the audience took to the streets. The 
 5Romanian protests 2017 
#rezist: Lessons from the Romanian 2017 Protests
doi.org/10.23774/QUAS.RP2017.01 
Authors: Darren G. Lilleker and Ana Adi
squares of the major cities of Romania were occupied, 
the rest is history. Media was also crucial during the 
uprising in Tunisia. 2008-2010 saw growing unrest 
over high unemployment, food prices, corruption, the 
lack of political freedoms and poor living conditions. 
The self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi was the 
trigger. Bouazizi was a 27 year old unemployed man 
who turned to selling fruit by the curb to survive, he was 
beaten and had his cart seized for illegal street vending. 
On release from custody he returned to the curb from 
where he sold his fruit, doused himself in petrol and set 
himself alight. His treatment became symbolic of the 
relationship between the government and its people 
and the message carried on social media. While it was 
a public reaction to events witnessed on television that 
led people to come together in the streets to protest 
in Romania in December 19_89_, 21 years later almost to 
the day Tunisians came together on social media and 
then came to the streets organised. 
The protests collectively referred to as the Arab 
Spring made the taking of squares fashionable. It was 
copied extensively by the Occupy movement globally 
(Costanza-Chock, 2012) as well as being an inspiration 
for the Spanish Indignados who took to the squares of 
Spain’s major cities in a co-ordinated campaign on the 
15th of May 2011, gaining them the 15M monicker. The 
latter’s undermining of the political elites (Hughes, 2011), 
leading to the creation of the radical Podemos party and 
some level of political reform (Orriols & Cordero, 2016). 
Ainger (2016, p. 37) suggests that these protests resulted 
from a process of contagion, the model of forming a 
semi-permanent encampment as a constant visible 
indication of protest spread across national borders and 
was adapted for a range of national contexts.
Kalle Lasn, editor of Adbusters, created the 
#OCCUPYWALLSTREET hashtag on the 13th of July 2011 
and believed he captured in this the mood of a generation 
of activists. The idea of Occupy was to “somehow change 
the power balance and make the world into a much more 
grass-roots, bottom-up kind of a place rather than the 
top-down Wall Street mega-corporate-driven system 
we now have” (Yardley, 2011). Occupy thus became a 
contagious brand, one built around viral online memes. 
The brand was re-presented and appropriated, each 
time it was given further meaning; capturing both the 
spirit of the protests as well as invoking the image of 
the physical presence of the protesters. The notion of 
fluidity captured by Occupy, where protesters can come 
and go or be longstanding members of the community, 
has had an impact on the concept of a social movement 
(Beraldo & Galan–Paez, 2013). Occupy also brought a 
carnivalesque character to protesting (Tancons, 2011), 
protesting moved away from violent confrontation to a 
developing a party atmosphere. But at the heart of the 
Occupy protests was the notion that protesters should 
occupy everywhere. As protesters were evicted from 
one public space they occupied another, at the same 
time occupying online spaces linking the idea of seizing 
control of a public space to one of seizing attention 
from media, supporters and those against whom they 
protested (Juris, 2012). This thread, a brand of protest 
and perhaps became a brand of its own, ran from the 
Arab Spring events to the Indigados and into Occupy 
(Gerbaudo, 2012).  The public display of indignation, 
and the demand for reform, with people taking to 
public spaces may have seemed the fashionable act of 
protest in the summer of 2011 and 2012 but, as we shall 
see, this precedent already had cultural and political 
significance in Romania. 
Occupying the Piaţa
Like many of the peoples of the soon to be 
post-Communist countries, in 19_89_ Romanians had 
taken to the streets. At that time Piața Universității 
was the focal point, due more to the size of the space 
than its significance. This space was also appropriated 
for subsequent protests such as the 19_9_0 Mineriada 
protest (Miner’s rage) and first anti-corruption protest in 
2015 following the fire in the Colectiv nightclub; these 
events are documented by Ciobanu and Light in this 
volume. In many ways these protests mirror those which 
took place as part of the Occupy protests and their 
precursors. As the Emergency Ordinance (OUG13) was 
passed that decriminalised many forms of corruption, 
the people again took to Piața Universității but proved 
quickly dissatisfied conforming with the traditions of 
Bucharest protests. The move to Piața Victoriei was 
symbolic due to it facing the government itself, but also 
perhaps due to its name. The occupation of a square 
named Victory Square can be a statement of intention 
as well as having proximity to those in power. Though 
its historical position as the heart of power is perhaps its 
most significant feature, making it particularly attractive 
to a post-Occupy style protest.
The protests in Romania did not, however, capture 
global attention in the same manner as did those in 
Tunisia, Egypt, Madrid or even Occupy New York. A 
search of Google news suggests that globally only 720 
online news articles were generated about the protests 
from the 28th of January to the 5th of February, the six 
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day period from the 25th of January 2011 saw over 1,500 
reference protests in Egypt. Yet news attention has been 
sustained, reaching over 70,000 articles over the five 
months (February – June 2017). Attention is given most by 
media based in the European Union, particularly within 
media with a more global outlook such as the UK’s The 
Guardian, France’s Le Monde and Germany’s Die Welt 
although the New York Times and even Fox News have 
covered events. The agendas of coverage range from 
pro-EU anti-corruption perspectives to more reflective 
pieces on post-communist systems, most supporting the 
protestors and their aims. World Politics Review3 offer 
the best historical context calling the protests not only 
“a victory for people power and civic activism against 
a corrupt elite” but part of a tradition within Romanian 
society and another step on the evolution to being a full 
democracy. The weight of both history and the future is 
here brought to bear on this protest.
As with its culture and politics Romania bridges 
old and new traditions. Its politics blends selected 
aspects of the European accession criteria with a political 
culture of corruption and clientelism, thus remaining an 
embarrassment to the European project of which it is part 
(Gallagher, 2009_). Its protest tradition also represents 
a convergence of cultures. The use of social media by 
protestors represents the new networked variant Castells 
(2015) argues are the cornerstone of a reshaping of 
democracy. Yet the first action was not to tweet, Whatsapp 
or otherwise communicate via social media, it was to take 
to the main squares and be visible. It is this intersection of 
forms of protest, the geography of the protests, the role 
of media and the individuals that this collection of essays 
explores. Basically we seek to provide understanding 
of who took part, why spaces were chosen, how media 
responded and was utilised and how these fit into the 
current and historical contexts of politics and society in 
Romania.
Understanding #rezist
The contributions to this report offer the thoughts 
and analysis of more than twenty-five scholars, journalists 
or activists not to mention the other activists interviewed 
in the course of the research. The aim of putting this 
collection of essays together is fourfold. 
• Firstly we seek to develop a more 
thorough understanding of the origins 
of the protest within Romanian politics 
and society and place this protest within 
the context of protests since 19_89_. 
• Secondly we focus on developing an 
understanding of the motivations of the 
protagonists, the trigger that led them to 
protest and the aims of that movement. 
• Thirdly we explore the communicational 
dynamics that both hinder and 
sustain the protests, and 
• Finally we look to the impact had by 
the protests and the future trajectory for 
Romania and well as situating these protests 
within a wider comparative perspective. 
The first section sets the scene. Antonio Momoc 
details the party political machinations that provided 
an environment nurturing disconnect. His analysis is 
followed by the essay by Borțun and Cheregi which 
explore the ideological divisions in Romania and their 
relationship to position taking within this period of 
unrest. Alistair, Lonean and Soare then follow this with 
specific detail on Romania’s history of corruption and 
summary of the country’s anti-corruption fight and 
how this might have influenced the birth of a protest 
movement. The timeframe is narrowed somewhat by 
Eliza Rogalski, focusing specifically on the seventeen 
months between the Colectiv fire and the passing of 
OUG13. The final essay details the legislative context, 
Ramona Ursu charts the battles between the elected 
chambers and the independent judiciary surrounding 
OUG13 and anti-corruption law in Romania.
The second section focuses on the protestors 
and their strategies. Cosmin Pojoranu talks of the ‘citizens 
cum laude’, those willing to take to the streets and places 
them within a historical context. Ana Adi then offers more 
in-depth understanding of the individual protesters, what 
led them to the streets and their vision for a better future. 
The Decât o Revistă4 team focuses on the dissemination 
of information using the rezist hashtag as a means of 
publicizing the protest and providing material to sustain 
supporters. Ciobanu and Light follow this focusing on the 
symbolism of Piața Victoriei, concluding this section with 
a discussion of how protesters promoted themselves 
against this symbolic backdrop. 
The next section opens with Monica Macovei’s 
analysis of the fight in Brussels and how the relationship 
between Romania and the EU featured in this conflict. 
Maria Corina Barbaros offers a perspective from the 
government side, showing how fake news was used to 
undermine the protests. Continuing the media theme, 
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Rodica Melinda Şuțu focuses on the role television 
played and how de-legitimisation tactics were employed 
against the protesters. Yet despite a traditional media 
environment hostile to the arguments of the protestors, 
the movement spread. Ana Adi charts the spread within 
the cities of Romania and the diaspora showing graphically 
how Romanians united around the themes of #rezist. 
Alternative media was a key enabler for this contagion. 
Ionescu and Ciudin explore dissemination through Piața 
Victoriei TV (recently rebranded as Rezistența TV), and 
the democratization of information facilitated by social 
media platforms. This theme recurs in Ruxandra Boicu’s 
essay; she charts the shift from #rezist being a social 
media movement to being a putative political party. 
Finally, in this section, Brîndușa Armanca discusses the 
use of humour and satire, and whether this energises 
and unites or trivialises. Alexandra Ioan and Monica Boța 
Moisin finalise this section with the perspective from 
among the diaspora in Berlin.
The final section is more forward looking, focusing 
on the impact of the protest. Adriana Ștefănel offers a 
philosophical take on the populist discourses that emerged 
with the #rezist movements. Raluca Feher explores 
the short lived protests by advertisers, who withdrew 
their revenue from media outlets offering unsupportive 
accounts of the protests. Pfiszter focuses on the legislative 
dimension of OUG13 and what legislative or constitutional 
changes are required going forward to prevent abuses 
of power. Dinu-Gabriel Munteanu writes about the future 
of Romania’s politics from the perspective of a newly 
established and rather anti-establishment party. Peter 
Gross extends this discussion, placing #rezist in historical 
context in order to caution those that see protests as a 
pathway to enhanced democracy. Immanuel Wallerstein 
broadens the discussion further to place #rezist and the 
current situation in Romania in an international context, 
discussing both the limits to reform and the limited effects 
we can expect from protest movements. 
The same yet different
The younger, better educated Romanians with a 
more global outlook appear to share a desire for change 
and express it convincingly across social media. There 
were valuable lessons learned in the past protests which 
in 2017 are fully and successfully re-enacted. In 2013 the 
protests united around a hashtag, in 2014 they formulated 
clear and actionable demands, in 2015 they used those 
and moved into organizing and coordinating activities. All 
this while also connecting to the world and Romanians 
around the world. 
A movement is the best way to think about the 
protests, a movement in opposition to government/state 
corruption. While leaders do not emerge, key figures 
who facilitated specific actions can be highlighted. Some 
of these actions are highlighted here. 
As with protests under the Indignados/Occupy 
movements, those who had communication or organising 
skills emerged within the protests in order to employ 
their skills to meet key objectives. Organization and 
coordination has moved onto Facebook and messenger 
apps. Meetings and protests became opportunities 
to communicate visually and symbolically. Facebook 
groups like Corupţia Ucide (Corruption Kills) created 
after Colectiv, 600000 pentru Romania (600000 for 
Romania, now called 600000 for Resistance) and 
Rezistența have joined efforts and at times resources. 
But as with the Occupy and similar movements 
the lack of leadership and a clear vision for the future 
suggests their impact might be limited. This is also 
jeopardized by the catchy yet perhaps too generic 
motto of the protests: #rezist and its associated group 
Rezistența (Resistence). For the rushed or untrained user, 
Facebook presents a challenge as there are at least 
two groups using the name, one associated with the 
protesters and one with the right-wing populist Frontul 
Popular Creștin (the Christian Popular Front). 
#rezist and its resemblance with the American 
Resist movement is also problematic. For the socially 
liberal political program towards which the Romanian 
#rezist is leading, the hard-left American resist programme 
of fighting oppression leads opponents and critics of the 
movement to further question their motives. Issues such 
as LGBT rights, same-sex marriage, the power of the 
church and Romania’s relationship with the EU remain 
key points of contestation. 
We can thus see these protests as fuelled by 
long-term dissatisfaction with a corrupt system which 
involved in the aftermath of the fall of Ceauşescu. The 
creation of a legal framework operating within a system 
where cutting corners and taking shortcuts is encouraged 
and weakened by a reactive and non-interfering EU did 
nothing to stem corruption, leading to the mobilisation 
of a new generation of Romanians. Tech-savvy and 
globalist, they were angered by the Colectiv fire and 
outraged when those responsible would be exonerated 
by Grindeanu’s Executive Ordinance 13. The long and 
short-term situation led them to the streets, to deploy their 
skills to make themselves heard, but with no leadership, 
no long-term vision beyond a nation free of corruption 
and divisions on multiple social issues it is hard to see 
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the movement sustain their challenge to the regime.
The collection of essays thus offers a range 
of perspectives of the #rezist protests, the personnel, 
the political and media environments and offers some 
thoughts regarding the impacts. We raise questions 
regarding the future, the challenges faced by Romanians 
seeking greater input into democracy as well as those 
faced by a government attempting to retain power 
and legitimacy. On balance the essays recognise the 
limitations of protests, but also the determination of the 
protestors and indeed the current elites. It remains still 
too early to know the long lasting effects on Romanian 
politics and society. On balance, taking a democrat’s 
perspective, the protests seem to be trying to move the 
country in a positive direction. Despite the challenges 
one would hope that this movement has some measure 
of success in exacting reforms.  
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The photo taken by Dan Mihai Balanescu on the 5th 
of February 2017 in Piața Victoriei with hundreds of 
thousands of Romanians protesting by lifting the lanterns 
of their mobile phones towards the sky became the 
iconic image of the anti-corruption protests. That day, 
between 250,000-300,000 people gathered in front of 
the Government building in Bucharest, while hundreds of 
thousands of others marched in cities across the country. 
Captured in Balanescu’s photo, the protests against the 
Executive Ordinance 13 (OUG13) from Romania’s capital 
turned into a symbol of the Indignados’ Movement and a 
model for similar protests in the region: first there were 
the solidarity protests1 in the Moldavian Republic and 
in Bulgaria, followed by civil society protests in Serbia 
and Montenegro2 (February 2017), then the protests 
against corruption in Russia3 (March 2017), Hungary4 
and Slovakia5 (April 2017). 
The Romanians occupied the streets again in 
early May 2017. The reason was the Pardon Law that, 
from the protesters’ perspective, preserves the spirit of 
OUG13. The Romanian Senate’s Legal Committee – the 
superior Chamber of the Romanian Parliament – had 
approved the amendment of a Social Democrat Party 
(PSD) senator by which also the criminals convicted for 
peddling influence or for accepting bribes could have 
been pardoned.
This time, only up to a thousand people went 
out to protest against the revisions of the Pardon Law, 
but it was enough for PSD – represented by Prime-
Minister Sorin Grindeanu and by the party president, 
Liviu Dragnea – to withdraw the support of those who 
planned to revise the Law. Grindeanu’s Government 
announced there is no support for the PSD senator’s 
amendments, but it was unclear whether the members of 
the coalition leading the country – PSD and ALDE – were 
endorsing them in the Parliament or not. These events 
occurred at the same time as Dragnea was handed a 
two year suspended prison sentence for voting fraud in a 
referendum and is presently being tried in another case 
of abuse of power, facts which permanently fueled the 
public’s suspicions that the revisions of the Penal Code 
via OUG13 or the amendments brought to Pardon Law 
might also favor him6. Additionally, the ALDE president, 
Calin Popescu Tariceanu, who is also the President of 
the Senate, is accused by The National Anticorruption 
Directorate (DNA) of perjury and of favoring the offender.
Ever since the beginning of the year, an 
atmosphere of discord revolved around the Penal Code 
definition of an abuse of office against public interests 
as “the deed of a public clerk who, while exerting job-
related tasks, does not fulfill an act, or fulfills it in a 
faulty manner, by this damaging the legitimate rights 
or interests of a physical person or a juridical person, 
and is punished with 2 up to 7 years in prison and is 
forbidden the right to serve in a public position”. 
The protesters accused the government of 
attempting to modify the Penal Code with the intention 
to cancel the DNA trials and to cease any investigations 
into accusations of abuse of office. All this under the 
pretext that the Constitutional Court (CCR) had forced 
the Legislative to redefine the crime of abuse of office 
by replacing the collocation “fulfills an act in a faulty 
manner” with “by breaking the law”. A quarter of the 
defendants sent to trial by DNA in 2016 were accused 
of abuse of office, according to the DNA report7.
In case OUG13 had not been repealed, it would 
have decriminalized two crimes from the Penal Code 
– negligence on duty and conflict of interests – and 
would have introduced criteria for incriminating the 
abuse of office: a threshold of 200,000 RON beyond 
which the material prejudice caused to a physical or 
juridical person became criminal. Moreover, OUG13 
would have removed the abuse of office crime for the 
case of adopting normative acts. 
The protests from mid-January 2017 against 
amnesty and pardon started as marches. First, they 
were organized in front of the Ministry of Justice (where 
the ordinance project for pardoning certain sentences 
was initiated), the National Council of Audio-visual 
(CNA) and the People’s Attorney (Ombudsman)8. These 
institutions were meant to serve the public interest, but 
the protesters’ perception was that they were politically 
affiliated, subordinated to the party holding the power. 
The public’s suspicion grew when the CNA decided not 
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to sanction the television stations presenting news in a 
biased manner. Moreover, the Ombudsman reaction and 
contestation of the OUG13 to the Constitutional Court 
was perceived as delayed. The protests against the 
attempts of the ones holding power to circumvent the 
anti-corruption fight were also supporting the National 
Anticorruption Directorate. On the 22nd of January 2017, 
Klaus Iohannis, the President of Romania, joined the 
20,000 protesters in Piața Universității 9_. The President’s 
presence in the street at an unauthorized meeting gave 
the opportunity for television news stations such as 
Romania TV and Antena 3 to accuse him of “coup d’état 
attempt”, “high treason” and “instigating violence”10.
After OUG13 was issued on the 31st of January 
2017, the protests moved in front of the Government 
building in Victoriei Square (Piața Victoriei) and continued 
even after OUG13 on has been repealed on the 5th of 
February, actually reaching a peak of attendance11 in the 
evening after the ordinance was abrogated.
The same evening when hundreds of thousands 
of protesters lit up all their phones in Piața Victoriei, 
they also held a moment of silence remembering the 
young men and women who died in the Colectiv Club 
fire on the 30th of October 2015. 64 people died then 
and the PSD Government led by Prime Minister Victor 
Ponta resigned after a few days of protests. People 
went out on the streets in 2015 to protest against the 
fact that the authorities approved the functioning of 
a club (among many others) that did not fulfill health 
and safety regulations, and in particular fire protection 
regulations. This attitude was considered to be corrupted 
and negligent by the public opinion. 
The PSD Government quit as result of the anti-
corruption protests, being replaced by a technocrat 
government for a year. Nevertheless, on the 11th of 
December 2016 the same PSD party won by far the 
parliamentary elections, with only 39_,5% presence at 
the poll12. According to the Central Electoral Bureau, 
for the Deputies’ Chamber 45,47% voted PSD, 20,04% 
PNL, 8,87% USR, 6,18% UDMR, 5,62% ALDE, 5,34% 
PMP13. For the Senate, people voted PSD – 45,67%, PNL 
– 20,41%, USR – 8,9_2%, UDMR – 6,24%, ALDE – 6%, 
PMP – 5,65%14. The parliamentary majority was formed 
by forming a coalition between the PSD led by Dragnea 
and ALDE led by Tariceanu. 
Usually the party who wins the parliamentary 
elections appoints as Prime Minister the head of their 
party. However, because of Liviu Dragnea’s criminal 
conviction, PSD could not propose him for the Prime 
Minister position. Article 2 of Law 9_0/2001 describes 
how the Romanian Government has to function and 
be organized; it stipulates that “only the persons who 
have solely Romanian citizenship, reside in Romania, 
and never had criminal convictions can be members of 
the Government and benefit of the electoral rights”15.
Since PSD-ALDE won the elections, the leaders 
of the two parties were entitled to question the legitimacy 
of the street protests in January-February 2017. The 
argument emphasized by the coalition holding power was 
that the Government has just been voted democratically 
by a vast majority, by millions of citizens, and it should 
not be discarded just because this is what a few hundred 
thousand people in the street ask for, being agitated by 
the political opposition and by the President. This narrative 
was supported by a few thousands who protested in 
front of the Cotroceni Presidential Palace – they were 
PSD-ALDE sympathizers, responding to the protesters 
in Piața Victoriei.
Romania is a semi-presidential parliamentary 
republic in which the President has the most political 
legitimacy, being chosen directly by the biggest number 
of citizens in two electoral ballots. The Parliament is 
chosen by a proportional vote system in which the 
parties put forward candidates’ lists. In the presidential 
elections, the second ballot allows the opposition 
parties to group around the candidate with the second 
chance and to defeat the representative of the biggest 
party – PSD lost the 2014 presidential elections with a 
score of 45,56% to 54,43% after its candidate, Victor 
Ponta, obtained 40,44% of the votes in the first ballot, 
and the PNL-PDL candidate, Iohannis, gained 30,37%. In 
the parliamentary elections, the party with the biggest 
resources, the biggest number of elected mayors or 
of party members wins most of the mandates, but not 
necessarily the majority of them. 
The fact that PSD won most of the mandates 
cannot be explained solely based on the proportional 
electoral system. The electoral message of the PSD 
targeted broad demographic categories, those neglected 
by the parties on the right of the political spectrum. 
The citizens who came out as winners16 from the post-
communist transition period participate less in elections17, 
showing up at the poll in smaller numbers18 and opting 
for the actors who endorse liberal policies19_. However, 
the citizens who came out as losers from the transition 
are disciplined when it comes to voter turnout20 and 
prefer social, interventionist policies, relevant for the 
assisted ones. 
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This is the reason why the PSD is identified with 
the credible left-wing social-economic message, although 
it is a party originating directly from the National Salvation 
Front and the ex-Romanian Communist Party. The economic 
right-wing is represented by a series of parliamentary 
parties that fragment the votes of the economic right-
wing electors: the National Liberal Party (PNL) and the 
Popular Movement Party (PMP) of the ex-President Traian 
Băsescu. The current PNL merged with the Democratic 
Liberal Party (PDL - Băsescu’s former party), the same 
formation that supported the austerity measures affecting 
the state employees and pensioners when they were 
governing during the economic crisis period.
The austerity or privatization measures proposed 
by PMP and applied by PDL-PNL are not attractive for the 
citizens who did not have anything to win from the transition 
period. The anti-corruption message of the protesters in 
Piața Victoriei does not change the mindset of the PSD’s 
loyal supporters, as they are convinced that all parties 
are corrupt, but only the PSD cares about them. And their 
perception is enforced by the reality that leaders from all 
the parties have been detained, arrested or convicted for 
acts of corruption.
This reality allowed the over-night appearance of 
a new player conveying anti-corruption and anti-traditional-
parties messages: the Union for the Salvation of Romania 
(USR) led by Nicusor Dan. The success registered by 
the USR at the parliamentary elections affected the PNL 
in particular: Liberals dropped from 31,49_% in the 2016 
local elections to 20,04% in the parliamentary elections. 
Ideologically, the USR is a catch-all party that 
endeavors to be positioned at the center, in the hope of 
getting votes from all the sides. It is not clear whether USR 
is progressive or conservative. Its leaders are trying to 
define their doctrine economically or politically in order to 
avoid polarization and not to lose the voters attracted by 
the anti-corruption and anti-traditional-parties messages. 
USR consists of people who have not been involved 
politically: technocrats, managers, NGO activists. That is 
why the party was accepted in Piața Victoriei during the 
2017 anti-corruption protests.
A few months after the protests, in June 2017, 
the PSD President, Liviu Dragnea, forced the resignation 
of the Grindeanu Government. Dragnea claimed the 
Government was not applying the party’s governmental 
program and he even offered Prime Minister Grindeanu 
alternative public positions to persuade him to quit his 
Government function21. To show their ironic spirit, some of 
the protesters in Piața Victoriei pretended to “solidarize” 
with Sorin Grindeanu on the social networks, associating his 
photo with the notorious #rezist. Some commentators22 
accused the real reason why Grindeanu was pressed to 
resign was the fact that the Prime Minister did not pass 
the Law of Amnesty and Pardon, moving the debate of 
this law in the Romanian Parliament.
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Introduction
The idea of a modern or pre-modern Romania is not new, 
even though it was rejected in the name of national unity, 
under the external threat of foreign forces that sought to 
overcome the ”territorial break-up of Romania”. 
After Romania’s EU accession in 2007, the cleavage 
between Romanian society and the objectives of the EU 
integration has deepened. In the last two years, the groups 
seeking a complete modernization of the Romanian society 
began to manifest themselves. The discursive formula 
revealing their aspirations is ”We want a country like the 
ones abroad” (Vreau o tara ca afara). This slogan was part 
of the #colectiv protests from November 2015, linked to the 
fire which occurred in Colectiv nightclub in Bucharest and 
one of the biggest tragedies that took place in Romania after 
19_89_.  Discursively framed as a national tragedy in the media, 
the #colectiv protests were largely anti-corruption protests 
aimed at removing political corruption from Romanian society. 
The acts of corruption in the Mayor’s Office from the district 
where the fire occurred acted as a catalyst and symbol for 
Romania’s wider corruption problems. 
In January 2017, the Romanian Government 
proposed an emergency ordinance to amend the Penal 
Code, decriminalizing misconduct offences. Hundreds of 
thousands of people have taken to the streets to protest 
against the ordinance and to ask the Government to resign. 
Conversely, there was a counter-manifestation against the 
Romanian President Klaus Iohannis, in front of Cotroceni 
Presidential Palace. People supporting the Government 
were dissatisfied with the President, who they say, wants 
to divide the country and create rift among Romanians1 
(Digi24.ro, February 7, 2017). The fight against corruption 
has become a public problem, continuing the fight of the 
#colectiv protests.  
These two opposing perspectives of the same 
Romanian reality are worth discussing. The slogans they 
displayed in Piața Victoriei or at Cotroceni Palace reveal 
how the two Romanias have expressed their identity, values 
and aspirations. 
Particular ideologies in 2017 Romanian protests   
Social movements are ”intended to mobilize 
potential adherents and constituents, to garner bystander 
support, and to demobilize antagonists” (Snow & Benford, 
19_9_8, p. 19_8). Put simply, movements are related to the 
production and maintenance of meaning for protagonists, 
antagonists, and bystanders. Thus, the constructed 
meanings are subject to change, as the social context 
changes.
 In the case of the emergency ordinance (OUG13) 
to amend the Penal Code, the hundreds of thousands of 
people that protested against it in Piața Victoriei were 
driven by common values and ideas, rallying against the 
Grindeanu Government and against corruption. In fact, 
corruption was again brought to the forefront of politics, 
in a chilling echo of the Colectiv fire of November 2015. 
Another fire at Bamboo Bucharest club in January 2017 
resulted in 44 people being hospitalised2 (Digi24.ro, January 
21, 2017), so the themes of corruption and responsibility 
have returned to and were again intensely debated in 
the media.  
The protest against OUG13 was soon followed 
by a counter-manifestation, starting on the afternoon of 
the 5th of February 2017. People protesting in front of 
Cotroceni Palace were demonstrating against President 
Klaus Iohannis and against the National Anti-corruption 
Directorate (DNA); they were supporting the Grindeanu 
Government.  
Membership to a certain social group provides 
the individual a certain place in the structure of social 
relations. The real basis of his ideology ”is not the praxis 
in its totality, in a given historical moment, but a certain 
form of the praxis – a determined, and, at the same time, 
delimited-concrete historical form” (Borțun, 2014, p. 125). 
The term ideology is used here in its broadest 
meaning, that of “assembly of ideas and beliefs, values 
and symbols, concepts and codes, mental and cognitive 
styles, representations and rituals by means of which 
members of a community perceive the world and treat 
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the information, get to know each other and unite forces 
for action” (Borțun, 2014, p. 124). 
Karl Manheim (2013) believes that there is a 
distinction between ”particular ideologies” (specific to 
certain groups and referring to a certain domain of reality) 
and ”total ideologies” (specific to a culture and referring 
to a comprehensive world view – Weltanschauung). 
In the case of the 2017 Romanian protests, the focus 
is on the particular ideologies defining two different 
perspectives of the same reality: old and new Romania. 
Future research should also consider the relationship 
between particular and total ideologies in the case of 
#rezist 2017 protests. 
Table 1 shows how the two different ideologies 
are investigated, considering the two types of publics 
that were formed during the protests, separated by 
different ways of interpreting the social reality. On the 
Table 1 – Characteristics of the two Romanias – Old Romania and New Romania
one hand, the discursive formula of the messages from 
Piața Victoriei (Fig. 1) represented the ideology of a ”new 
Romania”, revealing an anti-Government position („Down 
with the thieves!”, „The DNA will get you!”, „Down with 
the Government”). Messages such as ”The day we give 
in is the day we die” were reinforced from the #colectiv 
protest in November 2015, being a symbol in the fight 
against corruption.
On the other hand, counter-protesters rallied 
in support of the Grindeanu government at Cotroceni 
Palace, demanding the resignation of President Klaus 
Iohannis. The messages from Cotroceni Palace (Fig. 2) 
suggested the ideology of ”old Romania”, appealing to 
ethnocentrism: ”Down with Iohannis”, ”Get out, traitor”, ”We 
voted, you divided us”, ”Iohannis and his fellows, traitors 
to the nation” or ”You dishonored us, you are suspended”. 
Furthermore, the messages also appeal to an ethnic identity, 
New Romania Old Romania
Meritocracy (people are promoted and rewarded 
based on their abilities and achievements)
Clientelism (Eminescu’s “pyramid of clientelism” )
Contractual morals (predictability) Transactional morals (“One hand washes the other”)
Communitarianism (helping others) Individualism (every individual 
is the ruler for himself)
Interest for common good Selfishness (individualism against others) 
Respect for norms and values (rules and laws) Anomie or respect for a “boss”
Future orientation (legitimation of projects) Past orientation (legitimation of traditions)
Dialogue Monologue
Professionalism Professional imposture
Activism Contemplative laziness 
Strategic and projective thinking Speculative thinking and short-term improvization 
Critical thinking (a strong cognitive function) Wishful thinking 
Achieving goals, purposes, objectives 
and respecting deadlines
Interested in social status and establishing 
connections between people
Realism (objective view of reality) Idealism (ideological view of reality)
Multiculturalism Ethnocentrism (source of xenofobia, 
chauvinism, and racism)
Secular state (separation of church from the state) Unrecognized complicity between church and state
Citizenship (state membership) Territorial, ethnic and religious identity 
Republican spirit (agent for a political project) Conservatism spirit (agent of tradition)
Historical optimism (”We can change the world!”) Fatalism (”We cannot change the world!”) 
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built on the idea of national belonging, culture/ethniciy, blood 
relationships and place of birth. The protesters contested 
the President’s German ethnicity, building a gap between 
“Us” (Romanians) and “Them” (people who do not have a 
Romanian ethnicity). As we will see further, this is also a 
source of xenophobia and chauvinism.
The discussion about national identity is easily 
linked to the concept of a ”nation”. In this regard, there are 
two different conceptions of nationhood: the civic and ethnic 
nation. The civic conception is based on a ’contractual’ 
understanding of the nation, defined as the outcome 
of the free option of its citizens. France is considered a 
model of this conception, the model of the nation-state. 
At the other pole, the ethnic nation is built on the idea of 
national belonging, culture/ethnicity, blood relationships 
and place of birth. Germany is considered the model of 
this conception based on ethnicity. 
As Boia (2001, p. 34) argues, in the case of the 
Romanian nation, ”the model which is invoked corresponds 
to the German formula. The Romanians are defined by a 
common origin (whether Roman, Dacian or Dacian-Roman), a 
unitary language, a shared history, and a specific spirituality”. 
Therefore, the ”national identity of Romanians, representing 
89_.5% of the total population, is an ethnic one” (Borțun, 
2011, p. 119_). Compared to ”old Romania”, national identity 
Figure 1 – Illustrative sample for the slogans from Piaţa Victoriei 
(Adevărul.ro, February 7, 2017, danagont.ro, February 7, 2017 ) 
is defined in relation to citizenship in the ideology of ”new 
Romania” (Fig. 1). We can see a civic engaged Romanian 
protester in both #rezist and #colectiv manifestations, 
highly involved in political decisions. 
A fundamental problem of Romanian society is 
modernization, usually discussed in relation to the national 
identity issue. In fact, the theory of forms without substance 
(forme fără fond)2 as developed by Maiorescu (1868) 
and Eminescu (1870) explains the process of Romanian 
modernization. In this context, the modernity was based on 
imitation and import of institutions and laws from developed 
Western societies. Even though the political class and the 
intellectual elites adopted a modernity-oriented discourse, 
a consistent project of development and modernization 
was still missing. The cause is to be found in the fact that 
elites distance themselves from the values of modernity 
in order to achieve their own purposes (Schifirneț, 2012, p. 
43). Schifirneț (2009_; 2012) proposes the term of tendential 
modernity, refering to a modernity that is merely a tendency, 
while the transitions are never finished. 
Borțun (2011) too insists on the modernization 
issue, stating that Romanians live in ”a disguised feudalism, 
painted with some stigmas of modernity” (2011, p. 115). In 
fact, feudalism is still governing the perception, action, 
thinking and decision making of Romanian people. This 
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is due to the fact that ”Romanian communism has been a 
pre-modern attempt to modernize the country” (ibidem).
Old Romania is characterized by a contemplative 
laziness - ”oblomovism”3. According to Pleșu (2014, p. 277), 
Ilia Ilici Oblomov represents, in the same time, the charm 
and disaster of Eastern European mentality, ”a mentality 
that falls under relativism because of the exaggeration 
of the Absolut itself”. In the novel written by Goncearov, 
Oblomov is permanently asking questions about life and 
existence. Even though he is a misanthrope, he has a 
clean soul. An ordinary day of his life starts in his room in 
Sankt Petersburg and continues in the same room. On the 
other hand, Andrei Stolz, his best friend, is working hard 
and travelling to Paris, London and Odessa to broaden 
his horizons. While Oblomov is an idealist, contemplating 
his existence, Stolz is a pragmatist, interested in a better 
living. In this regard, the main character Oblomov is the 
symbol of the Eastern European mentality, while Stolz is 
the symbol of the Western European meantality. 
”Oblomovism” is usually associated with laziness, 
fatalism, and disgust. For this reason, Lenin referred to 
oblomovism as the central problem keeping Russia from 
advancing. This might also apply to Romania, if we take into 
account the fatalist attitude that appeared in the Romanian 
consciousness after the Communist Revolution. If Marx 
would have read Goncearov’s novel, he would realise 
that his doctrine is not suitable for the Eastern European 
man, who had to assume it (Pleșu, 2014, p. 278). On the 
other side, new Romania is characterised by a historical 
optimism (”we can change the world!”).
Conclusion
This report has investigated two types of publics 
that were formed during 2017 Romanian protests, separated 
by different ways of interpreting the social reality. Slogans 
from Victoria Square suggest the ideology of ”new Romania”, 
while slogans from Cotroceni Palace reveal the ideology 
of ”old Romania”.
The 2017 Romanian protests show a 
professionalization of the protesters, who are actively 
involved in the fight against corruption as a public issue. 
In May 2017, about a thousand persons took to the streets 
of Bucharest to oppose the ammendments to draft bill on 
prison pardons to include the crimes of influence peddling 
and bribe taking. Even though the protests were far smaller 
than those in February, one can notice that the cleavage 
between the ideology of ”new Romania” and that of ”old 
Romania” increases, leading to intense debates over 
political corruption and responsibility.
Since the focus of this article was to study particular 
ideologies in the context of emergency protests, future 
research should also consider the ways in which social 
movements are connected to comprehensive world views 
– Weltanschauung.
Figure 2 – Illustrative sample for the slogans from Cotroceni Palace (Vice.com, February 6, 2017)5 
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Endnotes / Media links
1. http://www.digi24.ro/stiri/actualitate/justi-
tie/legea-gratierii/protest-la-palatul-cotroce-
ni-protestatari-adusi-cu-microbuzul-665457 
2. http://www.digi24.ro/stiri/actualitate/eve-
nimente/incendiu-puternic-la-clubul-bam-
boo-din-capitala-653813
3. The forms without substance are systems 
of law and modern institutions mechani-
cally imported by the Romanian elites from 
Western societies in order to accelerate the 
process of social modernization, without 
adapting them to the historical, social, and 
cultural particularities of the internal context 
(Schifirneț, 2012: 48). For Titu Maiorescu, the 
forms without substance defined the simple 
naturalizing of Western institutions through 
the enthuziasm of an elite. A profound trans-
formation of Romanian society and mental-
ities requires much more than this.
4. The word ”oblomovism” is mentioned in the 
Russian novel ”Oblomov” (1859_), written by 
Goncearov, in relation to the main character 
Ilia Ilici Oblomov. It is defined as ”complete 
inertia rooted in indifference”.
5. https://www.vice.com/ro/article/pancartele-
penibile-ale-protestatarilor-de-la-cotroce-
ni-sunt-cel-mai-frumos-lucru-pe-care-o-sa-
l-vezi-azi-pe-internet 
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Romania joined the European Union in January 2007 
under the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism 
(CVM) of the European Union, a transitional measure 
fixed by the Commission to assist the country in order 
to get the necessary results in the reforms started in 
the fields of judiciary and the fight against corruption. 
The CVM remained in place for over 10 years and, 
although its effectiveness in ensuring good reforms 
can be disputed, its longevity is a very good indicator 
of both (1) the seriousness of the problems regarding 
corruption in Romania and (2) the complexity of the fight 
against corruption in the political, administrative and 
social Romanian environment. This article is covering 
the first of these two aspects, briefly presenting the 
problem and its measurements over time. The article 
also includes the main reforms needed to achieve 
sustainable public integrity in Romania.
Perceived presence and measurements of corruption 
in Romania
After a long and harsh communist regime when 
informal payments were needed in order to overcome the 
shortcomings (including the ones in the health system, 
the education, and daily supplies) and a difficult transition 
to democracy and the rule of law, the Romanian society 
suffers still from both systemic and high-level corruption. 
Romania’s place in the Corruption Perception Index1 
ranking evolved from 87 (out of 146 countries) in 2004 
to 69_ (out of 179_ countries) in 2007 and to 57 out (of 
176 countries) in 20162. Therefore, there is a long way 
to evolve and improve the integrity system in order to 
diminish perception of corruption, but the evolution was 
constant and decisive over the last decade.
As a result of its poor performance in curbing 
corruption and ensuring judiciary independence and 
integrity prior to 2006, when Romania was negotiating 
its accession to the EU, some of the chapters and 
files under discussions remained only a promise. This 
generated a unique mechanism, without precedent in 
the EU: Romania, along with Bulgaria, became a member 
state of the European Union under a safeguard clause. 
The European Commission through the Cooperation and 
Verification Mechanism (CVM) continues to monitor the 
performance of the country concerning the Judiciary 
chapter, and its main corruption related institutions and 
mechanism. The benchmarks established by the CVM 
indicate the main vulnerabilities of the judicial system 
and anti-corruption reforms at the time: 
1. the lack of transparency and efficiency 
of the judicial process notably the 
limited capacity and accountability of 
the Superior Council of Magistrature, 
2. the need for an integrity agency with 
responsibilities for verifying assets, 
incompatibilities and potential conflicts 
of interest as unjustified assets 
(sometimes resulted from corruption), 
incompatibilities and conflicts of interest 
were hardly monitored and controlled, 
3. high-corruption and low capacity of 
law enforcement agency to conduct 
professional, non-partisan investigations 
into allegations of high-level corruption, 
4. corruption present in public 
administration, in particular in local 
administration, with very few effective 
prevention mechanisms to curb it3.
According to the latest data of the Global Corruption 
Barometer4 and other surveys5, corruption in Romania 
also affects sectors that are not monitored by the CVM: 
the health system, the education system (schools and 
universities), the police, the customs, business, the 
administrative activity of issuing an administrative license, 
permit or certificate, public procurements, administrative 
inspections and last but not least the employment of 
civil servants and other human resources procedures 
in public institutions6.
In 2015 alone, 29_% of Romanians admitted they 
paid a bribe in the last 12 months (Global Corruption 
Barometer7 2016). This data makes Romania the European 
country (EU member state) with the most wide-spread 
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petty corruption, a sign of systemic corruption. 54% of 
Romanians consider that most or all members of the 
Parliament are corrupt, indicating a high level of the 
high-corruption perceived by the citizens.
A short review of the National Anti-corruption 
Directorate (DNA – the special Prosecution Office for 
high-corruption) shows that 1,271 persons have been 
prosecuted for corruption offences and crimes related 
to corruption, a third of which (426) have been high 
officials. Among these are 30 national dignitaries, 
ministers and MPs with 47 mayors and 5 presidents 
of County Councils, and the number of persons being 
sued for corruption offenses increased constantly in 
the last years (DNA, 2016)8.
In the same time (2016), the National Integrity 
Agency (ANI), the administrative institution in charge with 
verifying assets, incompatibilities and potential conflicts 
of interest reported 86 incompatibility cases, 46 conflict 
of interest cases, and 11 cases of unjustified assets (ANI, 
2016)9_. Although the activity of these institutions can be 
criticized for several reasons (as showed further in this 
article), their records are an important measurement on 
the prevalence of corruption in Romania.
Moving forward
Romania has registered constant progress in its 
fight against corruption, visible in all assessment on this 
issue. Progress has been made in ensuring transparency 
of public institution and public officials’ interests and 
officials and in prosecuting and sanctioning corruption 
when discovered.
However, corruption remains an important 
factor. The lack of efficiency in public policies and 
investments creates an environment more prone to 
political corruption. This in turn, affects Romanians’ every-
day life and their interactions with doctors, teachers, civil 
servants or policemen enabling corruption to maintain 
its systemic presence.
As showed by the Global Corruption Barometer, 
important progress can be made not only in fighting 
corruption at the level of public administration and 
political parties and persons, but also at individual 
level. Preventing corruption by raising awareness on its 
consequences on the long term, through communication 
campaigns and civic education projects, or introducing 
basic human rights, legal and anticorruption concepts 
in school and high-school curricula can help changing 
the entire social environment, making corruption an 
exception, not a rule in people’s everyday life.
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Endnotes / Media links
1. The Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perception Index (CPI) is probably the most 
worldwide used measurement of corruption. 
It that scores and ranks countries based 
on how corrupt a country’s public sector 
is perceived to be. It is a composite index 
drawing on data sources from independent 
institutions specializing in governance and 
business climate analysis, surveys and 
assessments of corruption.
2. Complete data available on Transparency 
International’s website: https://www.
transparency.org/research/cpi/overview 
(last visited: June 9_, 2017).
3. All CVM reports and documents are available 
on the European Commission website: 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/effective-justice/
rule-law/assistance-bulgaria-and-romania-
under-cvm/reports-progress-bulgaria-and-
romania_en (last visited: June 9_, 2017).
4.  Latest data referring to corruption prevalence 
in Romania in different sectors of activity in 
the Global Corruption Barometer are from 
2013. All reports and data from Romania in 
the Global Corruption Barometer available 
on Transparency International Romania 
website: http://www.transparency.org.ro/
politici_si_studii/indici/bgc/2016/index.html 
(last visited: June 9_, 2017).
5. e.g.: Eurobarometer on corruption, February 
2014, available online: http://ec.europa.eu/
commfrontoffice/publicopinion/archives/
ebs/ebs_39_7_en.pdf, Corruption Barometer 
by INSCOP, commissioned by “Adevărul” (a 
national Romanian newspaper), available 
online: http://www.inscop.ro/wp-content/
uploads/2013/06/INSCOP-Coruptie.pdf (last 
visited: June 9_, 2017).
6. http://sar.org.ro/english-how-the-media-talks-
about-corruption-in-romania-rass-report-
for-the-media-corruption-work-package-
published/ 
7. The full report of the Global Corruption 
Barometer available on Transparency 
International’s website: https://www.
transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/
people_and_corruption_europe_and_
central_asia_2016 (last visited: June 9_, 2017).
8. DNA Annual Report for 2016 is avalable 
online on DNA’s website: http://www.pna.
ro/bilant_activitate.xhtml?id=38 (last visited: 
June 9_, 2017).
9_. ANI Annual Report for 2016 is avalable online 
on ANI’s website: https://www.integritate.
eu/Files/Files/Rapoarte/086%20Raport_
Activitate_ANI_Ian-Mar_2016.pdf (last visited: 
June 9_, 2017).
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The fight against corruption has been one of the 
main priorities of the Romanian Government since 
the beginning of the negotiations for accession to the 
European Union. In order to implement all the needed 
reforms, strategic documents have been adopted, starting 
in 2005. No strategy has been fully implemented within 
its proposed time framework, as both governmental 
and independent assessments indicate (MJ, 2016; MJ 
and OECD, 2016). However, their partial implementation 
generated the anti-corruption policies presented in 
this article.
Legal provisions on transparency
First steps in corruption prevention have been 
made early: 
• in 19_9_6 the law requesting civil servants and 
public officials to publicly declare their assets 
and interests was adopted (Law no. 115/19_9_6). 
• the Freedom of Information law was 
adopted in 2001 (Law no. 544/2001) 
• the “Sunshine Law”, regulating transparency 
and consultation for any normative decision, 
was adopted in 2003 (Law no. 52/2003).
Cumulatively, these laws regulate the access to 
information on activities and all documents produced by 
public institutions and publicly owned companies (with 
generally clear exception on personal data, confidential 
information and sensitive information concerning public 
safety); they also regulate the access to information 
and public participation to decision making and ensure 
transparency of assets and interests of public officials 
and civil servants.
Corruption criminal incrimination
Several other laws have been adopted in 
order to strengthen the fight against corruption. These 
include the special law on corruption offences, which 
complements and circumscribes the provisions of Penal 
Code (Law no. 78/2000) and several laws amending both 
the provisions on corruption offences and regulations 
regarding assets and declarations of interest/conflict of 
interest. Amendments have been adopted in order to 
clarify the provisions and to allow applying the laws to 
all categories of public officials (not only civil servants). 
Several of these amendments have been made as a result 
of the Group of States against Corruption’s (GRECO)1 
recommendations. 
GRECO’s recommendations2 on party funding for 
instance, have been implemented only recently, in 2015 
and 20163 and only 2 elections have been organised 
according to the new regulations. In the meantime, 
several politicians have been prosecuted4 or convicted5 
for using public funds for party funding or for granting 
important public contracts to businesses that sponsored 
the political parties in return.
A new Penal Code and a new Penal Procedure 
Codes have entered into force only in 2014, regulating 
bribes/bribing and peddling of influence as corruption 
offences. As a consequence of the ‘fast-forward’ 
procedure used for drafting6 and adopting7 the codes, 
several provisions of both codes have been declared 
unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court. Therefore, 
amendments are necessary and articles with impact on 
the fight against corruption have to be modified. 
The article regulating the abuse of power while 
in office (art. 29_7 of the Criminal Code), prosecuted in 
relation to corruption offences, has been criticized by the 
Constitutional Court. For this article, the Constitutional 
Court imposed a particular interpretation of the text8. As a 
result, the texts remain binding after the decision issued 
in 2016, but under the Constitutional Court recommended 
interpretation. Therefore, in order to ensure a clear and 
predictable criminal law, the Romanian legislator has to 
amend the text9_. 
Another problematic article of the Penal Code 
is the one regulating and sanctioning the conflict of 
interest as criminal offence (a service offence, but in close 
relation with corruption offences). The definition of the 
conflict of interest prohibits public servants or officials 
to participate to decisions or activities generating a 
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patrimonial benefit for themselves, their family, but also 
for persons from whom they received benefits of any 
kind. This general wording allows for the prosecution 
and conviction of a very large number of acts without 
a clear danger for the social life that will justify the 
criminal sanction.
Therefore, as there is a need to bring 
amendments to the legal provisions on criminal offences 
related to corruption, it is also extremely important not 
to repeat the same mistakes that generated this need. 
The legislature shouldn’t rush into modifying the text 
without due public and parliamentary debate and it 
should listen and consider different opinions on the 
best ways to regulate these offences.
The institutional framework
In 2000 the Prosecution office for corruption 
and organized crime was established (Law 78/2000). The 
institution was subsequently reorganized and in 2003 
the National Anti-corruption Prosecution Office (PNA) has 
been founded, later reorganized as the National Anti-
corruption Directorate (DNA). Continuation of the high-
corruption prosecution is one of the benchmarks of the 
Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM)10 and 
therefore the work of DNA has been closely monitored 
by the European Union. The increasing number of files 
referred to the court made Romania a European champion 
on sanctioning political corruption.
Strengthening the institutional framework, 
an administrative agency for assets and interests 
(incompatibilities and conflict of interests) control has 
been founded by the Law no. 144/2007. The National 
Integrity Agency (ANI) verifies and controls the declaration 
of assets and interest/conflicts of interest of all public 
employees and officials. However, regulations establishing 
anti-corruption agencies have been contested in front 
of the Constitutional Court11 and their structure and 
procedures have been changed, mainly in order to raise 
their accountability.
Moreover, special anti-corruption and integrity 
departments have been established by particularly 
vulnerable institutions:
• the General Anti-corruption Directorate 
(founded in 2005) is the specialized 
department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs 
in charge with preventing and fighting against 
corruption in all institutions subordinated 
to the Ministry, including the Police;
• the General Directorate of Integrity (founded 
in 2013) is the specialized department of the 
National Agency of Fiscal Administration in 
charge with preventing and fighting against 
corruption in tax and customs administration.
Although international institutions and the 
Romanian public acclaim the performance of both DNA 
and ANI, important problems have to be raised related 
to selective investigation of corruption offences by 
DNA and administrative verifications by ANI. As these 
institutions lack capacity (including human resources) to 
follow up on the information they have on all wrongdoings 
and evidence gathered years ago are used in present 
prosecutions or investigations, one is entitled to suspect 
that the activity of DNA and ANI can be used for political 
purposes in order to undermine political opponents.
On the other hand, DNA has been collaborating 
with intelligence services in order to gather evidence, 
as the Penal Procedure Code states that electronic 
surveillance, mainly reserved at first in case of offences 
against national security, can be used when investigating 
corruption offenses and offenses assimilated to corruption 
(art. 139_). While these provisions support anti-corruption 
efforts, the cooperation with intelligence services 
exposes the DNA and its cases to potential abuses of 
power by prosecutors.
Other anti-corruption policies
As part of its anti-corruption efforts, several 
policy measures and actions started:
• Romania is a member of the Open 
Government Partnership,
• an ethics counselor is present 
in all public institutions,
• assets and interest declaration are publically 
available and searchable on ANI’s website,
• an electronic Interest Transparency 
Register has been developed in 201612,
• guides for transparency, preventing 
incompatibilities and conflict of 
interests have been developed,
• open data generated by public institution 
are published on a centralized website13,
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• a website centralizing the jobs in public 
administration has been supported by 
the government14 (after its development 
as a civil society initiative); and
• Romania has been one of the first 
and few European states with a 
special law on the protection of 
whistleblowers (Law no. 571/2004)
The effectiveness of all these policies hasn’t 
been systematically analysed, yet public institutions, 
NGOs and Think Tanks released reports on some of 
these initiatives (Romanian Government, 2015; MJ, 
2016; MJ and OECD, 2016, IPP, 2017). The general 
evaluation of the performance of these policies allows 
the conclusion that, although transparency is guaranteed, 
shortcomings still exist: not all information is published, 
not all the institutions are transparent and no sanction 
can be effectively used in order to determine a better 
compliance with the legal provisions.
Continuing the fight against corruption: steps to 
move forward
Corruption remains one of the important themes 
of the Romanian public and political agenda, as Romania 
joined the European Union in January 2007 under the 
Cooperation and Verification Mechanism, a measure 
implemented to assist and monitor anti-corruption 
reforms.
Therefore, one can easily understand why 
amendments to the Penal Code and the Penal Procedure 
Code concerning offences and procedures related to 
corruption investigations, made after short debates, 
and adopted unexpectedly, generated the impressive 
protests in Piața Victoriei in February 2017. The public 
sensitivity to anti-corruption policies has developed 
in Romania as a consequence of the priority given to 
the topic in over 10 years of public policy and public 
political discourse.
On the other hand, steps forward can only be 
made by developing corruption prevention policies: 
1. implementing corruption risks assessments in 
all public institutions, integrity plans including 
control measures for corruption risks 
adapted to each institution particularities 
and regular re-assessments of these risks; 
2. strengthening institutional capacity by 
developing clear and functional procedures, 
easy to follow and control, clarifying 
individual roles and responsibilities in 
all public authorities and institutions; 
3. strengthening the human capacity by training 
civil servants against corruption to prevent 
irregularities and to help them resist to 
political or managerial pressure for frauds; 
4. increasing the use of digital instruments 
for the administrative and the databases 
integration and transparency as open data, 
easily ‘searchable’ and ‘checkable’, and
5. implementing not only transparency, 
but also monitoring tools to prevent 
irregularities in public procurement, as 
open contracting and Integrity Pacts (a 
tool allowing a civil society appointed 
monitor to follow public procurement and 
contracting procedures in order to allow 
early warnings of integrity breaches).
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Endnotes / Media links
1. All GRECO Evaluation Reports and 
Complience Reports are avalable online 
on GRECO’s website: http://www.coe.int/en/
web/greco/evaluations/romania (accessed 
on June, 9_ 2017).
2. Recommendations on party funding were 
referring to: clarifying the accounting 
system for parties branches and associated 
organisations, clarifying financial reporting 
procedures and enforcing the Permanent 
Electoral Authority’s monitoring, supervision 
and control role, clarifying the loans 
management, limiting donations that are 
not registered in bank accounts (in kind or 
in cash) etc.
3. Through the Law no. 113/2015 and Law no. 
78/2016 amending Law no. 334/2006 on 
political parties and electoral campaigns 
funding and the Government Decision no. 
10/2016 – the Methodological Norms of the 
Law no. 334/2006.
4. Among prosecuted politicians: Vasile Blaga, 
former president of Democratic Liberal and 
National Liberal Parties and former Minister of 
Administration and Interior and Elena Udrea, 
former Minister of Regional Development 
and Truism, both very close to the former 
President Traian Băsescu.
5. Among convicted politicians: Monica Iacob 
Ridzi, former Minister of Youth and Sports.
6. Drafting the Criminal Code and the Criminal 
Procedure Code did not comply with 
the provisions of the law on decisional 
transparency no. 52/2003, open debates 
being avoided by the government in order 
to speed up the law making process. A 
civil society initiative: Stope the Codes was 
initiated in 2009_ against these procedures, 
but, despite civil society opposition, the 
codes drafted in this manner have been 
adopted.
7. The Criminal Code was adopted through 
a special Parliamentary procedure of 
Government Assumed Responsibility (art. 114), 
a procedure that don’t allow any debate on 
the legislation proposed by the government. 
The proposed legislation can be either 
adopted or rejected, and if rejected the 
Government is also dismissed. 
8. The Decision no. 405/2016 of the 
Constitutional Court. The decision is highly 
unusual, as the Constitutional Court have 
no powers of legislation interpretation, a 
competence of the High Court of Cassation 
and Justice.
9_. The actual provisions on the abuse of power 
in office as a criminal offence is not clearly 
distinctive from any misbehaviour (sanctioned 
administratively) of the civil servants.
10. The Commission set up the Cooperation 
and Verification Mechanism (CVM) as a 
transitional measure to assist Romania to 
remedy the shortcomings in the fields of 
judicial reform and corruption fighting.
11. e.g.: The Decision no. 415/2010 of the 
Constitutional Court.
12. www.ruti.gov.ro 
13. zwww.data.gov.ro 
14. www.posturi.gov.ro 
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On the 30th of October 2015, several hundreds of 
young people were attending the concert of a rock 
band in a popular Bucharest club. The last minute 
of the rock performance transformed not only their 
lives, but also the entire Romanian society. A dramatic 
fire, in which 64 young people died and others were 
severely injured, highlighted Romania’s most unsolved 
problems in 27 years of transition: corruption and bad 
public administration. On the 3rd of November 2015, 
30,000 people were protesting in Bucharest asking the 
PSD Government to resign1. Soon after, a new Prime 
Minister was appointed by Romania’s President and 
a new, independent government was in place to rule 
the country until the next year’s elections. They were 
called “the technocrat Government” as they included 
only independent specialists, with no connection to 
any political party.
The technocrat government did not have any 
political support or ability to manage most of Romania’s 
systemic problems that were left unsolved by previous 
generations of politicians. Therefore, the huge public 
expectation remained unmet, even though members of 
this Government proved to be transparent and sensitive 
to the topics that were debated in society.  
In December 2016, following democratic 
elections, PSD came back to power, after it had been 
forced to resign a year before due to street protests. It 
has done so with an overwhelming and undisputed 45% 
of the Romanians’ votes in what experts and analysts 
called “probably the fairest election process ever”2.
The historical election result was attributed by 
some commenters to a very clear governing program 
that PSD committed and referred to as the answer to 
Romania’s most pressing problems. But even before 
the new government was appointed, some analysts 
reflected on the possibility that PSD, validated by a 
strong majority, could abuse the electoral power that 
their winning vote afforded them in December 20163.
Confronted with a strong governing party, 
the opposition (Liberal Party – PNL and Union for 
the Salvation of Romania – USR) could not offer a 
coherent voice and continued to focus on their own 
internal problems. Soon after the new Government was 
assigned, it was clear that only the civil society could 
represent a real and credible opposition force, strong 
enough to monitor and question the decisions of the 
new Government.
That moment came late in January 2017, when 
the Government promoted an Emergency Ordinance 
(OUG13) to soften the anti-corruption legislation, despite 
strong voices against this idea had been heard during 
the first week of governing. 
Media had reported about this intention two 
weeks before, when a very influential online newspaper 
and its chief editorialist – Dan Tapalaga from hotnews.ro 
– started to cover the topic4. They claimed that, according 
to their sources, the Government - through the Ministry 
of Justice, prepared a bill to change the definition of 
corruption crimes. This was supposed to give future 
suspects in big corruption scandals the possibility to be 
released earlier, while creating conditions for pardoning 
and early release of felons already imprisoned for 
corruption crimes. 
The officials claimed that they were only 
following the decisions of Romania’s Constitutional 
Court, which previously judged objections raised by 
suspects and their lawyers regarding some unprecise 
definitions of the existing criminal law. Following these 
decisions, the officials claimed they wanted to clarify 
the existing legislation and therefore drafted a bill that 
was supposed to redefine the corruption charges. On 
the other hand, referring to several complaints that 
the imprisoned criminals filed against Romania at the 
European Court of Human Rights for very bad detention 
conditions, PSD politicians claimed that prisons are too 
crowded. They considered that, in order to improve the 
detention conditions, the least dangerous convicts – 
including thus some corruption convicts – should be 
released earlier. The signal that politicians sent to the 
whole society was that corruption was not a serious crime 
The “Revolution of Light” 
Came from Darkness
Eliza Rogalski
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and that created frustration across the society: people 
started to protest again their argument being that the 
anti-corruption fight should continue unchanged; the 
people protesting strongly believed corruption to be a 
serious crime endangering human life. 
On the 31st of January, very late at night, the 
Government announced the passing of Ordinance 13 
(OUG13), with the former Minister of Justice organizing 
a strange press conference to answer journalists’ 
questions immediately after. The press conference was 
broadcasted live by all news TV stations in Romania, 
showing a Minister unprepared to convincingly answer 
the most important question the bill raised: why was this 
ordinance needed. 
He seemed rushed and annoyed, disrespectful 
and disdainful of the journalists in the room and the 
people on whose behalf they were asking their questions. 
His ending every answer with his challenging “another 
question” (“alta intrebare”) –  repeated more than 20 
times in what felt like less than a couple of minutes - 
was all too telling of his unprofessionalism. The only 
motivation one could assume from this interaction 
seemed to stem from a contempt and entitlement that 
PSD felt it had as a result of their winning legitimately 
the elections: the party had a popular mandate and so 
any decision they made was therefore legitimate. 
The conference revealed that the Justice 
Minister did not intend to convincingly explain the 
reasons of the Ordinance or the details about the 
passing process, raising suspicions and transmitting lack 
of transparence5. His performance was cringe-worthy 
and it was even more so for me, as a communication 
professional. 
It came to me thus as no surprise that thirty 
minutes after the press conference, people started to 
mobilize on Facebook for a spontaneous protest in front 
of Government. Iordache’s attitude was symbolic and 
so telling for the image the protesters were painting of 
the corrupt PSD. 
By midnight, several thousands of people 
gathered in Piața Victoriei, announcing a longer and 
larger protests for the days to follow6. A week later, 
night protests caught the whole country, with people 
mobilizing better and better on social media.
Considering that people had voiced their 
concerns and protested at the news of the Ordinance’s 
proposal, the Government’s response to proceed with 
passing the Ordinance at night, ignoring public concerns 
and avoiding any consultation, is unacceptable under 
any circumstances7. 
This fueled even further the people’s frustration 
and deepened their conviction that PSD’s mandate was 
not to the Romanian people but rather to serving their 
own interests – including widening their immunities and 
making acts corruption an integral part of their mandate. 
The protests to me were a clear sign of a 
matured civil society, taking a very clear, loud and 
uncompromising stance towards corruption. 
This is how “The Revolution of Light”8 started.
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Endnotes / Media links
1. http://stirileprotv.ro/stiri/actualitate/noi-pro-
teste-sunt-anuntate-si-pentru-miercuri-seara-
ce-vor-manifestantii-sa-se-intample-dupa-
caderea-guvernului.html
2. http://www.ziare.com/alegeri/rezul-
tate-alegeri-parlamentare-2016/psd-cas-
tiga-detasat-alegerile-rezultate-ex-
it-poll-live-1446329_
3. http://revista22online.ro/70261446/vasile-dn-
cu-liviu-dragnea-cstigtorul-btliei-elector-
ale-sfideaz-opinia-public.html
4. http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-esen-
tial-21538217-alerta-surse-guvernul-adop-
ta-miercuri-ordonanta-urgenta-modificari-im-
portante-legislatia-penala-vor-gratiate-se-
rie-pedepse-dezincriminate-fapte-amnis-
tie-mascata.htm
5. http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-poli-
tic-215709_23-florin-iordache-agresiv-bal-
bait-tupeist-expeditiv-speriat.htm
6. http://stirileprotv.ro/stiri/actualitate/pro-
test-spontan-aseara-in-fata-guvernului-jan-
darmii-au-folosit-gaze-lacrimogene-protes-
tatar-ori-pleaca-ei-ori-plec-eu.html
7. http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-esential-
21564818-romanii-ies-din-nou-strada-im-
potriva-amnistiei-gratierii-proteste-anuntate-
duminica-seara-bucuresti-alte-22-orase-din-
tara-8-din-diaspora.htm
8. https://republica.ro/revolutia-luminii
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Hundreds of thousands of people out in the streets, 
defending their own country from its rulers. Romania 
transformed overnight into a field of protests, the likes of 
which had never before happened in the contemporary 
history of this people, not even during the Revolution of 
19_89_, when dictator couple Nicolae and Elena Ceaușescu 
were taken down. Dozens of cities, some in which you 
could previously only watch the protests on the news, 
were now shaken to the core, for days on end, by the 
voices of those who took to the streets in the name of 
democracy. 
That was the picture of Romania starting from 
the night of the 31st of January to the 1st of February 
2017, when the Government, officially led by social-
democrat Sorin Grindeanu, enraged millions of people 
by adopting OUG13. The legislative measure that was to 
come into effect ten days after being published in the 
Official Gazette, on the 11th of February, that is, brought 
a series of changes to the Criminal Code that meant 
“relaxing” the rule of law. The official reason invoked 
by the then-Minister of Justice, social-democrat Florin 
Iordache (widely considered as the father of OUG13), 
for adopting it was that prisons were overcrowded and 
that put Romania at risk of being fined by the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECHR).
This was not true, as OUG13 had but one 
purpose: to get a series of politicians, friends of politicians 
and public workers out of trouble. Among the crimes 
erased partially or totally by OUG13 were: favoring the 
perpetrator, abuse of office, negligence and conflict of 
interests. The big winner of OUG13 and the one the public 
eye knew immediately the law was dedicated to was 
Liviu Dragnea, the leader of the Social-Democratic Party 
(PSD) and the president of the Chamber of Deputies, 
the man who leads the Government from the shadows. 
With a suspended sentence of two years of jail time 
for corruption and fraud during the 2012 referendum 
for impeaching the then-President, Traian Băsescu, 
Dragnea was being prosecuted for a different case of 
abuse of office.
The partial decriminalization of this offence, 
by establishing the minimum damages at 200,000 lei, 
basically enabled the leader of the PSD to walk away 
from the new charges, which this time would have meant 
actual jail time. The way the Government decided, in a 
first for Romania, to “relax” the laws in favor of criminals, 
with the obvious goal of saving Liviu Dragnea, without 
caring about the opposition of the magistrates, of 
president Klaus Iohannis, scandalized the people and 
drew them out of their homes.
The enormous public outcry, the ample protests, 
peaceful but loaded, during which the people cried 
“At night, like thieves!” (a reference to the moment the 
Government issued the Ordinance – on the night of 
the 31st of January, published around 1 AM on the 1st of 
February), “Resignation!” and “DNA / Come and get 
them!” (DNA – the National Anticorruption Directorate), 
was taken over by some legal experts who understood 
the danger posed by the legislative measure. Among 
those who demonstrated that the emotions of millions of 
Romanians were in fact a legal problem were Augustin 
Lazăr, Romania’s Attorney General, and judge Cristi 
Dănileț, a former member of the Superior Council of 
Magistrates (CSM). Due to their quick reactions and 
clear explanations to the public, the two became the 
benchmarks for citizens’ arguments during the protests 
that began mid-January, when the press notified the 
public about the Executive’s intention to write such 
a law, and continued and grew throughout February.
In the interviews they gave for my blog, 
www.ramonaursu.ro, the two legal specialists explained 
in detail the danger posed by OUG13, as well as its traps, 
and the manipulation undertaken by PSD-ALDE, the 
parties that came to power after the December 2016 
elections to form both a the majority in Parliament and 
the Government.
Attorney general: „The fight against corruption 
must go on”
Augustin Lazăr, who as Attorney General of 
Romania notified on the 3rd of February, the Bucharest 
Courts of Appeal – Department of Administrative 
and Fiscal Matters regarding OUG13, demanding its 
suspension until the case was closed, specified, in the 
interview he gave me on the 10th of April 2017: 
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“Of course I’ve immediately understood the 
public outcry to an emergency ordinance adopted 
in contentious circumstances in respect to 
transparency and urgency, and with a significant 
impact on Justice. I knew, however, that the 
magistrates’ mission was precisely to identify, 
take over and transform the public outcry into 
cold hard matters to be dealt with promptly, and 
to restore social balance. Therefore, we analyzed 
the situation within the CSM (the Attorney 
General is also a member of CSM), which notified 
the Constitutional Court of Romania (CCR), and 
then the Government intervened by revoking 
the emergency ordinance, thus restoring the 
constitutional framework.” 
In the same interview, prosecutor Lazăr also 
explained why the Romanian Criminal Code didn’t need 
changing in the way OUG13 tried enforcing: 
“The Criminal Code is modern, with moderate 
sanctions. Of course it needs to be in conformity 
with the decisions of the Constitutional Court, 
but strictly within the limits drawn by the Court. 
Criticism by people who have clashed with the 
law must be regarded with skepticism. Under no 
circumstances must we decriminalize acts like 
conflict of interests, negligence etc., as people 
tried in their own interest.”
One thing Augustin Lazăr did during the days 
when the country was ravaged by OUG13 was to send 
a letter to the Ombudsman, asking the leader of this 
institution, Victor Ciorbea, to himself notify the CCR. 
This initiative of the Attorney General was lauded by 
civil society, scandalized by the fact that Victor Ciorbea 
had initially firmly refused to address the Constitutional 
Court1. It is for this reason, as well as taking into account 
a controversial past, that the citizens accused Victor 
Ciorbea of playing along with the powers that be. 
Following the reactions of Augustin Lazăr, as well as 
president Klaus Iohannis, forced, at the same time, by the 
public eye, the Ombudsman notified CCR about OUG13.
Shortly after OUG13 was abrogated, Attorney 
General Augustin Lazăr was subject to an evaluation 
from the new Minister of Justice, Tudorel Toader (who 
replaced Florin Iordache after he resigned due to the 
backlash against OUG13). As well as Lazăr, the leader 
of DNA, Laura Codruța Kövesi, came under scrutiny. 
They were both targeted by the Minister of Justice for 
a file opened by the anti-corruption prosecutors after 
they were notified of illegal acts that took place within 
the Government in regards to OUG13. Although the 
PSD-ALDE camp hoped for the strict evaluation by the 
Minister of Justice to lead to the dismissal of the two 
attorneys, regarded by the political class as a threat, 
such a proposal never came. Again after OUG13 was a 
danger no more, Augustin Lazăr was targeted by some 
of his CSM colleagues, who suggested, on the 28th of 
February, for the Judiciary Inspection to verify the way 
the Attorney General gave information to the public 
about the same legislative act. This request was denied.
Even after these attempts at intimidation, 
Attorney General Augustin Lazăr carried on discussing 
the importance of fighting against corruption. In the 
same interview he offered me, he added: 
“The fight against corruption must go on, and 
corruption must not be treated with clemency”, 
and that “faith in Justice, in the rule of law, 
is essential. The Romanian Magistrature has 
reached maturity as a European Magistrature 
with integrity, dedication and professionalism. 
It will be able to solve the legal problems of the 
Romanian society, restoring balance to emotions 
and to the rule of law.”
Judge Cristi Dănileț: „OUG13 was badly conceived”
On the 4th of April 2017, judge Cristi Dănileț, a 
former member of CSM and one of the most renowned 
and admired Romanian magistrates, gave me an interview 
where we discussed the dangers of OUG13. The judge, 
who has reacted publicly numerous times, especially 
on his personal Facebook page and on his blog 
www.cristidanilet.wordpress.com, where he explained 
the legal problems with this legislative act, added: 
“My legal expert’s eye said thusly: firstly, the 
reasoning in the preamble of OUG13 had no 
correspondent in its text. It said there that this 
modification to the Criminal Code is necessary 
in order to respect certain decisions of the 
Constitutional Court. That’s it, but the draft 
expanded on this. For example, for the crime 
of abuse of office they set a certain minimum 
of damages, negligence went out the window, 
conflict of interests was half eliminated. Secondly, 
what stupefied me was that a ten-day window 
for Criminal Code modifications to apply was 
put in place, something that’s never happened 
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before. An emergency ordinance is issued in 
exceptional cases, when something absolutely 
must change to avoid a legal catastrophy. Here, 
we had a ten-day term, meaning it was an 
emergency, but not a big one.”
The magistrate also explained how 
„legally, OUG13 was badly conceived, which 
led some of us – Attorney General Augustin 
Lazăr, the High Court of Cassation and Justice’s 
president Cristina Tarcea, even the leader 
of DNA, Laura Codruța Kövesi – to believe 
there was a nefarious, immoral goal they were 
pursuing. We spoke out, then, to explain to the 
citizens the consequences of this Order. I can’t 
claim the Order was dedicated to X or to Y, 
although, personally, I’m convinced it was. But as 
a judge or as a prosecutor, I have a duty to show 
the public, when such an important legislative 
measure comes up, its consequences.”
Regarding these consequences, the judge 
explained in the same interview, that 
„on the one hand, my job is to prosecute people, 
if they’re guilty; to fight back against corruption, 
if there is corruption. On the other hand, one 
of the powers of the state says «Your work was 
all for nothing. Right now, we’re closing files or 
releasing certain people from prison.» (…) We 
know the situation in Romania’s penitentiaries 
is not good, but we only send people to prison 
in extreme cases. We’re talking about very 
dangerous people, hardened offenders. No 
one who commits a light criminal act, let’s 
say punishable by law with up to five years of 
detention, and who’s on their first strike, will end 
up in prison. So, people go to prison because 
they break the law. (…) I wonder, this time as a 
citizen and as a father, if it’s normal to let rapists 
walk free, to let robbers walk free, to let thieves 
walk free, maybe even murderers?”
The former member of CSM also touched 
upon one of the lies and manipulations launched by 
the politicians who wanted to decriminalize corruption. 
The manipulation was the fact that the crime of abuse 
of office, partially decriminalized by OUG13, had actually 
been inducted into the Criminal Code through this 
legislative measure. This was obviously false, as the 
Romanian Criminal Code already observes this crime, 
and OUG13, by establishing a minimum of 200,000 lei in 
damages in order to prosecute, led instead to pardoning 
criminals and erasing the criminal files of certain people 
who were being prosecuted or already convicted such 
as Liviu Dragnea, who was being prosecuted for abuse 
of office in a file whose damages had been determined 
to be 108,612 lei. About this lie that was spread in public 
judge Cristi Dănileț said 
“it was a shameless lie. (…) I analyzed the text, 
explained the Attorney General, but some 
time had passed and the lie had picked up 
momentum. It’s harder to refute such widespread 
lies. (…) But there is a problem in Romania, and 
that is that people don’t go to the primary source 
to check for themselves.”
On the 5th of February 2017, on the day of the 
biggest protest against politicians in Romania, which 
drew out 300,000 people in Bucharest’s Piața Victoriei 
and 300,000 others across the country, the Government 
adopted the Executive Order 14, through which OUG13 
was abrogated. In the streets, however, the citizens held 
on and carried on for months with the biggest resistance 
movement in Romania. On the 14th of May, when this text 
was written, the protests, christened #Rezist, celebrated 
in Bucharest their 103rd day. The citizens are asking for 
the Grindeanu Government’s resignation, as well as 
the resignation from the Romanian Parliament of the 
leaders of the two governing parties, PSD and ALDE, 
regarded as guilty of repeated attacks against Justice. 
The two are Liviu Dragnea, convicted felon and the 
leader of the Chamber of Deputies, and Călin Popescu 
Tăriceanu, president of the Senate, also prosecuted for 
corruption.
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Without even realising, politicians who keep defying 
their citizens actually end up embittering them to the 
point that they become “citizens cum laude”. Defiance 
works up to a point in a country with a traditionally 
apathetic civil society as Romania. When the tipping 
point is passed, black swans1 are imminent. Indeed, 
nobody expected that 2017 will begin with the 10-year 
old EU-member Romania seeing its people calling for an 
end to corruption cast a ray of light in a darkening post-
Brexit Europe. But the country has recently witnessed 
its biggest protests since the bloody 19_89_ Revolution. 
The aim of this paper is to explain how these 
protests came to be. When we refer to protests, we are 
taking into account not only the recent #rezist movement, 
but also its precursors, over the past five years. We will 
look at numbers – the demographics and size of the 
protest crowds, but also at specific qualitative data to 
understand the movement: how the media reflected the 
protests, how the riot police handled the crowds, how 
the protesters chose their themes and, finally, what was 
the legacy of each protest.
A run through of the 2012-2017 Romanian protests
January 2012 marked the first authentic, civic 
protest in Romania for twenty years. Of course, there 
have been several niche protests, such as the football 
fans 2007 protest against an unjust law2 that concerned 
their interaction with riot police or the fringe 2008 anti-
globalist protest during the NATO summit in Bucharest3 
(which was quite brutally broken up by special troops). 
But the 2012 one was spontaneous (thus disorganized), 
their demands were not quite articulated, but it was large-
scale, with heterogeneous groups coming together in 
major cities, facing below-zero temperatures to voice their 
discontent in the wake of austerity measures (post-2008 
economic crisis). Triggered by (then president) Traian 
Băsescu’s move to publicly criticize deputy Minister of 
Health Raed Arafat during a public debate about health 
reform legislation, the 2012 protests started with street 
violence and ended up overthrowing a government. 
With the help of partisan media, the protests legitimized 
the coalition that eventually won the parliamentary 
elections that year. 
2013 brought the Romanian Autumn, a hybrid, 
non-homogenous yet more focused movement. The 
social democrat government headed by Victor Ponta 
triggered these protest by sending a controversial bill to 
Parliament. The bill would eventually allow a Canadian 
company to start the biggest open pit cyanide mine in 
Europe, in the small 2,000-years old Transylvanian village 
of Roșia Montană. Anti-capitalists, environmentalists 
and promoters of the rule of law united with older Save 
Roșia Montană activists (a resistance campaign under 
way for at least ten years). 
The newly created movement was called 
#unitisalvam (literally translated – “united, we save”) 
and sparked strong debates among Romanian civil 
society: encouraged by its unexpected early success in 
increasing numbers, everybody had an opinion on what 
the movement’s future should be, even if not everybody 
was out there in the streets. The movement was intense 
for three months, with protesters eventually marching 
weekly through major cities, as a way to inform fellow 
citizens about their demands and thus counter the 
media blackout4. After nine months of protests, in June 
2014 the Parliament rejected the bill for good. Today 
Roșia Montană is on its way to becoming a UNESCO 
World Heritage5 site, thanks to its ancient Roman gold 
mine that has, to some extent, still been preserved. By 
order of the Ministry of Culture, issued on the 30th of 
December 2015, the mining complex was classified as 
a historic site of national importance6. From December 
2013 onwards, the Uniți Salvăm movement tried to be 
more inclusive and adopt other causes (such as opposing 
shale gas extractions in parts of the country, or a strong 
anti-corruption stance in the Black Tuesday7 protest8). 
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These attempts at bringing about nation-wide reform 
contributed to the dilution of the movement. Some of 
the hard core of Uniți Salvăm even tried to boycott 
the May 2014 EU Parliamentary elections, a move that 
caused more political turmoil than expected.
2014 saw further unrest, this time caused by 
perceived irregularities in electoral processes. Tensions 
rose due to the Romanian diaspora having to queue up 
in unprecedented numbers for the opportunity to elect 
their President9_. In the first round, many voters were 
Romanian protester facing a chain of riot policemen in Bucharest’s main boulevard
Romanian protesters revamping old symbols: showing the “V” victory sign they 
used in the 1989 anti-communist revolution, occupying Piața Universității, a 
central square where people died in the violent 1989 Revolution
Photographs by Tudor Vintiloiu ©
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unable to cast their ballots before polling stations closed, 
which some saw as a denial of their constitutional right 
to vote. The Government has the legal duty to organize 
elections. The head of government at that time, Victor 
Ponta, was also the presidential candidate for the Social 
Democrat Party (the PSD held the majority in Parliament 
after the 2012 elections and were going for a landslide 
win in the 2016 ones). After the first round of elections, 
Ponta had a 10% lead. The protests were important 
because diaspora voters traditionally cast anti-PSD 
votes. The non-functional manner in which the diaspora’s 
vote was organised in the first round really backfired 
against Ponta, who would eventually lose in the second 
round, gathering only 46% of the votes. New laws that 
reformed the diaspora voting system were in effect for 
the 2016 parliamentary elections, with little effect, since 
the bureaucratic process was made complicated and 
tedious. Moreover, the changes were not communicated 
to voters in a timely manner.
The 2015  #colectiv protests were the foundation 
for the 2017  #rezist anti-corruption movement. A tragic 
fire broke out in late October in the Bucharest-based 
Colectiv nightclub. The fire was sparked by some 
fireworks that were part of the show, but as the building 
did not adhere to fire and safety regulations, the fire 
has quickly spread. As a result, 64 people died and 
even more were injured. The protesters thought that 
the fire could have been prevented had it not been for 
the endemic corruption that caused fire inspectors to 
overlook the club’s setup. Also, the way in which the 
health care system handled the patients provoked 
outrage. “They day we give in is the day that we die” 
was one of the mottos adopted by the protestors, but 
also a verse from “Goodbye to gravity” a song by the 
rock band that was playing that night. Protest was in 
the air, a new entity was formed under the name of 
Corupţia Ucide, and, like in 2013 with Uniți Salvăm, 
its main asset was a Facebook page. The immediate 
effect of a massive protest attended by 25,000 was 
the unexpected resignation of Prime Minister Ponta 
(runner-up in the 2014 presidential elections) the day 
after11. The resignation was unexpectedly quick, since the 
2013 protesters had been asking for Ponta’s resignation 
in vain, for months and months. The Social Democrat 
Party agreed that the country would be governed by a 
non-political government (the technocrats) for one year, 
until the next parliamentary elections (December 2016). 
2016 saw only a small protest against poor 
conditions in hospitals. The trigger was a report by 
investigative journalists which proved that disinfectants 
in many big hospitals were being purposely diluted, 
thus rendering them inefficient when fighting bacteria. 
The then Minister of Health resigned, and the owner 
of Hexi Pharma, the company who was supplying 
the diluted disinfectants, committed suicide12, 13. 2016 
ended with political turmoil in the aftermath of the 
December Parliamentary elections, undisputedly won 
by the Social Democrat Party14: Wannabe Prime Minister 
Liviu Dragnea, the new head of the Social Democrat 
Party following Victor Ponta’s resignation, argued with 
president Klaus Iohannis over the prime-ministerial 
nomination. Iohannis refused the first proposal Dragnea 
made, only to appoint former deputy Sorin Grindeanu, 
a much less known politician, as a proxy Prime Minister. 
Having been convicted back in 201515 for interfering 
with a referendum vote, Dragnea would have forced a 
Constitutional crisis if he decided to nominate himself 
as the next Prime Minister. 
 2017 broke record after record in terms of 
protest attendance. There were three pre-emptive 
protests16 against reported attempts to pardon corrupt 
politicians and decriminalize acts of corruption. The 
second protest was controversially joined for brief 
moments by Klaus Iohannis, Romania’s president who had 
previously unexpectedly presided over a Government 
meeting (it is not usual, but it can happen, according to 
the Constitution). The 31st of January saw a spontaneous 
crowd of ten thousand Romanians gather in front of 
the Government building in Bucharest, at midnight, at 
eight degrees Celsius below zero. They had all recently 
watched a press conference in which the Minister 
of Justice announced an emergency ordinance to 
pardon those convicted of some acts of corruption 
and decriminalize others. Plain defiance outraged the 
protesters: this kind of softening approach on corruption 
was not in the electoral programme that got the social 
democrats elected in December, plus the public had 
protested (alongside other institutional actors) against 
rumours that the government would take this kind of 
measure. The following day saw an even bigger crowd 
Cover photo for the Uniti Salvam 
Facebook page, June 201410
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turn out in front of the Government after working hours, 
with clashes breaking out between some protesters and 
riot police after midnight. It was the only violent day of 
the protests, which eventually spread out to some 100 
other cities (some of them hadn’t had street movements 
since the 19_89_ Revolution) and led to counter-protests 
that supported the recently appointed government. The 
controversial ordinance was repealed in a week’s time 
and the Minister of Justice resigned, but, at the time 
this text is written, there are plans to pass a similar bill 
through regular parliamentary procedures.
Context and factors
The unexpected jail sentences for famous 
politicians started in 2012, when social-democrat 
frontman Adrian Năstase (ex-Prime Minister 2000-
2004) was convicted and sentenced to two years in jail 
by the Supreme Court, after being prosecuted by the 
National Anticorruption Directorate (DNA) he himself 
created in 2002 in the context of Romania-EU accession 
talks. The shock had been so big, that he actually tried 
to stage his suicide, in a desperate attempt to avoid 
prison. DNA has been gaining more and more traction, 
having successfully prosecuted hundreds of high profile 
politicians, such as media mogul Dan Voiculescu - 
serving a 10-year sentence for money laundering, or 
businessman George Copos – serving a five year one 
for tax evasion17. Such stories raised awareness of how 
endemic corruption was within Romanian politics.
Political opposition to the social-democrats is 
waning, leaving civil society at large to act as the de-
facto opposition, thus blurring the border between civics 
and politics. New parties18 such as Demos or USR have 
been established. The latter had a good run in the local 
and parliamentary elections of 2016, winning almost 9_%19_ 
of the votes in the latter, based on an anti-corruption 
fame. Due to extreme differences in capabilities and 
resources, the clashes between the authorities (of social 
democrat origin in all instances described above, except 
2012) and its opposition – the protesters – have been 
characterized by an action – reaction loop, namely the 
protesters have been successful only in their reactive 
attempts. Proactivity among citizens is thus seen as the 
key means to combat corruption.
Grasping the protests – key insight
As far as triggers and themes go, as morbid as it 
may sound, death is the most common trigger, as Andrei 
Tiut pointed out in a recent piece20. In 2012, the publicly 
acclaimed head of emergency services was ruthlessly 
sacked, triggering protests. In 2013, the protesters were 
against the “cyanide that kills”. 2014 was the exception, 
“Fuck all your wicked corruption” placard.
Photo by Bogdan Dincă ©
Protesters march under Romania’s tricolour 
flag on the streets of Sibiu, the hometown 
of current president Klaus Iohannis.
Photo by Dumitru Matiu ©
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but 2015 and 2016 were also marked by matters of life 
and death. In 2017, the Corupţia Ucide Facebook page 
created the Facebook events for each protest, but soon 
the movement grew larger and morphed into something 
new - #rezist. All of these particular instances converged 
towards a unifying theme – one against corruption 
and against what some western-loving Romanians 
derogatorily call the “Balkan mentality”.
Who are the protesters?
Generally speaking, the children of the 19_89_ 
revolutionaries are today’s activists. Still, the 
crowds differed from one movement to another. 
Some nuclei from the 2012 movements were 
dedicated in the 2013 ones. Surely half of the 
2013 ones attended the 2014 protests, where 
they also met new faces. The 2015 brought about 
fresh forces, but the 2012 & 2013 backbone 
was still there. 2017 was a mixed bunch.
What do they stand for?
The demographics may have changed since 
19_89_, but the cause that united hundreds of 
thousands in the past years is very much linked 
to the democracy demanded by the 19_89_ 
revolutionaries: today’s protesters want less 
corruption and implementation of the rule of 
law, which is a pillar of democracy. This is visible 
even in the 2014 protests for the right to vote.
What the protesters have learned in the five-year span
Since 2012, the protesters matured and learned 
their lessons gradually. 
In 2012 they rediscovered the protest and the 
fact that - when the going gets tough - they can take 
to the streets, since Romanian politicians have a deep 
fear of street protests. Protests are useful for venting 
frustrations and expressing the emotional mood, but 
they also have political consequences, even if the 
long-awaited long-term change takes more time than 
initially expected. 
2013 was the turning point, as the protesters 
tested their resilience and found out that focus and 
stamina are key traits of a successful movement, along 
with creativity, which has been an underused awareness 
tool (essential when facing a media blockage). Attempts 
to organize or build upon the 2013 protests failed. The 
protests were decentralized, as in they lacked central 
leadership, which is what distinguishes them from 
protests organized by political parties. 
In 2014 the lesson was that change needs to 
be approached on multiple battlegrounds, one of them 
being the realm of political parties, but civics and politics 
need to stay separated. In 2015 trust consolidated among 
groups in the crowds, the very groups that had formed 
back in 2012 and 2013. 
In 2015 and 2016 “the protester” - as a collective 
character - worked his civic muscle, refining its techniques 
and improving their effectiveness.
In 2017 the protesters realized they need to 
invest in their civic education, because information is a 
weapon that can quickly be loaded and fired into social 
media. They also understood that social media is not 
enough and that live and extensive TV coverage of the 
protests can easily multiply the number of protesters. 
Among the lessons learned by protesters is that trusting 
each other matters, but critical thinking matters most. 
The trigger of the #rezist protest was quite technical, so 
the protesters had to educate themselves in very niche 
areas such as justice and public administration. Political 
fact-checking and investigative journalism became a 
well-respected and sought-after genres. 
Contrasting with the 90s protests
Facebook reliance is heavy among protesters 
nowadays and the media landscape is saturated, which 
makes the spreading of fake news really easy, but also 
gives fact-checkers a chance to fight back21. 
The current protests have no formal leader or 
hierarchy, the organisations are rather flat and apparently 
democratic when it comes to decision making, with 
Facebook being the one-stop-shop for information and 
mobilisation. 
All the big civic protests in the 2012-2017 
timespan were illegal according to the Romanian law 
concerning public gatherings, but the law is randomly 
enforced, since it is archaic, dating back to 19_9_0, a 
turbulent period in Romania’s street movement history. 
Unlike the 9_0s, today’s protesters were engaged 
in less violent clashes, because they understood that 
violence scares away potential protesters (so they trained 
themselves in how to weed out potential troublemakers 
from their groups). Also, the authorities refrained from 
instructing the riot police to make use of full force, 
which was not the case with the infamous Miners’ rage 
(Mineriade22) in the 9_0s. The only violent protests were 
the 2012 and 2017 ones, but usually the protests have 
been family friendly.
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How many is enough?
Counting protesters in the street is a common 
occupation for some, as is counting likes on Facebook. 
It was a rarely seen event when a couple of thousand 
people in Piața Universității occupied the main boulevard 
in Bucharest in 2013 and went on to march for two metro 
stops, to Piața Victoriei, the centre of the Government. 
The 2015 #colectiv protests drew crowds ten times 
bigger, but protesters still felt like they were living in a 
small bubble, since Bucharest alone has at least two 
million people within its city limits. 
When the 2017 protests drew tens of thousands 
in smaller cities across the country and hundreds of 
thousands in Bucharest, some protesters were expecting 
the crowds to surpass millions. But, as is the case with 
every fire, it eventually dies out. Hopefully, after more 
years of civic schooling and dialogue, the protesters 
will learn that civic involvement need not be limited to 
the act of protest.
Perhaps a symbol in the making for protesters, the Victoriei Square in downtown 
Bucharest is flooded by protesters who formed a tricolour choreography. 
Photo by Adrian Câtu ©
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The #rezist protests are said to be Romania’s biggest 
post-2000. At their peak, more than 600,000 people 
are said to have taken to the streets, 300,000 of them 
in Bucharest alone. That makes roughly 3% of Romania’s 
entire population (currently estimated at 19_.2 million) 
and a good 15% of Bucharest’s (currently estimated at 
1.9_ million). 10,000 of them, Decat o Revista (DoR) says 
(2017), showed up in the middle of a freezing, sub-zero 
temperatures night in Bucharest in the first day. 
A mixture of anger and sadness is what drove 
them DoR says in its timely coverage of the first days 
of protests. And anger is often mentioned by protesters 
with whom I have been in touch with since the beginning 
of April. 
Andrei Rosu, a 41-year old father of two, was 
among the first protesters in Bucharest. A former 9_0s 
boy-band member turned project manager turned 
endurance athlete and inspirational speaker describes 
the moment of hearing the news about OUG13 in physical 
terms: “My heart rate suddenly jumped from 50 or 60 to 
140”. He says he tried to calm himself down and avoid 
posting in the heat of the moment on Facebook but then 
considering what was happening he concluded that “this 
is no longer about politics; this is about values (…)” and 
that he had to out in the street: “Half an hour after the 
law was passed, I was in front of the Government with 
other 1,000 people”. 
Calin Puia (34), a former actor from Brasov 
and now Dementia and Enablement specialist living 
in London has taken part in protests in front of the 
Romanian Cultural Institute (ICR), since mid-January but 
the news of the Emergency Ordinance being passed 
had escaped him as he had switched off from the 
Internet to spend the day with his friends. He found out 
only later, in the middle of the night, that OUG13 has 
been issued, so angered, betrayed and saddened, he 
found himself cycling to ICR where he had protested 
before. He says he went there almost without thinking, 
so moved by the news, to make a point that the OUG 
and what it represents was totally unacceptable. So on 
the 1st of February together with another man, who like 
Calin made his way to ICR, they stood silent, facing the 
cold and damp night in Belgravia Square. They even 
took a smiling selfie with the Romanian and EU flags 
flying above their heads, saying “now and here, we are 
protesting alongside with you!”1. Calin’s companion left 
at 02:45 but Calin stayed on until 06:00 in the morning. 
He went home exhausted and returned after a brief 
break to find that hundreds have gathered to protest, 
without anyone calling them. 
Furious, disappointed and upset was Florin 
Branisteanu, a 37-year old accountant and a hearing 
impaired entrepreneur living in Bacau, Romania and 
furious and angry was also Catalin Lazar (46) a Project 
Marketing Manager from Bucharest now residing in 
Milan, Italy.  
Raluca, “just Raluca” as she wants to be 
identified (33), a Bucharest born engineer now living 
in France, who joined the protests in Paris says that in 
her “outrage at the impertinence of the Government” 
she too realized that any action, any protest would have 
to be “to protect our values”.
It is this feeling, that values needed protecting 
from the Government, that Justice and Democracy were 
seriously and unequivocally threatened, is what many 
of the protesters I spoke with invoke, so their joining of 
the protests was a self-driven, personal act. 
Ramona Strugariu (37) , a policy advisor to a 
Romanian Member of the European Parliament now 
living in Brussels, made it her mission to openly oppose 
the decisions in Bucharest so she willingly took it upon 
herself to organize the protests in the Belgian capital: 
“(…) I wrote some slogans on two pieces of 
cardboard, I posted on Facebook that since 
no Romanian organisation or political party in 
Brussels decided to protest, I would proceed 
by myself; I went to the esplanade in front of 
the European Parliament and called on people 
to join me”.
Vlad Lascoi (30) who was working at the time 
on a cruise ship in the Antarctic “couldn’t believe” the 
news he has just heard. He felt betrayed, he felt that 
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they [the Government, a.n.] didn’t care about what the 
public believes” which is why he decided that even 
there, so far away from home, he had to do something. 
Vlad saw himself as a spectator to the entire 
political show in Romania and had protested before only 
once in his lifetime, during his student times, a protest 
he says was very small. 
Andrei Rosu speaks quite fervently about how he 
didn’t want to have to do anything to do with politics until 
these protests. With Calin, things are more complicated: 
he was interested in politics he says however every 
time he got involved he ended up being deceived, 
betrayed and with a sense that “the game was rigged 
from the start”. He mentions his work in Brasov as a teen 
to clean up the city that got the attention for the then 
launched Alliance for Romania party and the invitation 
to join them as President of their local youth group just 
to find out that the party meetings were being held in a 
strip tease club owned by one of the members. There 
are other examples too and every time he reiterates his 
amazement at the level of compromise (the lesser evil) 
Romanian voters have to accept each time.  
Both Loredana Ivanov (39_), from Balan, Hargita 
now running her own cleaning business in London and 
Raluca from Paris recall the humiliation and struggle of 
voting abroad for the Presidential Elections in 2014. It 
is then that Loredana started to pay attention to politics 
and when Raluca started to get more involved; since 
2016 Raluca has picked up volunteering in support of 
one of the newly formed parties. Others, like Valentina 
(28), an architect from Satu Mare now living in Vienna, 
and Cristian (50), an IT specialist originally from Bucharest 
now living in Toronto, Catalin Lazar from Milan or Ramona 
from Brussels voted on every occasion and hoped that 
was enough.
Vlad decided that his protest would be a photo 
he’d post and share with friends on Facebook. He 
printed out the message “Antarctica is protesting; PSD 
= Thievery Shamelessness The Red Plague” and asked 
one of his colleagues to take the photo. In his uniform, 
shirt slightly untucked, tie not quite centered, looking 
rather tired and stern, on the Antarctic background, Vlad’s 
image soon went viral and became a sign of solidarity 
and resilience. The placards of the other participants 
had similar messages: the red plague, corruption kills 
(coruptia ucide) and “at night, like thieves” (noaptea ca 
hotii) are often mentioned as is the use of the hashtag 
#rezist which emerged from Facebook.
Facebook, in fact, played a central role in the 
#rezist protests. This should not come as a surprise: 
after all, more than 9_3% of Romania’s online population 
has a Facebook account, compared to only 79_% in the 
UK and 68% in Germany (Statista, 2017a, 2017b, 2017c). 
The protesters with whom I spoke mention the 
network among their top sources of news: whether from 
friends or media outlets like HotNews, Ziare.com, Digi24, 
Epoch Times, Republica or Adevarul, but Facebook 
nonetheless. They also list it as their preferred outlet 
to connect with other protesters and to get organized. 
Loredana from London, says that she initially 
answered a call to join a protest on the 22nd of January 
coming from a guy who had links with the 2013 Rosia 
Montana protests but then ended up organizing it, that 
is ensuring that the authorities were informed, health 
and safety regulations were respected, participating 
protesters were peaceful and could express freely their 
opinions but not promote a political party or another. 
Andrei Rosu too speaks about the days when 
he created #REZISTENTA3, the biggest closed group 
associated (currently at more than 55,000 members) 
with the protests. He created the group in the hope that 
he would find others to replace him during the time he 
would be away; from the third day of the protests he 
had moved his office into Piata Victoriei managing his 
online business from there, facing the cold wrapped up 
in his Antarctic gear and responding to queries from 
his laptop. Within that timeframe he had postponed his 
holiday twice. While he was hoping that the Government 
would resign and new elections would be announced, 
his presence in the Square as he puts it was meant to 
ensure that there was a constant protest presence in 
the Square and not only in the evenings and weekends 
when people would be off work. It was his fourteenth 
day of continuous protest when he announced to his 
Vlad Lascoi. 1st of February 2017. 
Reproduced with permission.3 
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friends and followers on Facebook (more than 20,000 
of them) and posted a link to the group on his blog as 
well: “in the first hour I had 2,000 people getting in the 
group and after the first 24 hours there were 20,000”, 
an overwhelming response and testimony that Andrei’s 
outrage was shared and so were his actions. 
W. (32), the son of a German-Romanian couple 
who emigrated to Germany in the 19_70s and protested in 
Munich joined the protests at the call from a friend and 
kept up with all the developments via a Facebook group 
and so did his fellow protester, A. As they continued to 
protest in Munich, the organizing and keeping-up was 
done online. 
Catalin on the other hand wanted to keep up with 
the news from the diaspora, beyond Milan. So he created 
the #Rezist Diaspora4 Facebook page that aggregates 
and keeps up with #rezist protests wherever they are 
known. To Catalin’s accounts, the Romanian diaspora 
had organized protests in 81 cities around the world 
and 36 countries. 
The most common theme discussed as the 
reason for being active and campaigning for change 
was the profound mistrust in the Government. This led 
many into getting organized, focus their demands, get 
active to enact and support change. For Ramona this is a 
must: a government that commits such a faux pas within 
days after taking office means that “something goes 
fundamentally wrong in the way the country is governed 
by these political parties and that a lot more involvement 
is needed from the people, if they want things to improve”.
For some this is a completely new terrain, so 
it no surprise that they feel inexperienced but they say 
they are undeterred. 
Andrei Rosu and W. from Munich have never 
taken part in any form of protest. Florin Branisteanu 
says that he joined other protests before out of solidarity 
with his friends, not out of conviction. Loredana started 
to be more active after the fire in Colectiv, a nightclub 
in Bucharest, where 64 people attending a concert lost 
their life and which triggered soon after the demise of the 
Ponta Government. Calin and Valentina have supported 
the #unitisalvam protests in 2013 opposing the law that 
would have enabled the commencement of a gold 
mining project in Rosia Montana (Angel, 2013) whose 
environmental and heritage impact could have been 
disastrous. Ramona from Brussels protested whenever 
there was a cause worth protesting for, whereas for 
Catalin his stand has a clear anti-corruption theme (he 
protested in 2016 against the Parliament’s decision to 
grant immunity to MPs for acts of corruption).  
Andrei Rosu’s desk in Piata Victoriei. “Working hours: 
9-17 Office, 17 - : Protest. P.S. We seek approval to 
work during the weekend too! Don’t leave us alone!”. 
Reproduced with permission.
#Rezist Diaspora Banner. 
Reproduced with permission.
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For others, this Government’s actions are 
painfully reminiscent of the 19_9_0s. For Cristian from 
Toronto in particular, the #rezist protests are a continuation 
of the anti-communist student protests of the 19_9_0s 
brutally silenced by the Miners' Actions in which he took 
part. For him, the Proclamation Romania 2017+ (2017), a 
document compiled and issued by some of the protesters 
in the wake of the March 22 visit to Brussels to meet with 
members of the LIBE Committee (Civil Liberties, Justice 
and Home Affairs) at the EU Parliament (meeting called by 
the ruling coalition parties SPD and ALDE representatives 
during a plenary meeting in Strasbourg and approved 
by all the other political groups represented) has many 
similarities with the 19_89_ Timisoara Proclamation: while 
the 2017 document demands “7. Eliminating parliamentary 
approval for criminal prosecution of the governors.” and 
“8. No convicted citizen shall hold public service and 
other statesman positions.”, the Timisoara Proclamation 
sought to exclude from politics any high ranking former 
Communist Party members or high ranking Securitate 
members, the Communist much-feared Secret Service. 
They also feel that they need to keep up the 
pressure. 
“we must not keep silent, ever again; this is 
what kleptocracy builds upon: silence and 
indifference of a deciding majority who keeps 
swallowing lies, either because it finds it easier 
than coming out of its comfort zone, or because 
they strongly believe that ‘’all politicians are the 
same’’ and ‘’nothing can be changed, anyway’’. 
This is a lame excuse. There’s no irreversible 
state of art for a nation. The question is, at what 
cost do we fail to ensure refreshment, rotation 
and control of political power? The lower the 
shift, the higher the cost.“ (Ramona Strugariu) 
Now that they know they are not alone, they feel 
that they should contribute to the others’ “awakening” 
or at least to help them be better informed when making 
their political choices. Cristian from Toronto describes 
this as “continuing the Revolution of the Common Sense” 
while Vlad sees this more in terms of enabling the 
formation of a national “moral conscience”.  Interestingly 
enough, although none of them know each other, Calin 
too speaks about an awakened consciousness. 
Most of them thus continue to protest (some daily 
after their working hours, others during the weekends) 
and seek ways in which their protests can be seen 
(Loredana from London mentions literary protests and 
Raluca from Paris speaks about flashmobs). Some are also 
moving on to joining or establishing civic engagement 
organizations while others are considering (if they haven’t 
done so already) to donate money to various NGOs and 
independent and investigative journalism initiatives and 
groups in Romania. They all want to make it clear that 
this is no longer a “one-time” exercise as Ramona puts it.
Andrei Rosu’s #REZISTENTA group has since 
moved on to identify the skills and expertise available 
within the group. 15 of the 55,000 thousand have taken an 
admin role and an extended 200 or so of them have now 
joined specialist groups, where the PR and legal teams 
especially, Andrei says, are kept rather busy. Needless 
to say, their work moved away from Facebook and into 
Slack. Calin says he has now joined the #REZISTENTA 
group in an advisory role. This takes a lot of his time and 
refocused completely his daily activities. The Diaspora 
Civica Berlin and Nova Romania e.v. from Munich are 
Loredana’s photo of London’s literary #rezist protest in 
Trafalgar Square. This is a reference to #rezist literary 
protests organized in Sibiu, Romania.
Reproduced with permission.
Catalin Lazar’s photo of a #rezist literary protest in 
Milan on the 12th of March. 
Reproduced with permission.
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among the first of such groups formed abroad and word 
has it that similar ones might soon emerge in other cities. 
The #rezist protests started opposing the 
emergency ordinance OUG13, opposing corruption. 
Their initial goal was to have the OUG13 revoked 
and in this sense, the protests were successful. The 
protests however, fueled by the mistrust in the political 
establishment and inspired perhaps by the previous 
protests (2013 - #unitisalvam succeeded in stopping the 
mining project and the law supporting its commencement 
and 2014 - #colectiv resulted in the resignation of Victor 
Ponta and his government and the installment for a 
period of one year of a technocrat government led by 
Dacian Ciolos). They have however morphed many 
times since then, moving their target from singling out 
politicians like Liviu Dragnea (the President of the Social 
Democrat Party and since December 2016 the President 
of the Chamber of Deputies, the lower chamber of the 
Romanian Parliament) and Calin Popescu-Tariceanu 
(currently President of the Romanian Senate, the higher 
chamber of the Romanian Parliament), both accused of 
embezzling funds, to targeting opposition at an entire 
party (mainly the Social Democrat Party) (ProTV, 2017), 
to supporting the National Agency for Anti-Corruption 
(DNA) and to a wider fight for values and principles of 
transparency, accountability, meritocracy and rule of law.
The #REZISTENTA group, for instance, Andrei 
Rosu says that their desire is to become a watchdog of 
the state and state-related institutions in Romania, and 
by extension of all actions in the political arena. In order 
to do so, having control of their messages which could 
potentially include generating their own news on their 
own media channels is an essential step. And, Andrei 
says, they do not exclude the potential of supporting 
a political party that presents a viable and trustworthy 
alternative to the ones currently active in Romania. 
Raluca from Paris continues to support the 
activities of the newly formed party for which she started 
volunteering in 2016 but most of the protesters I spoke 
with are hoping that a new party would emerge “from 
the streets”, one whose members are competent and not 
corrupted, and one that can present a viable and strong 
political alternative to the parties currently operating. 
The alternative, Cristian from Toronto says, would be 
that the former technocrat Prime Minister Dacian Ciolos 
to get set up his own party. 
For the Nova Romania group in Munich of 
with which W. works closely, their main aim become 
a spokesperson for the Romanian diaspora within 
their region, liaising with media and political actors. In 
a similar manner, the Diaspora Civica group in Berlin 
seeks to enable and increase the German diaspora’s 
political implication and enable the development of a 
“civic spirit”. This means moving away from just reacting 
to the events unfolding in Romania but rather taking 
an active role in debating and developing political and 
governing alternatives. 
The #rezist protests continue. The numbers 
in the streets may have dwindled but for those I have 
interviewed their work has just begun (many in fact were 
back into the streets as the rejected OUG13 found its 
way into a law project that was approved by the Juridical 
Commission of the Senate). There is a sense of pride in 
their discovery that Romanians can be united and work 
together. There is also a sense of joy in the discovery 
that their hopes for Romania (with less corruption, 
strong educational, health and justice systems, with 
transparent and accountable institutions that prohibit 
access to public office functions to convicted felons) are 
shared by others and a definite sense that they want 
to continue to be involved. There is also a sense that 
their anti-corruption and pro-democracy messages and 
pledges might have, in the long-term, effects that span 
beyond Romania. 
These are the Romanian #rezist protesters: 
Romanians in spirit, heritage or nationality, generally 
tech-savvy, with a global focus and understanding, 
with a checkered record of civic engagement but so 
enraged and disappointed by the current state of 
affairs in Romanian politics that they are determined 
to get involved and do more. This is in part in line with 
the #rezist protester profile in Romania; a recent IRES5 
Raluca’s image of a protest in Paris. The Balloons are 
a reference to the protests in Bucharest that created 
a human Romanian flag in front of the Government 
building in Piata Victoriei. 
Reproduced with permission.
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survey portrays them as young adults and adults, urban 
dwellers (76%) working mainly in the private sector and 
having average to high education levels (70% of the 9_80 
people interviewed). And whatever that “do more” is, 
remains to be seen.
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On the 31st of January 2017 around midnight, 10,000 
people in Bucharest went out into Piața Victoriei to 
protest. At minus 13 degrees, nobody expected to see 
them there, but rather in their pajamas, in bars, or still at 
work. No protest had been announced. Still they went 
out, setting into motion what would culminate into the 
largest protests Romania has seen since 2000.
 While the hashtag during the protests in 2013 
was #unitisalvam (together we save), and #colectiv in 
2015, now, in the freezing cold, the message coming from 
the streets was #rezist (resist). It was a civic movement 
of the masses. But it was also one of the individual, 
understanding that each one of us takes part in the 
fight for the country of our dreams. One person can be 
a protest in itself, and the people having their morning 
coffee in Piața Victoriei, eyes fixed on the Government 
building, or the citizens from small, provincial towns 
gathering in handfuls across all counties and county 
seats seemed to put this on display, each doing his or 
her part.
 In sight of the protests growing larger and larger, 
on the 5th of February, the Government issued a new 
Executive Ordinance, no. 14, to repeal OUG13 before 
taking effect. That day saw the most protestors: some 
country-wide estimates reporting 600,000 people. The 
protests continued, and there were counter protests in 
front of the Cotroceni Palace as well, but the evening 
of the 5th is still the most relevant.
We collected snapshots which piece together a 
living history of those days. In no way are these accounts 
objective, nor do they cover the whole spectrum of 
opinions and experiences from the protests – history 
will perhaps shed a better light than journalism –, but 
they tell a story of what we were doing in February 2017, 
a month of unprecedented public assembly.
Corina Bratu, 30, a strategist at Leo Burnett, 
was in Piața Victoriei on the first night: 
“There were already around 1,000 people when I 
got there. Half an hour later it was like a concert; 
I saw a lot of friends, old colleagues, familiar 
faces (…). I didn’t have a sign, so I just started 
writing ‘Josnic’ (Despicable) on a drawing pad. 
Anyways, as best I could, I was there – ski pants 
on, two jackets, holding signs. I was waving a 
flag I’d bought at the market for 25 lei, tied to 
a mop handle and hoping they’d realize their 
mistake. I think my dad was happy that we 
weren’t just shrugging our shoulders. He was 
out in the streets in ’89_.”
Ioan Maxim, 28 years old, PR at the Apollo 111 
Theatre, was also there on the first night: 
“It was so nice at home that evening. I was just 
making tea, eating, browsing the internet. I think 
I’d wrapped myself in a blanket, too. Then the 
Dragnea Government issued OUG13 and my 
comfortable evening became the winter of our 
discontent. I went straight out into the Square, 
feeling a mix of sadness and rebellion. I went 
there for an answer, but not just any answer, the 
answer I would get on board with: the Ordinance 
wouldn’t pass, it wouldn’t go into effect, that 
this is just a ditch effort. But nobody believed it, 
just the opposite. A friend who worked for the 
[Dacian] Cioloș Government told me there was 
no chance it would go my way. My legs were 
frozen when I got home at 01:30 in the morning. 
The next days I felt like mourning, like the week 
after the Colectiv nightclub-fire.”
Adrian Tudorache, 30, was born in the 
countryside and moved to Italy 13 years ago with his 
family. He came to Bucharest in the beginning of January 
to see if and how the city had changed. 
#rezist: February in the Streets 
Snapshots of the Largest-Ever  
Romanian Protest1
By Irina Tacu, Sorana Stănescu, Ioana Burtea, Alexandra Bădescu, Ana Maria Ciobanu,  
Gabriela Pițurlea, Andreea Vrabie, Carla Lunguți, Medeea Stan, Adina Brăduț,  
Elena Văduva and Adrian Lungu (DoR Editorial Team). Edited by Georgiana Ilie
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“I found another Romania. I made a different 
sign every night - one with three rats instead of 
the three PSD roses, I’d written ‘Filter politicians’ 
on a carton of Marlboro unfiltered cigarettes. 
Everyone was looking at the others’ signs and 
talking about them. It was civilized. No one was 
littering. I would shovel snow, collect any garbage 
around. I know I’ll be coming back once my girl 
finishes 1st grade. I’m hopeful.”
Not everyone felt they were represented at 
the protests, especially activists who’ve been trying for 
years to draw public attention to their causes. Tudorina 
Mihai, an expert in feminist politics, has been attending 
rallies for years. 
“If we can’t get past the dominant discourse that 
only recognizes corruption, if we don’t have a 
progressive liberal agenda that includes the 
rights of marginalized groups, we won’t live in 
a society we like. (…) If I want prosperity, I have 
to also care about those who can’t go out in the 
streets and defend their rights, such as children 
living in extreme poverty.” 
Vlad Viski, 28 years old, president of the MozaiQ 
Association and LGBTQIA+ activist, didn’t feel comfortable 
in Piața Victoriei. He didn’t identify with the anti-corruption 
discussion, which seems to dominate the entire public 
space, leaving no room for other relevant issues such as 
nationalism, homophobia, or prejudice against the poor. 
There were homophobic jokes on signs; organizations 
that rallied against women’s rights were leading the 
march in Cluj; the mothers’ march, he says, reinforces 
the idea that family can only mean heterosexual couples 
with children; the expression “ciuma roșie” (red plague) 
which the far right movement of the World War II period 
would also use when referring to communists; the singing 
of the anthem and the choreography with the flag, they 
all made him wonder if there’s room for everyone under 
the flag. He has the feeling that these protests, which 
are just as legitimate as voting, are underscored by a 
sense of entitlement, that the country belongs more to 
the people in the Piața Victoriei than it does to those 
who vote. 
Piața Victoriei was full not just with adults, but 
with children too, both during the usual nights of the 
protests and during the weekend, when a “children’s 
march” was organized. The mothers who brought 
their children to the protests had read commentary 
making them out to be irresponsible. Ramona Poiană, 
an economist, says she would tell her child, now a year 
and eight months old: 
“Son, you were with us there because your father 
and I felt we couldn’t stand by, couldn’t let our 
leaders toy around with us. So you participated, 
too, more like a handbag, and you saw people, 
doggies and a plaster giraffe. We all went out 
together and that’s why today we’re having this 
talk in Romania, instead of another country.”
Raluca Buzea, 30 years old, PR manager at 
IRI Forest Management (IKEA Group), believes it was a 
protest that “reached so many social and age groups 
(…). I only had a sign one night, saying ‘Brothers, parents, 
grandparents: we need you here.’ Many of us come 
from small towns where industry and manufacturing 
are dead, where people are grey, bleak and aging. I 
think there are many of us whose parents have a salary 
unfit for a life of work, and grandparents with a pension 
about as large as what we pay at the Carrefour check-
out. Does somebody out there think we were born from 
corporations and advertising?”
Ramona, an entrepreneur, was told by her 
parents on the 11th of December, “we voted the way you 
guys wanted.” “Then, on New Year’s Eve, my dad shared 
some ‘best wishes’ from a questionable character. (…) One 
night in January, in an almost funny phone conversation, 
it slipped out in a joking-ironic tone: ‘look, you shared 
some posts from a person in that party. You should 
sometimes check who you support publicly, haha.’ That 
moment set off a rant like nothing I’ve ever heard from 
him—screaming and making these weird statements, 
just like those on bad television. I was shocked. Then 
he started to criticize me for spending hours in the cold 
and voting for that president so-and-so and what’s more 
than that, which… beep beep beep. I hung up. The hate 
speech being spread by toxic news programs had taken 
hold of my father, too, and I was stunned. I didn’t know 
how to respond besides just hanging up. We haven’t 
spoken in eight weeks.”
On the morning of the 1st of February, IT specialist 
Florin Bădiță, 28 years old, took unpaid leave from his 
job in Cluj and flew to Bucharest. In 2015, after the 
Colectiv nightclub fire, Bădiță created a Facebook page, 
Corupția ucide (Corruption kills)2, which today has 60,000 
followers. That year, he and others used this account to 
encourage people to go out in the street and protest. 
The pressure coming from the streets was essential as, 
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Bădiță says, “the objective was to get that Government 
out.” Because there was a lot of work to be done, from 
coordinating people to responding to messages, Bădiță 
asked for help. Izabela Lazăr, a student, said she would 
organize a “human national flag” in Piața Victoriei. They 
bought around 7,500 sheets of paper in red, yellow 
and blue. Around 50 volunteers handed them out to 
people in front of the Government building, grouped 
into three sections, and collected them afterwards. “A 
lot of people in the Square already had sheets of paper, 
as we requested on the event page3, because we had 
no way of buying one for every person.” Izabela says, 
“we didn’t contract any sponsorships.” Then, on the 
12th of February, nearly 70,000 people lit up the Square 
with their phones in the national colors. Others said it 
was a nationalist protest but, according to Bădiță, the 
purpose was to show they’d managed to do something 
together, that they’d united.
Cătălin Georgescu photographed the protests 
in the last years and says the ones for Roșia Montană 
were almost completely invisible in the media. 
“Here it’s the exact opposite: everyone is in the 
Square, everyone has phones, I saw dozens, 
hundreds of people going live on Facebook 
and, three years ago, we didn’t have anything 
like that. We couldn’t even send pictures taken 
with a camera that well. (…) Now, really, it’s over 
coverage. Everyone’s on rooftops, there are 
drones, aerial lifts, television camera cranes. 
(…) You have live updates on Instagram and 
Facebook. You have no way of saying you don’t 
know, only that you don’t want to.”
The Romanian protests became a model of 
civic involvement for other Europeans, even some you 
wouldn’t expect. On the 5th of February, Bulgarians 
protested in Sofia4 to show their support. “A step back 
in the fight against corruption in Romania bodes poorly 
for Bulgaria,” was the reason for the event. A Bulgarian 
commented on a picture of the little lights shining in 
unison in Piața Victoriei: “And we’re sleeping…”.
In Budapest, at an NGO’s protest against the 
Viktor Orban government and the lack of education 
reforms, as no more than 2,000 people showed up, 
they started chanting: “Call the Romanians.” On the 19_th 
of February, there was a Facebook event announcing a 
protest in Paris “against the corruption of the elected,” 
and the organizer gave Romania as an example: “We 
wouldn’t be the only ones making our voices heard; 
Romania, among others, is a serious example right now.”
The public square has become a symbol of 
rebellion in Romania. Raluca Șoaită, a medical architecture 
specialist, went to the protest every day. 
“The square, itself, functions like a little town. 
There are traffic ways, focal points, knots and 
landmarks, the elements that define a city. 
People organically reside there. I was walking 
through the crowd and there were crossroads, 
the pillars were meeting landmarks, paths were 
created. The people that came to the square 
represent the city well in terms of its composition. 
We don’t have well-respected urban planning 
regulations, but what I love is there’s a lot of 
creativity. Cleaning up at the end was a decision 
taken that we can live in an organic world, not 
strictly controlled, because we feel the need to 
protect one another, to go on living.”
Diana Mărgărit, 33 years old, a political science 
PhD, notices how the protestor’s profile has changed. 
Looking back at the protests in 2012 – 2015, the people’s 
demands have evolved from specific—mining operations 
must stop at Roșia Montană, the government or a minister 
must resign—to more general, like stopping corruption. 
That being said, the problem of corruption was behind 
all the protests, because “fundamentally, nothing has 
changed.” She believes corruption is a phenomenon 
the West handles with a kind of cynicism and fatalism: 
corruption is everywhere, there’s nothing we can do, 
the political class will continue defending their privileges 
no matter what. 
“But the fact that Romania protests in the name 
of certain ideals, it can show that, in fact, people 
will work for days, weeks on end in the street 
to, finally, influence change.”
Towards the end of the protests, Ioan Maxim 
started to ask himself questions: 
“At one point, I could no longer follow the debate. 
It was too much. I was happy it was repealed. 
But was it enough? Are we still going to shout 
‘Resign?’ What is it we really want? Why are 
we making a human flag? Are we aware of the 
extremes? Is there still a small, legal loophole 
that would allow OUG13 to take effect? What is 
OUG14? Why are we laughing at the protestors 
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in Cotroceni? Why aren’t we laughing at them? 
I don’t feel the protests had any result yet, but I 
think I managed to answer the most important 
question these days: I go out in the street 
because I want to wake up one morning, turn 
on the television and be shocked by the news 
that one of the country’s leaders is corrupt. 
For now, these kind of news stories are the 
norm. I’m tired of this norm, and I can’t wait for 
our version of normal to come. And I’m willing 
to keep going out in the streets until then.”.
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DoR (Decât or Revistă)
magazine is an independent quarterly that 
publishes in-depth stories about the realities 
of the Romanian society. It was established in 
2009_. The DoR Editorial Team is composed of 
experienced journalists who frequently cover 
social, political and cultural issues and tell untold 
stories about the way the society changes.  
c  www.decatorevista.ro 
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Public protest (particularly directly against the 
government and the political elite more broadly) has 
been commonplace in Bucharest since the collapse of 
the communist regime in 19_89_.  However, there has been 
a distinct geography to these protests. Before 2017 most 
public gatherings to express opposition or discontent 
have taken place at Piața Universității (University Square) 
which became established as an almost hallowed site of 
protest.  However the 2017 #rezist protests were different 
in that the protesters gathered in a new location, in front 
of the government headquarters. Here we analyse the 
changing geography of protest in Bucharest in 2017 
and examine the reasons behind the emergence of a 
new space of protest.
Piaţa Universităţii as a space of protest.  
Piața Universității is an irregular (and partly 
pedestrianized) space, situated adjacent to the 
intersection of Bucharest’s two major boulevards. As 
the name suggests it stands alongside a part of the 
University of Bucharest. It is also bounded on one 
side by the National Theatre but is not home to any 
government buildings. The square stands close to the 
Kilometre 0 monument (the point from which all distances 
in the country are measured) and for this reason is often 
considered to be the symbolic centre of Bucharest. 
Piața Universității gained its current symbolic 
importance in December 19_89_ when crowds gathered 
there during the Romanian ‘Revolution’. It was here 
that security forces first opened fire on the crowds, 
resulting in 49_ people being killed and 463 wounded 
(Siani-Davies, 2005). For this reason a part of the square 
was subsequently renamed Piața 21 Decembrie 19_89_. 
However, it was in 19_9_0 that its reputation as a site of 
protest was cemented. When it became clear that the 
National Salvation Front (FSN – Frontul Salvării Naționale) 
which had assumed power after the overthrow of 
Nicolae Ceauşescu) was dominated by members of the 
former Romanian Communist Party, students set up a 
protest camp in the square which rapidly increased in 
size. The leaders of the FSN responded with appalling 
violence: on the 14th of June 19_9_0 thousands of miners 
(brought to the city by the government on specially 
chartered trains) rampaged through Bucharest in an event 
which became known as the Mineriadă (Miners’ Rage). 
The miners savagely attacked the protesters in Piața 
Universității where, according to official figures, seven 
people died (although the real figure was suspected 
to be in the hundreds). This event demonstrated to 
the population that the post-communist regime was as 
willing as its predecessor to use violence to maintain 
order.  It also established Piața Universității as an almost 
‘sacred’ site of protest and sacrifice in the heart of the 
city (Antonovici, 2009_).
As a result of events during both the 19_89_ 
Revolution and the Mineriadă, Piața Universității – and 
in particular Piața 21 Decembrie 19_89_ – became the 
principal site of opposition and protest, especially against 
the former communists who coalesced in the Social 
Democratic Party (PSD - Partidul Social Democrat) who 
were in government for much of the post-communist 
period. For example, when the centre-right candidate 
(Emil Constantinescu) won the presidential elections 
in 19_9_6, it was to Piața Universității that he came to 
celebrate. In subsequent election campaigns the centre-
right parties ‘claimed’ Piața Universității as their base. 
When Romania joined the European Union on the 1st 
of January 2007 the official celebrations took place 
in Piața Universității (despite its unsuitability for such 
a large gathering). But the square is also the focus 
for broader protest against the political class (Jurcan, 
2017), as was apparent in 2012 when large crowds 
gathered to protest against austerity imposed by a right-
wing government and corruption among the political 
elite more broadly1, an event which brought down the 
government of Emil Boc. The following year thousands 
of young people gathered in the square to protest the 
government’s decision to allow a Canadian company 
to open an opencast gold mine in Transylvania, forcing 
the government to abandon the project. And in 2015, 
thousands of people protested against corruption among 
the ruling elite following a fire in the ‘Colectiv’ nightclub 
in which 64 young people were killed. This resulted in 
the resignation of the Government and Prime Minister 
(Victor Ponta).
A New Geography of Protest in Bucharest
Cristian Ciobanu and Duncan Light
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The #rezist protests
On the 22nd of January 2017 following rumours 
that the government intended to pass a law which 
would grant an amnesty to officials jailed for corruption, 
Bucharesters took to the streets in protest. Almost 
instinctively they gathered (in sub-zero temperatures) at 
Piața Universității where they were joined by President 
Klaus Iohannis2 who expressed his support for the 
protests. However, the protesters then spontaneously 
headed towards Piața Victoriei (Victory Square), whose 
name commemorates the 1878 War of Independence. 
Located about 2,5 km to the north (see Fig. 1), Piața 
Victoriei is the site of the Government headquarters and 
it was clear that the protesters wished to come face to 
face with the source of their discontent – the governing 
elite (Mihăilescu, 2017) – rather than restricting their 
protests to a location which had considerable symbolic 
importance but where their actions would have limited 
visibility or impact.  
Thereafter Piața Universității would play little 
role in the #rezist protests (although a small number of 
protesters used it as a gathering place before marching 
to Piața Victoriei). Indeed, on the next significant day 
of protests (Sunday, the 29_th of January) the majority 
of protesters headed directly to Piața Victoriei. And 
again, late in the evening of the 31st of January, after the 
government passed its emergency ordinance, around 
10,000-15,000 people spontaneously gathered in Piața 
Victoriei (in freezing temperatures) in protest3. Protests 
continued in Piața Victoriei over the following week until, 
on the 4th of February, the Ministry of Justice announced 
that the ordinance would be repealed. Although Piața 
Universității was no longer the site of protest, it was 
frequently evoked in terms of the spirit of the protests. 
For example, protesters at Piața Victoriei held placards 
stating “We are the children of the golani from Piața 
Universității” and “Golan 2.0”. Golani means ‘hooligans’ 
in Romanian and was used by the FSN Government 
in 19_9_0 to denigrate the student protesters in Piața 
Universității: it was later adopted as a badge of pride 
by the protesters themselves. Thus, the 2017 protests 
in Piața Victoriei were presented as the direct heir of 
the 19_9_0 protests in Piața Universității.
How can we explain why the main site of public 
protest in Bucharest suddenly shifted to Piața Victoriei 
in 2017?  The explanation seems to lie in a number of 
broader social and technological changes in Bucharest 
over the past decade. In the decade since Romania joined 
the European Union in 2007 there has been the rapid 
growth of a well-educated, young professional class. This 
includes those working in Bucharest for international 
organisations and companies. It also includes the many 
young Romanians who have travelled to (and often 
worked in) other EU countries. 
Young Romanians have a greater understanding 
of how the rule of law works in other countries, along 
with an awareness of how corruption among the political 
elite inhibits progress in Romania and damages the 
country’s international reputation. In addition, students, 
although less active and united as they were 20 years 
ago, increasingly look to other EU countries as models 
for Romania to aspire to. It was these groups of young 
Romanians that formed the core of the #rezist protesters, 
and this explains why so many of them turned out in 
January/February 2017 when compared with previous 
anti-government protests. Their protest was directly 
against the government and to have maximum effect 
it needed to take place in front of the government’s 
headquarters. However, it is significant that most of the 
#rezist protesters were not calling for the overthrow of 
the elected government, but simply the withdrawal of a 
piece of legislation which they considered legitimised 
corruption among the political elite.
Figure 1. Piaţa Universităţii to Piaţa Victoriei
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Furthermore, this young generation of protesters 
was much more aware of how to organise their actions 
so that they would have maximum impact via new media, 
both domestically and internationally. In particular, they 
recognised that filling a large space such as Piața Victoriei 
would have a greater visual impact than would filling 
the cramped and irregular space of Piața Universității. 
One of the authors participated in the protests and 
informally asked other protesters why they had come to 
Piața Victoriei: the answer was invariably “because it’s 
more suitable”. However, the protesters also recognised 
that for their protests to have maximum impact, large 
numbers needed to turn out. For this reason, most of 
the protests attracted at least 10,000 people, with the 
largest (on Sunday, the 5th of February) attracting up to 
300,000 people4. The protesters were able to use the 
large space of Piața Victoriei to make dramatic and very 
telegenic statements: thus, on the 12th of February, more 
than 50,000 people formed a giant Romanian flag by 
holding the torches on their mobile phones underneath 
pieces of coloured paper. They then repeated the 
exercise and formed the EU flag. This event received 
global media coverage, which would simply not have 
been possible in Piața Universității.
In addition, these young protesters made full 
use of the potential of social media. In the era before 
immediate communication through social media and 
smart phones, Piața Universității was a convenient 
and obvious location for protest: it was in the centre of 
the city, all Bucharesters knew its location, and it was 
already notorious as a site of protest. However, social 
media created new possibilities and an enhanced ability 
to organise large numbers of people quickly. Thus, the 
#rezist protests were very effectively choreographed by 
social media, enabling all those who wished to protest 
to find out quickly where and when to gather5. This was 
best illustrated when protesters formed the Romanian 
flag on the 12th of February: each protester knew from 
Facebook where they needed to stand (and were even 
advised about an app – Flashlight – they could download 
which would enable their smartphone screens to display 
a particular colour). 
The 2017 #rezist protests were significant for 
achieving their intent, and the location of these protests 
was central to their success. What is clear is that there is 
a generation of young Romanians who, while respecting 
the symbolic importance of Piața Universității, do not 
share the same attachment to it as their parents. They 
have also demonstrated their ability to organise swiftly 
for maximum visibility and newsworthiness and in order 
to do so have found a new site of protest that was more 
suitable for their purposes. The lessons of January/
February 2017 are obvious and, in the future, public 
protest in Bucharest is likely to focus increasingly on 
Piața Victoriei.   
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Fighting against political corruption is a contradiction 
in terms, possible only in crucial moments such as pre-
accession to EU. The contradiction in terms of the fight 
against political corruption derives from the exclusive 
power of the politicians to legislate or adopt anti-
corruption measures while knowing that this legislation 
can turn against themselves.  While in other parts of the 
world, business self-regulation and self-enforcement 
might be possible, sadly, in Romania’s case, especially 
in the context of the 2017 #rezist protests and their 
aftermath, the current Government adamantly shows 
that this is not in their interest nor their desire. Their 
sustained actions to pass laws aiming to decriminalize the 
abuse of power, political corruption and embezzlement 
of funds along with pardoning their politician mates, their 
funders and the de-facto owners of media channels 
working for them sets a dangerous precedent within 
the European Union. Not to mention that they are set 
to destroy everything Romania has worked to achieve 
since 2005 and after joining the EU in 2007. Moreover, 
as it currently stands, the European Union’s reactive 
response strategy (no matter how trenchant) is insufficient 
to discourage such behavior. 
As Justice Minister (in December 2004) my 
mission was to ensure that Romania eliminated the “red 
flags” that the European Commission has highlighted in 
the pre-accession documents linked to justice. These 
included the fight against high level political corruption, 
reform of the judiciary, and the fight against money 
laundering.  Failing to fulfill any of these would have 
postponed Romania’s accession to the EU. One of the 
measures taken as part of the judicial reform was the 
banning of judges and prosecutors who collaborated 
with the Secret Services both during Communism as 
well as after. It was at the beginning of my mandate 
that I had set up in 2005 the National Anticorruption 
Directorate (DNA), an independent entity, specifically 
aimed at fighting medium and high political corruption: 
that means either acts of corruption undertaken by 
someone in a high public function (ministers, members 
of parliament, mayors, prefects, judges and prosecutors, 
etc.) or whose resulting damages are very high. DNA 
was meant to discourage all corruption by investigating 
and prosecuting those that commit it at the highest 
levels.  Most were convicted. The DNA has been highly 
successful. In 2016 alone, 879_ people have been 
convicted and another 1,270 have been prosecuted 
for high and medium corruption leading to an identified 
prejudice of more than 260 million euros. This includes 
3 ministers, 17 members of Parliament, 47 mayors, 16 
judges and prosecutors and 21 directors of national 
companies (DNA, 2016).  
Considering these recent figures, the Emergency 
Ordinance 13 (OUG13) passed on the night of the 31st 
of January 2017 although it has never been an item 
of the Government’s meeting that day, can be rightly 
interpreted as a symbol of the Government’s attempt 
to continue its “business as usual” without the threat 
of prosecution and potentially jail time. 
There were signs that the PSD-ALDE Government 
installed after the December 2016 elections was aiming 
to dramatically change Romania’s laws and do it quickly, 
and to their advantage. Since their taking office, several 
executive orders have been passed dismantling previous 
legislation set in place by the Cioloș’s technocrat 
government. This included suspending for a year the 
legislation banning mayors to commission expenses 
beyond their allocated budget or divert investment to 
other projects (OUG 6 and 9_). This also included actions 
from the People’s Advocate (Ombudsman) in favor of Liviu 
Dragnea’s taking office as Prime Minister despite his final 
conviction for electoral fraud and the ongoing criminal 
case for embezzlement. The People’s Advocate acted 
basically against the people as he challenged before the 
Constitutional Court a 2003 law prohibiting a convicted 
individual to be appointed in the Government, being it 
minister or Prime Minister.  After 5 postponements, the 
Constitutional Court ruled on the 4th of May 2017 that it 
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found the request inadmissible and that it is only for the 
Parliament to change the 2003 law if it wishes so. We 
now have to be very vigilant with the Parliament where 
the majority is in favor of eliminating the conviction 
condition for taking a seat in the Government for allowing 
the PSD President, the convicted Liviu Dragnea, to claim 
the position of Prime Minister.  
Coming back to the night of the 31st of January 
2017, I too was surprised when OUG13 was passed. I 
was shocked, appalled, hurt. 
OUG13 in Brussels: the principles vs EU’s reactive 
stance on national politics
“Dragnea, do you realize what you did to get rid 
your pending criminal file? You removed Romania 
from the map of the democratic countries. (…) 
Dragnea and Iordache passed these laws for 
themselves in the middle of the night, as thieves” 
I wrote on my Facebook page. 
While the streets were slowly getting filled in 
Bucharest and elsewhere, I was asking for an urgent 
debate in the plenary of the European Parliament on 
Romania’s rule of law. The debate took place on the 
2nd of February and it was an exchange of information 
meant to inform the members on the adoption of 
OUG13 and the reason why it was adopted and its 
first beneficiary, the chair of PSD, party affiliated to the 
European Socialist Party. Definitely, it was also a call for 
support to reestablish the rule of law and I remember 
saying to those defending PSD and ALDE that they 
should come to Bucharest and stand by the people, 
on the streets.  Romania is its people not its politicians. 
During the debate, Frans Timmermans, First Vice 
Chancellor of the European Commission, applauded 
“the force of the Romanian people’s will to become a 
fully fledged European, democratic, open nation” while 
he called promulgation of the OUG as “worrying”: 
“The emergency ordinance and the draft 
legislation pertaining to the fight against 
corruption cannot be interpreted as anything 
other than a step back from the progress we have 
seen in the last decade, and I would urgently call 
upon the Romanian Government to reconsider 
what they have done, both with the emergency 
ordinance and with the draft legislation.” 
(European Parliament, 2017)
Roberta Metsola (member of the PPE group 
from Malta) took a strong stance in Romania’s favour: 
“The EU institutions, and this Parliament in 
particular, cannot remain silent on political 
corruption if we are to remain relevant to the 
people we represent. Let me be clear. This is 
not about the Romanian nation or the Romanian 
people: this is about the corrupt few who are 
working to circumvent the law. Romania’s efforts 
to join the European Union, 10 years ago, were 
pushed by those who wanted a different way, 
who believed in Europe and its value system, and 
who looked to Europe as a way to ensure that 
a crooked establishment never again gripped 
the reins of power. Europe cannot and should 
not abandon those who are reaffirming these 
ideas in the streets of Bucharest and Timișoara”.
For PSD’s representatives at the debate like Andi 
Cristea, Victor Bostianu, Maria Grapini, Norica Nicolai 
and others, this was a crass attempt at disinformation 
from our part, a clear attempt to overturn the December 
2016 elections and an invitation to the EU to meddle in 
Romania’s internal affairs. Mircea Diaconu (ALDE), former 
senator and Minister of Culture, prosecuted by DNA but 
not convicted alluded that “the popular vote is modified, 
stolen, thrown away through other methods than the 
democratic ones” and that as long as people can go 
on to the streets to protest whatever their reason, this 
should be considered as a clear and enough sign that 
democracy is working.” Basically, Diaconu stated that 
while protests are allowed, politicians can be blind and 
deaf to people’s demands.
The debate turned, as Timmermans rightly 
pointed out, into a party-spat but the core of the 
problem remained: that the urgency of the ordinance 
was unwarranted and that its promulgation lowered the 
standards of fighting corruption. At the end of the day 
however: “The Parliament of Romania is sovereign in 
its decisions, and it also has to face the consequences 
of those decisions”. One consequence would be the 
triggering of Article 7 of the EU Treaty for serious 
violations of the rule of law, leading to sanctions against 
Romania. There would be diplomatic consequences as 
well, as this Government cannot be respected and taken 
seriously in any European or international negotiations, 
and this is going contrary to the Romanians’ interests. 
The debate in the EP Plenary led the PSD 
MEPs to call for an additional meeting with the LIBE 
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commission. This took place in Brussels on the 22nd of 
March where the newly appointed Minister of Justice, 
Toader Tudorel, Prof Gabriel Liiceanu, journalists Liviu 
Avram and Attila Biro, Victor Alistar (last one, on behalf 
of PSD) were invited to speak, designated by some 
political group, after very tough negotiations.  I invited to 
the LIBE hearing representatives of the protesters from 
more Romanian cities and also from European Capitals 
were protests were held. Unfortunately, they were not 
allowed to ask questions or make any comments. This 
was something unseen before in a “public” debate. If 
members of LIBE, including those from the socialist 
group (where PSD members are) really wanted to know 
what happened, the first to ask should have been the 
protesters and listen why they took the streets. It was a 
humiliation to force them to remain silent while others 
were speaking about the reasons of the protests. LIBE is 
chaired by an English member of the Socialist group and 
he contributed to these rules against the long practice 
of openness in the public hearings in the European 
Parliament. Even I, a LIBE full member, was banned to 
distribute to my MEP colleagues albums with photos 
from the protests.    
The next event, a LIBE mission to Romania,  was 
scheduled for the 26th - 28th of June this year but the 
meeting has been postponed to a yet unknown date. 
This LIBE mission requested and organized by PSD 
looks to many like a trap. At this mission are expected 
to participate pro-PSD NGOs and media funded by 
convicted politicians and media owners (Antena3 is 
owned by former senator Voiculescu, former Securitate 
collaborator and, serving a 10 years sentence in prison 
for money laundering and other crimes) while impartial 
NGOs and other media are reluctant to attend. Concerns 
on the fairness of the upcoming mission were raised 
by the presence of Claude Moraes, the LIBE President, 
in recent interviews at Antena3; the channel has been 
for a long time the home of fake news, defamation or 
lynching those supporting the anticorruption initiatives 
or judges who convict politicians and oligarchs. 
The fight must go on
OUG13 was repealed by OUG14 on the 9_th of 
February 2017, a few days after the debate in the EP 
Plenary. However, it was the fear of the protests growing 
and more and more people taking the streets all over 
Romania that made the government repeal OUG13 
rather than the European views and debates. The 
Government’s position to defend its convicted felons 
and their assets over Romania’s interests in Europe and 
worldwide fuelled further the distrust the protesters were 
already harbouring. This is why the protests continued 
even after OUG13 was repealed with their demands 
changing to the resignation of the Government. The 
protesters have seen (in part) their demands met. The 
first to resign was the Minister for Business, Trade and 
Entrepreneurship, arguing, inter alia, that he could not 
look into his child’s eyes after the adoption of OUG131. 
He was then followed by Minister of Justice, Iordache, 
known for his disastrous post-OUG13 and internet meme 
“Another question” (alta intrebare) press conference.
The debate and the subsequent LIBE 
Commission meeting did not deter the Government in 
Bucharest. They might have brought the people a sense 
of support and strength, and my fellow colleagues a 
renewed sense that Romania’s democracy was under 
threat but brought no immediate measures from the EU. 
On corruption, the EU is powerful only in the 
countries which are on the path to accession. After a 
country becomes an EU member, the situation changes: 
corruption and anti-corruption are considered a national 
matter and therefore left to the decision of the member 
state, based on the principle of subsidiarity. The EU cannot 
regulate for all its members on matters of corruption, as 
it can do on the internal market, competition, budget 
and many other matters.  
In fact, the EU is strict with its applicants and, at 
times, incapable of enforcing its own rules and regulations 
with its member states. Romania’s red flags might have 
been removed in the years prior to its accession to the 
EU but with actions like those taken by the PSD-ALDE 
Government they are likely to return.
12 years after Romania’s accession to the 
EU, politicians are fighting back; it is, it seems to me, 
inconceivable for them to cease carrying out their 
corruption and thus, in response, they attempt to eliminate 
the anticorruption laws and institutions instead. In fact, 
over 9_0% of the provisions of the repealed OUG13 have 
now been promoted in the Romanian Parliament as 
parliamentary initiatives, including the pardoning and 
the decriminalization of abuse of power but with a much 
higher limit. These draft laws have made their way up 
to the second chamber of Parliament where they are 
currently under discussion, some of which have been 
submitted even before the first LIBE commission took 
place. Moreover, the Minister of Justice, Toader Tudorel, 
announced that he plans to submit to the Government 
additional draft laws to change the criminal Codes, all 
this by the end of June 2017.
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The current political events in Romania prove 
that a battle between the clans in PSD has started; the 
convicted PSD leader Dragnea tabled just days ago an 
unprecedented motion of non-confidence against PSD’s 
own Government run by a PSD Prime Minister. Grindeanu 
as response, appointed the former PSD leader Ponta as 
Secretary General of the Government, although Ponta 
is a notorious plagiarist and prosecuted by DNA.  
Political instability is a crime against Romania 
and this is being committed at a crucial moment when 
the EU is recovering on new criteria of power and the 
strategic partnership with USA has just been reinforced. 
For now, the only choice left is for Romanians to 
continue to protest and for the protesters to get organized 
and get active. Only by playing the democratic game, 
can Romania’s EU legacy survive and the protesters’ 
hopes for a Romania where the rule of law is respected 
come true.  This is in people’s hands and they must be 
alert and ready to defend Romania, including by taking 
on to the streets again if it need be.  
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Early 2017, international media focused on Romania due 
to a massive and highly creative protest, the so-called 
#rezist. For the first time in a long time (probably since 
the 19_89_ Revolution), the Romanian citizens and the 
civic spirit they showed in February 2017 attracted the 
sympathy and admiration of the international media and 
gathered a positive image worldwide for Romanian civil 
society and democracy. However, it is less known that 
the demonstrations that broke out at the beginning of 
the year are not a novelty for Romania. This protest was 
preceded by other anti-system rebellions or supporting 
specific causes, so we may say that a culture of protests 
has developed strongly in Romania in the last six years. 
The culture of protesting beginning in 2011 
created a framework for public communication in times 
of crisis which the current Romanian Government had 
to attempt to ameliorate in February 2017.
A Communication Strategy Based on Fake News
The #rezist protests have made use of the 
current tools of communication to maximize their 
potential, and at the same time have capitalized on 
the experience already gained in previous protests. 
Although late, the Government too has also connected 
itself to the current trends in public communication; we 
are referring here to the use of fake and post-truth news. 
The fake news phenomenon is a topic that is 
lately intensely analysed and debated by scholars, due to 
its widespread occurrence and impact. Recent evidence, 
Allcott and Gentzkow (2017, p.212) say, indicate that 62% 
of US adults get news on social media (probably, a large 
percent of adults get their information on social medial 
in other countries too) and that the most popular fake 
news stories were more widely shared on Facebook 
than the most popular mainstream news stories. More 
worryingly perhaps is that many people who see the 
fake news stories report that they actually believe them 
to be true.
What makes fake news to be so powerful? It is 
difficult to have a definitive answer, but many researchers 
argue in their studies that, on the one hand, people have 
a natural disposition to partisan news (Bullock et al. 2015), 
and on the other hand, it is more difficult to refute fake 
news because of their lack of rationality (Della Vigna 
and Gentzkow, 2010). These two reasons might justify 
why fake news are so present and so intensely used 
within political communication processes.
There were several strategies designed 
to discourage protesters and dismantle public 
demonstrations (one of them which failed consisted in 
the mobilization of “hardcore” soccer fans to instigate 
violence within the peaceful protest), but the only 
consistent strategy was the one built around the 
generation and dissemination of fake news. So, the 
Government’s narrative talked about “street war” or even 
a “coup”. The officials of the coalition holding the power 
(i.e. the Social Democrat Party and its allies) accused 
multinational companies of forcing their employees 
to take part in the demonstrations and the political 
establishments’ friendly media (e.g. Romania TV) claimed 
that some protesters had received monetary incentives 
which would have been supplemented if they were 
accompanied by a pet1. 
The Government communication topics during 
the #rezist protests shows a process of making the 
truth relative. In fact, the fake news strategy was used 
to substantiate that the protests were fake themselves. 
The obvious goal was to discredit the protesters, their 
intentions and the good faith thereof. According to the 
communication strategy based on fake news about 
protesters, the audiences of such fake news that claimed 
fake protests were not primarily those people protesting 
on the streets of Romania (these people don’t vote for 
PSD, they are the political opposition’s electorate), but 
other social categories with lower civic activism and 
who did not participate in such demonstrations, but 
they traditionally vote for PSD (e.g. retired, low skilled 
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workers, people in rural areas, etc). The latter had to be 
convinced that the protests did not have the claimed 
extent, and in any case, they were manifestations with a 
hidden agenda, orchestrated by foreign forces that had 
interests contrary to the national interest (accidentally 
or not, the former dictator Ceaușescu had suggested 
the same about the protests which erupted in the ’89_ 
Revolution). 
How has this been accomplished?! 
By using fake news as tools to achieve the 
goal outlined above. More specifically, prejudices have 
been amplified (i.e. xenophobia, the idea that young 
people are exalted and their grasp of reality is wrong) 
and negative emotions were fed (fear of social disorder 
that brings poverty, distrust).
In brief, the Government’s communication 
strategy aimed to create major social cleavages on the 
Latin principle divide et impera (divide and rule) and 
to achieve this goal it was necessary to discredit the 
protests by launching fake news – a fashionable tool 
and proven to be highly effective in other social and 
political contexts.
How it’s done
From the plethora of fake news articles launched 
during the protests, I will review only two, namely the 
ones with the highest circulation in terms of frequency of 
mention and that managed to remain high on the public 
agenda, causing many debates: (1) the multinationals 
mobilized people to go out for protests; (2) the citizens 
participating in protests are organized and paid by 
George Soros (an American billionaire of Hungarian - 
Jewish descent) who has special interests in Romania. 
It was not by chance that these two pieces 
of news were promoted by the representatives of the 
political establishment and its friendly media. The first 
piece of fake news appeals to existing beliefs in the 
collective mind-set that multinationals exploit Romania’s 
natural and human resources while having interests 
contrary to the national interest and practicing tax 
evasion. The second piece of fake news is based on the 
fear and distrust in others, in brief xenophobia, fuelled by 
conspiracy theories (according to one of such theories, 
the fire in the Colectiv club was intentional in order to 
overthrow the then Social Democrat Government for the 
benefit of a part of the political establishment supporting 
and being supported by the current Romania’s President 
Klaus Iohannis).
Building the communication strategy around 
fake news observed the following scenario: in the first 
stage, fake news appears in some obscure (online 
or mainstream) publications, then the information is 
reworked and disseminated by the mainstream media 
that is friendly to the political establishment which cites 
obscure and unverified sources, and subsequently 
launches debates upon these subjects, amplifying, in 
this way, the initial fake news story. In the third stage, 
the politicians supporting the Government take on 
their own discourse the information launched on mass 
media’s and eventually add their personal touch on it.
Let us review the route of the fake news 
mentioned above.
Within a debate held at a PSD friendly TV station, 
Romania TV, on the 30th of January,  a moderator (Denisa 
Pașcu) argues that her sources (without providing any 
details to confer them credibility) declared that protesters 
are paid through the NGOs established in Romania by 
the Hungarian billionaire Soros. In order to substantiate 
and provide apparent accuracy to the information, the 
moderator of the TV broadcast puts forward the amounts 
that would have been paid to protesters: “Adults were 
paid RON 100, the children earned RON 50 and for each 
pet the protesters were paid RON 30”2. 
Immediately the information is repeated by all 
the Social Democrats’ friendly media outlets, including 
high-rated media (TV station Antena3, news website 
DC News). At the same time, the PSD’s communicators, 
including PSD’s President, Liviu Dragnea, took up this 
topic in their public discourse, resurrecting a theme 
from the previous electoral campaign related to foreign 
interference in Romania’s internal politics and the hostile 
interests of George Soros.
The second story is built on the same strategy. 
In the first phase, the online newspaper PH-online.ro 
presents a story titled “REVOLT at Yazaki! The claim made 
was that employees were forced to go out into the street 
to protest against the GOVERNMENT!”3. Subsequently, 
Yazaki, an automotive industry components manufacturer 
located in the city of Ploiești, denied the information 
on its official Facebook account, but this (small but 
essential) piece of information was lost in the avalanche 
of messages invading the mass media those days. The 
original fake news in the online newspaper is taken up 
again in the public discourse by the PSD President, Liviu 
Dragnea. He supports the need for multinationals to be 
investigated by the Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI) as 
the former engage in organizing protests. In a TV show, 
the PSD leader endorses the fake news by providing 
an example: the CEO of an important foreign bank, 
Steven-van-Groningen, as also present at the protests. 
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The statement of Liviu Dragnea was formulated 
as follows: “It seemed to me more than incorrectly that 
the CEO of a foreign bank, a foreign citizen, to protest 
against the [Romanian] Government. Normally he may 
be upset about the “Datio in solutum” law or for other 
things we did for Romanians”4. Dragnea implied that 
the simple fact that a foreigner banker was protesting 
is something wrong and that Steven-van-Groningen was 
dissatisfied with some laws adopted by the Government 
aimed to negatively affect the bank’s profits. 
In the third phase, the news on the newscasts of 
obscure websites and the political leaders’ statements 
are repeated, debated and additionally backed up by 
the communicators of the party holding the power and 
its friendly media. 
Why is This Communication Strategy so Efficient and 
How Can We Tackle it?
This communication strategy is extremely 
effective, mainly for two reasons: 
• It blends untruths that are hard to disprove 
with easily accessible, believable and 
verifiable truths among the public (e.g.: 
it is hard to prove that multinationals 
are not involved, because you cannot 
actually prove something which is 
absurd, but it is easy to notice the fact 
that the CEO of a foreign capital bank 
participated in the protest, regardless if 
he participated as a simple citizen); 
• It is hard to prove the untruthfulness 
of some absurd / ridiculous situations 
/ facts (e.g. the nonsense to pay for 
pet participation in protests); 
• Last but not least, reason and solid 
arguments come second in times of crisis, 
priority being given to emotions which 
appeal to the collective mind-set imaginary 
(shaping thus ideas in the long run).
It is worth mentioning that citizens have reacted 
to the fake news broadcasted by certain TV stations. The 
Romania’s National Audio-visual Council (CNA) received 
over 1,500 complaints in January and February alone, 
almost 10 times more compared to the same period 
last year5.
Beyond the counter-action above, the question 
remains: How do we combat such a strategy? A possible 
answer is found in McLuhan (19_64), even after more 
than 50 years from its formulating: “The medium is the 
message”. The discussions about and debates upon 
solutions could start from the role of televisions, the 
traditional media in general, the journalistic deontology, 
exposure of the general public to online and mainstream 
information and arguments, public debates organized 
within local communities each designed to offer better 
civic education and media literacy to citizens. The issue 
of fake news and their influence is a wider topic that 
affects many societies, hence Romania is part of an 
international media trend. Same as in other countries, 
talking about the existence and the impact of fake 
news and together with the launch of several websites 
and apps for checking fake news are, in fact, possible 
solutions for decreasing the impact of fake news. Such 
Romanian apps and websites are: Verificasursa.ro, “De 
necrezut” App, Factual.ro. 
Reality has shown us that beyond the long-term 
cultural change that this generation active in protests has 
launched, it is hard to guess the outcome for democracy 
itself. The last six years have shown, however, that protests 
have been very effective in Romania in bringing about 
short-term political changes. It is however premature to 
consider the long-run perspective.
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The internet provided the spark and the fuel for the 
anti-corruption protests, but television news channels 
provided insight, explanations and interpretation of the 
largest demonstrations since the fall of communism in 
December 19_89_. In Romania, most of the population uses 
television as the main source of information, according 
to the data shown in the last edition of the International 
Encyclopedia of Media Effects (2017). The audience 
of 55+, retired or part-time employed, on minimal 
income, that never travelled abroad or even outside 
their town village fall into the category of heavy users 
of a single channel, according to an analysis published 
by paginademedia.ro (2014)1. 
The coverage of street protests that took place in 
late January and early February 2017 against the decree 
that decriminalized corruption displayed stark differences 
between Romania’s various television channels, perhaps 
the most striking being between Digi24, Antena3 and 
Romania TV. The research took place during the 22nd of 
January and the 7th of February, the programs monitored 
being the main evening newscast of Digi24, presented 
by Cosmin Prelipceanu, Roxana Lazarescu or Liana 
Patras, Antena3’s main talk show Sinteza Zilei, hosted 
by Mihai Gadea, and the breaking news and special 
editions moderated by Corina Dragotescu, Cristina 
Sincai and Victor Ciutacu on Romania TV. 
The news channel Digi24 took an early interest 
in the executive order prepared by the ruling political 
coalition made up of the Social Democratic Party (PSD) 
and the Liberal Democrat Alliance (ALDE) to decriminalize 
several offences, the most obvious being the abuse of 
power becoming punishable by incarceration only if the 
sums involved were over 200,000 lei (cca. €44,000). 
Before OUG13 was adopted, the information was 
published off the record on the news website hotnews.
ro and rapidly spread across social media networks and 
blogs. The news was ignored by most of the television 
channels as Prime Minister Sorin Grindeanu, the head 
of the ruling party Liviu Dragnea and all the relevant 
officials in the cabinet and the Parliament denied the 
information. However, independent journalists, activists, 
political analysts and legal experts were invited as 
panellists in the evening programs of Digi24 to explain 
the consequences of the Ordinance. 
“OUG13 “would have stopped all investigations 
for pending corruption offenses, freed officials 
imprisoned for corruption, and blocked further 
investigations related to those offenses from 
being brought to justice” (Cristian Pantazi, 
hotnews.ro).
Digi24 was the only TV station which broadcasted 
live from the eve of the demonstrations that started in 
mid-January in Piața Universitatii in Bucharest, with 
dozens of protesters holding hand written signs. On 
the 22nd of January, the cameras showed live shots 
of President Klaus Iohannis who decided to show his 
support for the protesters by joining the first major anti-
corruption rally. “The problem is that one cannot act 
the way the government did in a country with the rule 
of law, which Romania is and wants to remain” was the 
President’s reaction when interviewed at the emergency 
meeting of the Superior Council of the Magistrates 
(CSM) (Digi24, 01.02.2017). Iohannis’ requests that the 
Government should immediately scrap the measure 
were broadcast by Digi24 throughout the day, as well 
as the statements of Jean-Claude Juncker, the head of 
the European Commission: 
“The fight against corruption needs to be 
advanced, not undone. We are following the 
latest developments in Romania with great 
concern.” (Digi24, 02.02.2017) 
#Resist on TV. 
Three Romanian news channels: two different 
perspectives on the anti-corruption rallies
Towards a Romanian Culture of Protests 
Rodica Melinda Şuțu 
 79_Romanian protests 2017 
#Resist on TV. 
doi.org/10.23774/QUAS.RP2017.14
Author: Rodica Melinda Şuțu 
After the OUG13 was adopted by the Government 
on the 31st of January, and the protests spread across 
the whole country, with hundreds of thousands of 
Romanians marching in the streets, the topic dominated 
the entire agenda of this news channel: newscasts and 
live reports Piața Victoriei in Bucharest, as well as major 
cities such as Sibiu, Iasi, Constanța, Cluj-Napoca. There 
were aerial shots to show the magnitude of the rallies, 
live reports from the journalists who followed the events 
in the streets, and live interviews with the protesters that 
explained their presence at the demonstrations. “They 
are thieves. The only way to stop them is to stay in the 
street until they repeal OUG13”, and “I came here with 
my son because I don’t want him to grow up in a country 
led by politicians that make corruption legal” were some 
of the opinions of the protesters interviewed by Digi24. 
The manner of reporting was informative and the 
tone of Digi24 journalists was neutral, as the emphasis 
fell on the people in the streets and their voices, without 
adding the opinions and comments of the guests that 
are usually invited in the studio. The broadcast of “no 
comment” pictures such as aerial shots of the hundreds 
of thousands of people lighting their phones in the dark, 
forming the Romanian flag with their red, yellow and 
red clothes, or the natural sound of the voices singing 
the national anthem simultaneously across the country 
generated an emotion that spread across online and 
social media. 
In the case of Antena3, the emotional outbursts 
of the moderators of the talk shows and their guests were 
directed against the protesters, regarded as a source 
of chaos and political instability. The political analysts 
invited in the studio, such as Bogdan Chireac and Mugur 
Ciuvica, as well as the host Mihai Gadea drew a parallel 
with the volatile situation in Ukraine, one of Romania’s 
neighbours. They compared the demonstrators against 
the decree that decriminalized corruption in January and 
February 2017 with the miners that beat to death five and 
injured hundreds during the massive anti-government 
protests in June 19_9_02.
The moderators of the talk shows on Antena3, 
Mihai Gadea and Mircea Badea, accused the protesters of 
being verbally aggressive towards one of their reporters 
and vandalizing their video equipment. The situation of 
the group of about 300 football fans called Ultras that 
came on one of the nights of the demonstrations and 
threw fireworks and rocks of ice and solidified snow at 
the police came as a support of the station’s claims that 
all the anti-government protesters are violent. Antena3 
argued that the ruling coalition “was entitled to issue any 
law they please, as the left-wing Social Democratic Party 
(PSD) won elections in December 2016 with about 45% 
of the vote” (Bogdan Chireac, political commentator). 
They gave the example of the former technocrat cabinet 
of Dacian Ciolos, which passed a few decrees (none of 
them justice related though) and presented the initiative 
of the current government as an act of clemency. The 
host of the main evening program, Sinteza Zilei, Mihai 
Gandea, made an analogy with the pardons American 
President Barack Obama, granted at the end of his 
second mandate. The story was illustrated with photos 
showing Obama at a dinner table with some beneficiaries 
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of his act. There were close ups and dramatic camera 
zooming on the American president hugging men and 
women that had tears of gratitude in their eyes. 
The accusations made by the protesters that 
the immediate beneficiary of the decree would be PSD 
leader Liviu Dragnea, who faces charges of defrauding 
the state, led to the Romanian Prime Minister Sorin 
Grindeanu being invited in the studio of Antena3. He 
explained that “the changes in the legislation were 
needed to align some laws with the constitution and 
reduce prison overcrowding” (Antena3, 05.02.2017). 
Also interviewed by Antena3, Liviu Dragnea called the 
rallies an attempt at a “coup d’etat to threaten the PSD’s 
governing program of wage increases and other reforms 
aimed at helping the poorest”. In Dragnea’s view, the 
“coup” was orchestrated by the country’s president Klaus 
Iohannis, Romania’s secret services and the Romania’s 
National Anticorruption Directorate (DNA). 
“The organization of these protests and their 
scale show that this is a political gathering. Who 
is organizing this? I reproach myself for not 
having understood that this is a much better 
organized plan than a simple spontaneous 
movement” (Antena3, 05.02.2017)
The politicians from the ruling coalition, invited in 
the studio of Antena3 accused the National Anticorruption 
Directorate of “being overzealous with its investigations 
and its prosecutors of being the successors to the feared 
communist secret police” (Securitate). 
The third news channel monitored for this report, 
Romania TV, also presented the protests as the beginning 
of a coup d’etat organized by the president Klaus Iohannis 
and implemented by the secret services and the DNA. 
The politicians invited in the studio of Romania TV live 
programs accused the demonstrators of threatening 
the national security; lawyer Pavel Abraham, former 
chief of the Romanian police, went as far as urging the 
authorities “to use guns and war ammunition against 
the protesters that abusively occupied Piața Victoriei”. 
The moderators of the main evening program claimed 
that they “know for sure that billionaire George Soros 
paid the protesters and advanced the sum of 20 euro 
for people and 10 euro for dogs”. Corina Dragotescu, 
one of the anchors, said, referring to the profile of the 
protesters: 
“They were carefully selected to form a positive 
image in the international media: young, 
educated, well dressed, good looking.” (Romania-
TV, 23.01.2017) 
Interviewed by the reporters of Romania TV, 
the Minister of Labour and Social Welfare, Lia Olguta 
Vasilescu, and the Mayor of Bucharest, Gabriela Firea, 
both members of PSD, criticized the Romanians for 
bringing their children to the demonstrations and called 
for “an investigation of the parents for putting the 
children in jeopardy” (25.01.2017). In terms of filming, 
the shots Romania TV cameras took from the rallies in 
the streets were tight, so that the number of protesters 
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seemed smaller than in reality, and the selection of the 
interviewees supported the policy of the government. 
One interviewee in the street was a former convict that 
complained that the conditions in prison were despicable 
and urgent measures are necessary, while another 
expressed the gratitude to the ruling party for salary 
and pension raises (RomaniaTV, 22.01.2017). 
It is interesting to notice that the owners of the 
last channels mentioned have been involved in activities 
related to corruption. Media mogul Dan Voiculescu, 
the owner of Antena3, was sentenced to 10 years in 
prison, charged with money laundering and fraudulent 
privatization of the Food Research Institute (ICA), worth 
about €7.7 million3.  
The 67-year-old former senator and founder of 
the Intact Media Group was accused of having used his 
political influence to cheaply privatize this institute and 
damaging the state by more than €60 million (stirileprotv.
ro). Sebastian Ghita, the owner of Romania TV, is a 
former MP who disappeared in mid-December 2016 
and was included on Europol’s most wanted list. Ghita 
is investigated for corruption in a case related to former 
British PM Tony Blair’s visit to Romania in March 20124. 
The messages aired on Romania TV and 
Antena3 played an important role in the mobilization of 
the counter-protest, the pro-government demonstration 
in front of the presidential palace, that gathered a couple 
of hundreds of people during several days. The majority 
of participants at the rally were senior citizens, asking 
for Klaus Iohannis’s resignation. They denounced him 
as “traitor”, accused him of “dividing the nation” and 
“preventing the government from working in the benefit 
of the Romanian citizens”. 
On the other hand, Digi24’s broadcast was 
more news oriented, showing the amplitude of the anti-
corruption rallies, the messages of the protesters and 
the exact content of OUG13. The attitude and tone of the 
anchors were neutral, the images reflected the reality in 
field, and the accounts of the reporters were accurate. 
Digi24 targeted a completely different audience than 
Romania TV or Antena3, appealing to a younger public 
that attended or supported the anti-corruption meetings 
held in Piața Victoriei in Bucharest or other cities such 
as Timisoara, Sibiu, Cluj-Napoca or Iasi. This audience 
was mostly middle class, individuals or families with 
children, who watched Digi24 while also getting their 
information from social media, online newspapers and 
independent journalists’ blogs.
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Big protests happen in big cities. The more populated a 
city is, the chances are that any protest it would witness 
would be proportionate to its population. Equally, a big 
city would geographically have more space(s) where 
people could gather in comparison with towns or villages. 
Moreover, the bigger the city, the more opportunities to 
identify a building or space that embodies either the spirit 
of the protest or that represents the institution or idea 
against which protesters have gathered to voice their 
opposition and discontent (Price & Sabido, 2016). This 
is the case of Ukraine’s Kiev’s relabeled “Euromaidan” 
(a combination of a reference to being European and 
the Russian square – maidan), Cairo’s Tahrir’s Square 
(Liberty Square) or Bahrain’s Pearl Roundabout. 
While not all big protests have been in public 
spaces, many recent ones have.
“Georgia’s Rose Revolution  in 2003 toppled 
President Eduard Shevardnadze from Tbilisi's 
Freedom Square. Kyrgyz protesters seized 
Ala-Too Square from police in 2005, then 
promptly  stormed the nearby presidential 
palace and ousted long-time President Askar 
Akayev. Ukraine’s Orange Revolution in 2004 
took place in the same Independence Square 
where protesters have now engaged in bloody 
clashes  with government forces,  wringing 
promises  from President Viktor Yanukovych 
for early elections and a return to the 2004 
constitution” (Ford, 2014). 
For big protests to be truly big, they need to 
appeal beyond capital cities. In order to do so, they need 
to capture the attention of national and international 
media and the imagination of local populations. This 
was the case of #occupy, of the Arab Spring and more 
recently of Romania’s #rezist protests. 
The #rezist protests are considered to be 
Romania’s biggest since 19_89_ but that is not simply 
because of the number of people gathering on the streets 
in Bucharest, but rather due to the number of people 
protesting elsewhere (in the provinces and abroad) and 
due to the length of the protests (continuing for more 
than 100 days at the time of writing, in May 2017). 
To fit the cause and reflect the anti-corruption 
narrative of the protests, the center of the #rezist protests 
was Piața Victoriei, in front of the Government building 
and not in Piața Universității, Bucharest a space that 
had until 2017 been the usual place of protest (see 
Ciobanu and Light in this report). The counter-protests 
happened in front of the Cotroceni Presidential Palace. 
As the anti-corruption protesters focused on a space 
facing the government, pro-government demonstrators 
(some hundreds of them compared to the thousands 
of anti-government protesters1) faced their bete noire 
President Klaus Iohannis.
It is in Piața Victoriei that Romanians gathered 
to send their message to the world, staging their two 
visually appealing and strategically viral pictures: the flag 
of lights (on the 12th of February) and the EU flag (on the 
26th of February). Both images aimed to represent the 
solidarity and unity of the protesters, one emphasized the 
location and origin (Romania) while the other referenced 
Romania’s place in Europe and the anti-corruption 
conditions of the nation’s membership. These images 
did capture the imagination of the international press 
(like the Guardian2, the Washington Post3 or Die Welt4), 
so becoming the emblems of the protests. 
As a capital city, Bucharest had the size (of people 
and spaces, including the opportunity for polarization 
enabling thus generally peaceful demonstrations) and 
the spatial (the square, the Government building) and 
the symbols (the staged images) so that demonstrators 
could have impact, face their opposition and produce 
communication from a space that was instantly 
recognizable and had broader symbolic meaning (Ainger, 
2016). 
Importantly, other cities and towns in Romania 
followed suit. At the beginning of February tens of 
thousands protested in the provinces: 50,000 in Cluj, 
Here, there and everywhere 
How space and images shaped the Romanian #rezist protests
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25,000 in Timisoara, 20,000 in Sibiu and 10,000 in 
Constanta. Later on, as 70,000 protesters in Bucharest 
were organizing to form and project the image of the 
Romanian flag, there were 30,000 in the provinces, 
10,000 of them in Cluj alone (there were 2,000 protesters 
in Timisoara, 2,000 in Iasi, 1,500 in Brasov and 350 in 
Constanta – Ziare.com5). There were other cities where 
smaller crowds gathered, for example in Oradea, Cugir or 
Tecuci and others where just one person would protest: 
this was for instance the case of Florin Branisteanu 
(interviewed by Ana Adi - see "Protester profiles" article 
this report) in Bacau. 
The symbolism of the protest was re-presented 
into the small city geography where the main city 
squares became the centers of activity and marches 
took place passing by (or stopping if possible in front 
of) the Prefecture buildings (the representations of the 
Government in the counties). However, the distance 
that Bucharest afforded for the peaceful polarization 
of discontent, was at times impossible in the provinces 
– either physically (as there was no such space) or 
personally (as the communities were small). This story of 
being the only one visibly on the “resist team”, is painfully 
told by Florin Branisteanu. Branisteanu, a 37-year old 
accountant and a hearing impaired entrepreneur living 
in Bacau, used his placards to “shout” every evening in 
Bacau’s main square. While messages of support were 
pouring in on Facebook from other cities in Romania and 
diaspora, at home Branisteanu had become the target 
of PSD members one of whom in particular had taken 
it as her mission to discredit him to his family and urge 
his family members to pressure him into stopping his 
protest. For a while their tactic worked as Branisteanu 
stopped going to the city square at the request of his 
eldest daughter but returned recently as his Facebook 
posts show.  
Branisteanu embodied #rezist and, in Bacau, 
his hometown, he became the symbol of #rezist. Not 
only did he adopt the symbols of the protest (the flag, 
the placard, and his occupation of the main square in his 
city) but he also started to produce bracelets with the 
#rezist symbol. Moreover, in such a small community, 
Branisteanu himself became the symbol of resist through 
his resilience and perseverance. 
The #rezist message also travelled abroad. A 
Google Map6 listed 52 cities abroad where anti-corruption 
The EU flag made out of lights in Piata Victoriei in Bucharest, Romania; estimates indicate between 5-6,000 
people to have contributed to creating the flag.  
Daniel Mihailescu/AFP via Getty Images
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protests took place (side by side with 65 places where 
protests took place in Romania). The map’s source and 
ownership could not be verified.  The #Rezist Diaspora 
Facebook page7 records an even higher number: 
81 cities across the world in 36 countries including 
Paris, Milan and London where big Romanian diasporic 
communities reside as well as more  unexpected sites 
such as Yokohama or French Guyana.
Here, like in the provinces, the Romanians and 
their supporters gathered in places that either reminded 
them of Romania (like the Romanian Cultural Institute in 
London or the Romanian Consulate in Berlin and Munich) 
or in places with high visibility, increased pedestrian and 
tourist footfall (like the Dome Plaza in Milan, Trafalgar 
Square in London, the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin, the 
European Parliament in Brussels or having the Eiffel 
Tour in the background in Paris, a market square in the 
city of Kenitra, Morocco or the famous tour of Seattle). 
At times, to get the attention of passersby and start a 
conversation, they resorted to flash mobs and creative 
interpretations of the Romanian protests. This is how 
Sibiu’s literary protest was re-enacted in London and 
Paris and the Bucharest flag of lights has its own version 
with balloons in Paris. 
The Rezist Diaspora Facebook page offers a 
compelling collection of images from around the world 
which are usually stamped with the rezist hashtag, the 
country and city name, sometimes also indicating the 
date of the protest. The images are generally focused on 
the people and their placards, most of them handwritten, 
leaving little to be seen of the environment surrounding 
them. This is where Vlad Lascoi’s picture taken while 
on duty on a cruise ship in Antarctica was reposted and 
this is where several one-man protests can be identified: 
the diving protest performed by a man in Mexico, one 
man and his flag in Sri Lanka or one young man and his 
handwritten rezist sign on a street in Bangalore. 
When it comes to groups, location is either 
not easy to distinguish or cannot be seen at all. The 
Melbourne protest image is taken in the dark, focused 
on the placard alone. In French Guyana it seems to show 
the living quarters of the five protesters while the other 
five protesters in Koln are pictured in a park.  The San 
Francisco group is on a beach, the Dublin group could 
have been on any street or alley in the city and so could 
the photos taken of big crowds orderly huddled along 
a sidewalk on a frozen morning in Olso. The Dallas 
photograph on a bridge shows some of the cityscape 
contours. The Italy group from Carapelle (Foggia) are 
pictured protesting on the 5th of February with a green 
ink placard in hand and patiently yet gloomily looking 
into the camera is indoors; the space is reminiscent to 
an airport arrivals hall.   
From these images, one could infer that it was 
the act of protesting and of showing solidarity and support 
with the protests in Romania that was valuable for the 
Romanian anti-corruption protests in diaspora according to a Proteste #Rezist Google Map. 
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Romanians abroad and that considerations of visibility 
(especially in smaller cities or further away locations) 
were not taken into account. This direct connection with 
what was going on in Romania is perhaps best shown 
in the image of the crew from Congo. 
This mirroring of the Romanian protests has 
been mentioned in this volume by Moisin and Ioan and 
also seen in Adi’s protester’s profiles. 
The #rezist protests started out of indignation. 
Protesters quickly identified both the spaces and the 
symbols with which to associate their protest, managing 
thus to capture the imagination of media and people 
beyond the Romania’s capital city of Bucharest. By 
leveraging powerful symbols with a short and clear 
message and enabling each participant in the protests to 
reinterpret these symbols, the protests invited resistance 
and resilience through creativity. Their message has 
survived and the lessons learned are now helping some 
of them get organized.
Rezist Protest group in French Guyana9 
Rezist protesters in Carapelle, Italy10 The Boys from Congo know as well that Dragnea is a 
Jerk (see Girls from Sibiu know that Dragnea is a Jerk)11 
Rezist protester diving in Mexico8  
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It was the 36th day of Romanian protests, quietly 
diminishing as days went by and life resumed its placid 
rhythm.  The number of protesters reduced drastically 
after the Government repealed the infamous OUG13, with 
nothing but a “communication error” excuse, and kept 
decreasing to about 2-3 hundreds during the evenings.
As the mainstream media stopped informing 
about the protests, everybody started behaving like they 
had gotten over it, like the protests were old news. But 
they weren’t for us, we were still intrigued, we were still 
angry, we were still frustrated, or maybe even more so. 
You can’t just break and enter, steal things, and 
then, when caught, just get away with the whole thing just 
because you were forced to give things back. Although, 
this was exactly what was happening, the government 
was getting away with it and people looked like they 
were accepting that.
We were a group of 5-7 people continuing to 
protest during the day in front of the Government building; 
ordinary people, with jobs or businesses, family and 
lots of friends with different interests but who shared 
common values and a dream that Romania can evolve.
Beatrice gave up all personal projects and 
became a fully dedicated protester for over 100 days, 
keeping her eyes on the Government for 8-9_ hours a day 
and transmitting live from various locations and events 
where the civil society was protesting. She’s had all the 
support of her family during this period.
Cristi is an entrepreneur dealing with fire safety 
equipment and procedures, and for him it was only natural 
to protest as a form of protection against abuses of the 
state; his NGO Evolutie in Institutie1 (Evolution in the 
Institution) aims to put pressure on public institutions to 
follow the law and implement existing procedures to the 
benefit of the citizens. He has made sure the protesters’ 
activities complied with existing laws and thanks to him, 
there are now a few thousand more Romanians that 
know Law 60/19_9_1 (law for public assemblies) by heart.
Cristina and Constantin are entrepreneurs; they 
own a company selling cleaning products and devices 
and have two beautiful sons educated to be active 
and balanced citizens. Constantin is happy to share 
his life experience and volunteering campaigns for the 
environment on his personal website2 and has been 
our principal reporter and technician although he has 
no formal training in media/communication.
Adrian is a freelance programmer who has 
dedicated his last 6 years to developing a platform 
for participative democracy – Panoul de bord (Civic 
Dashboard)3; he dreams that people will one day be 
actively involved in making the decisions now controlled 
by the state. He is currently working on a mobile app for 
sending legal petitions to state institutions on various 
areas of interest.
Diana works in human resources for a 
multinational and 2017 was the first time she participated 
in a collective protest. Very active on her own, challenging 
public institutions and companies to obey the law and meet 
their obligations towards the citizens, she is extremely 
proud to have seen all those Romanians out in the street 
demanding their right to a normal life in a democratic state. 
One day, one of us started broadcasting live on 
his Facebook account. Then, another one said, “Hey, we 
should talk with the people that are watching us, let’s start 
a dialogue, let’s express our concerns, and let the people 
know why we are here”. There were all kinds of lies4 that 
were being propagated by the party in power through 
their controlled televisions: that we were Soros’s people; 
that we were being paid to be there by the multinationals; 
that we were brain controlled with psychotronic waves5. 
In the beginning, when we were hundreds of 
thousands in the streets, a lot of people came with dogs, 
and children, and the propaganda said that even the 
presence of dogs was paid6.
So there were a lot of shameless lies, and we 
thought that live transmission from the protests is a 
good way to counter all that, and say to everybody that 
we were there for justice, for democracy, to defend our 
rights, and to request the current government to leave 
because it wasn’t eligible anymore and had damaged 
the credibility of our country to EU and NATO partners.
Romanian protests:  
Piața Victoriei TV, the civil society's voice 
Adrian Cristian Ionescu and Diana Carmen Ciudin
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It wasn’t long until we realized that a common 
Facebook page where we could all transmit live is better 
as it could aggregate all broadcasts on a single page that 
people can follow and stay updated. The most relevant 
name for the page was that of the square in front of 
the Government where we had been protesting: Piața 
Victoriei (Victory Square). The name of the square was 
in consonance with our goals and it fitted perfectly. And 
so, on the 5th of March the Piața Victoriei TV was born. 
We started rapidly gaining an audience and reached 
about 4,000 likes in the first week. We were also sharing 
our posts (daily video transmissions from the protests, 
interviews with protesters) on larger groups on Facebook, 
formed earlier: #REZISTENTA, 600000 pentru Rezistenta, 
Corupția ucide, Geeks for Democracy. The day this article 
was written (the 25th of May) Piața Victoriei TV had over 
8,700 subscribers receiving our content and a post reach 
of 540,000.
Piața Victoriei TV aims to increase awareness 
about the citizens’ constitutional rights but also the 
obligation to defend the rule of law. And it does this 
through short live broadcasts trying to inform about our 
constitutional rights or explaining legal or economic 
concepts. It is said that we live in a democracy, however 
60% of people with a right to vote didn’t cast their vote, 
and many of them don’t understand why it would be 
important to do so. It is said that we live under the rule 
of law, although, if you ask, probably 9_ out of 10 people 
won’t be able to tell you what that means. So I guess that 
what we are trying to cover with this new kind of media 
is what was ignored and/or blocked by mainstream 
media and formal education. We are trying to force 
and enforce transparency in public institutions, we are 
disseminating relevant information about civic actions, 
promoting dialogue, educating, and, most of all, giving a 
voice to the civil society.
None of us has had prior experience or 
education in media, communication, public speaking, 
taking interviews, promoting events, but we were ready 
to learn and we even bought professional technical 
equipment from own funds in order to increase the 
quality of our transmissions; filming in the middle of 
traffic or after sunset was diminishing the clarity of 
our videos; after acquiring special microphones, smart 
selfie sticks and a spotlight, our followers appreciated 
the improvements. 
There are a lot of Romanians living abroad and 
from other cities in the country that support our protests 
and have been sharing their thoughts during our live 
transmissions. Most people from the diaspora have 
expressed regret for not being able to attend the street 
movements from Romania; some shared information 
about their own local protests; many have stated that 
the reason for leaving the country was corruption which 
leads to poverty and lack of job opportunities. There 
were people asking how they can help us; there were 
ideas about talking to relatives back home who had 
voted for the coalition parties and opening their eyes; 
sending letters to EU officials to request support for the 
Romanians fighting against corruption. We have been 
contacted by different NGOs or individuals inviting us 
to promote and broadcast live from events they were 
organizing (protest for a pedestrian walkway in a very 
congested neighbourhood of the capital city; cleaning 
event in Vacaresti Delta or the Bucharest beltway).
Nowadays lots of other groups and individuals 
transmit live, either from protests, or from different events 
that bear relevance to the current political turmoil in our 
country. To maintain our relevance, we have diversified 
our coverage and started transmitting from civic events 
and actions; for example, PVTV has had broadcasts 
from the European Parliament hearings related to the 
Romanian protests7, discussions against changing 
anticorruption law; garbage cleaning from different areas; 
debates on hot topics with opposition political parties; 
Mr Timmermans’ dialogue with Romanians encouraging 
civic involvement8. 
On the 10th of May, the Piața Victoriei TV merged 
with the largest closed Facebook group created during 
the protests - #rezistenta and it was renamed Rezistența 
TV. A series of interviews with public figures from all 
walks of life (opposition politicians, economists, writers, 
a judge) was initiated thus opening a dialogue with our 
followers on relevant topics. 
The civil society has become the new opposition 
for the ruling coalition and the new media, like our 
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Rezistența TV is pivotal in keeping informed, educated 
and involved this new opposition.
We have a long way to go, but we feel that 
a lot of us woke up and realized that we have to get 
civically involved. We hope that we might achieve a true 
democratic society using the ever advancing technology.
The democratization of information seems to be 
a big shift in how societies behave and organize. Those 
in power simply cannot control undesired information 
from surfacing, because now almost every citizen can be 
a reporter. This shift is only in its infancy in Romania, but 
it is already having visible effects. Currently it happens 
only within groups of people that belong to the younger 
generations, but it is spreading quickly. No oppressive 
regime can maintain its position under these conditions. 
Although we are still a long way from winning the battle 
against the old system – the corrupt, bureaucratic state, 
we are confident that we are facing one of the last 
convulsions of a disappearing beast, the oppressive state. 
Piața Victoriei TV/ Rezistența TV is but one of the many 
civic initiative examples that will contribute in a small 
but significant way to reshaping Romania’s future.
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Endnotes / Media links
1. https://www.facebook.com/EIIromania/
2. http://www.reluparaschiv.ro/
3. https://panouldebord.ro
4. An article about “fake news” and manipulation 
by media during the protests at the beginning 
of 2017: https://www.news.ro/externe/afp-
stirile-false-alimenteaza-euroscepticismul-in-
romania-19_22400102002017041816885837
5. A report about counter-manifests to 
support the Government and the opinion 
of those protesters http://stirileprotv.ro/stiri/
actualitate/imagini-de-la-contra-manifestatia-
de-la-palatul-controceni-aproximativ-150-
de-oameni-scandeaza-impotriva-lui-klaus-
iohannis.html
6. An article about Romania TV channel 
disinformation with regards to dogs and 
protesters being paid, with video fragment 
from their show on January 22nd 2017 
http://romanialibera.ro/actualitate/eveniment/
foto---video--manipulari-la-romania-tv--
burtierele-au-transmis-ca-la-protestele-din-
bucuresti-s-au-platit-30-de-lei-de-caine--50-
de-lei-de-copil-si-100-de-lei-de-adult-4389_14 
7. Video transmission from EU Parliament 
LIBE committee https://www.facebook.com/
RezistentaLIVE/videos/270429_2067359_72/
8. Full video coverage here: https://
www.facebook.com/RezistentaLIVE/
videos/285724008539_825/ and https://
www.facebook.com/RezistentaLIVE/
videos/28575335853689_0/
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I propose a critical approach to the process through 
which two Romanian Facebook (FB) groups evolved 
from unbiased political positions, consistent with the 
new media values promoted by the FB creators (see 
below), to biased political discourse, contrary to the 
mission statements posted by the FB community leaders 
themselves soon after the number of users grew in 
a matter of hours and days, subsequent to the anti-
corruption civic protests that burst out in January – 
February 2017.
 The first group under scrutiny is #Rezist 
(Romania Rezista)1, a FB community which was set up 
spontaneously on the 8th of February 2017, to support 
the street protests in Bucharest, against the PSD 
Government’s sudden issuing of Emergency Ordinance 
no. 13/2017 (OUG13).
The second FB group, Corupţia ucide 
(Corruption kills)2, started its activity much earlier (after 
the Colectiv fire), and joined the January – February 
protests consistently contributing to the coherence of 
the anti-Government movements too.
The street protests were sparked on the 31st of 
January, soon after 11 PM., when the National Television 
[TVR1] broadcast the press conference of the then 
Minister of Justice Florin Iordache. 
Why was this press conference the reason 
for which anti-corruption protesters came out into the 
streets of Bucharest, invading the Square outside the 
Government headquarters, in the middle of winter, at 
low temperatures? 
First, the announced Ordinance confirmed the 
public’s suspicion that the newly appointed Government 
led by Sorin Grindeanu as Prime Minister had a secret 
plan to alter national legislation, so as to annul the Law 
articles that could concern PSD members who had been 
charged, and in some cases, imprisoned, because of 
acts of corruption. First and foremost, the protesters 
interpreted the effects of OUG13 as the Government’s 
attempt to remove the charges of misconduct in public 
office against PSD leader, Liviu Dragnea.
The protesters were encouraged by the fact that 
President Iohannis himself wrote: “Today is a mourning 
day for the rule of law”3 on his Facebook page4, precisely 
during Iordache’s conference. Moreover, the intensity 
of the street movements was enhanced by Iordache’s 
arrogance and unwillingness to answer journalists’ 
questions at the press conference. According to 
www.realitatea.net5: 
“Justice Minister Florin Iordache had an absolutely 
hilarious performance at the government press 
conference after the adoption of the Ordinance 
on criminal codes. To the sharp questions of 
journalists, Minister Iordache avoided direct 
answers and always went to “another/next 
question!”6. 
 Corupţia ucide was the most active Facebook 
page during the protests7. This page already had a 
long history related to anti-corruption protests. It had 
been launched during the street protests in Piața 
Universității [University Square] in 2015-2016, following 
the Colectiv tragedy, which led to the fall of the Victor 
Ponta Government. Actually, the page discussions about 
the January – February anti-Government protests were 
activated again on the very night of the 31st of January, 
and are still active at the time of writing.
As I mentioned in the introductory paragraph, 
some Facebook groups, such as #Rezist (see home page 
photo), were born during the first days of February, after 
the beginning of the January–February street movements 
and were specifically devoted to them. This page became 
so popular that many of the people in Piața Victorei 
(outside the Government headquarters) and throughout 
Romania, later on, would carry “#Rezist” banners and 
shout “#Rezist” slogans. Actually, as reported at that 
time, the initiative of the hashtag came from:
“Iulian Uță8 has registered with OSIM the 
trademark #REZIST [...] The idea came 
from a Spaniard, member of Podemos“ 
(StareaPresei.ro: Branduidu-vă #Rezist)9_.
Active Facebook Groups 
during January – February Movements
Ruxandra Boicu
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Facebook in Romanian politics
The power of Facebook has been used in 
Romanian politics for the last 12 years. Its technical, social 
and inter-relational virtues have made some politicians 
create personal pages and post visual and verbal 
messages intensely. Remus Cernea11, Victor Ponta12, 
Elena Udrea13, Crin Antonescu14, Dan Diaconescu15, etc. 
were active FB users even before the 2014 Presidential 
election which effectively proved how influential social 
networks may be in politics and in society, in Romania too.
Basically, in the second round of the presidential 
election, on the 16th of November 2014, Klaus Iohannis, 
supported by some active FB groups, succeeded in 
turning the first-round results around in his favour and 
becoming President, in spite of all polls. It was for the 
first time in Romania when the online environment played 
a decisive role in an electoral campaign:
“I did not believe at the beginning of the 
campaign that this new party that appeared in 
Romania, called the Facebook Party, alongside 
the other new party in Romania, called the 
Diaspora Party, would have this force and this 
determination to turn the result of the vote. 
The Social Democrat candidate, Prime Minister 
Victor Ponta, lost in the second round, obtaining 
45% of the votes, according to the data, after 
the counting of 9_9_.07% of the votes. In the first 
round, he had received 40.44% of the votes, 
while Iohannis was then elected by 30.37% of 
those who voted.”16
Since that date, Facebook has been respected 
and feared by Romanian politicians, due to its above-
mentioned technical and social possibilities. Technically, 
it was devised so as to show the profile of its users; 
technically and socially, it enables the creation of groups, 
communities of practice, relying on users’ common 
goals, beliefs, values, etc. Facebook conveys informative 
messages and invitations to Events. This complexity 
of usages has turned FB into a privileged channel for 
political communication.
But was Facebook created for political 
communication? 
Its creators considered that between politics 
and FB, there is a conflict of interests: its initial status 
forbade political bias and involvement. Coleman & 
Blumler (2009_, p. 175) stated it explicitly: ”E-democracy 
must be supported by civil society, not by the forms of 
government”17. The link between Facebook and politics 
was controversial at first. The very collaboration between 
Chris Hughes (Facebook co-founder) and Barack Obama 
(when Hughes himself became Obama’s campaign 
adviser) led to questions and allegations about the conflict 
of interests between political action and the nonpartisan 
status of this social network (Slotnick, 2009_, p. 252)18. 
Keeping this ideological clarification in mind, 
we have to acknowledge the legitimacy of the use 
of social networks, in general, by civic, unbiased 
groups such as Corupţia ucide and #Rezist. Their 
administrators, moderators, or common members posted 
a kind of manifestos, besides regulations concerning 
communication rules on the pages of each of these 
two groups. 
Mission statements vs. biased discourse
In its “mission statement” Corupţia ucide, whose 
founder was Florin Bădița, emphasizes that his FB 
community is committed to educating, informing and 
making citizens responsible regarding their “freedom 
and rights”, as well as regarding “the less healthy 
things” that happen on Romania’s political and social 
stage. More clearly expressed, irrespective of the age 
or professional differences within the community, its 
members are united by a shared aspiration to “live in a 
better Romania … a Romania which should respect its 
citizens and their rights.” 
 Likewise, in a later post on the 12th of February, 
under the very name of the FB page, the creator of the 
group synthesizes the contribution of this group to the 
anti-corruption protests in January–February19_, posting 
that, apart from the first spontaneous protests on the 
31st of January, the “street actions had been announced 
through Corupția ucide in conjunction with other groups 
in Romania or in the diaspora.” Besides specifying the 
significant role that Corupţia ucide played in the protests, 
Coruptia ucide Facebook page header10
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the group leader supplies some pragmatic information 
about short- and long-term objectives, as well as a strict 
plan of concerted events, flashmobs, to be attended by 
this FB group users or readers.
What is the identity of this group? 
A team of 350 young people administered this 
most active page during various protests. The page was 
created, as stated earlier, by a young and enthusiastic 
IT specialist from Cluj, Florin Bădiță, in November 2016. 
The initial goal of the page was to offer space for online 
debates, and to create events and funny banners/
slogans for the protesters. In the meantime, the group 
has become militant for citizens’ rights, in an explicitly 
democratic way, through editing a joint Proclamation21, 
with the participation in debates of large categories 
of publics. 
 As of the 10th of June 2017, Corupţia ucide 
has 59_,473 members, among them some outstanding 
intellectuals, reputed university professors, such as 
Brînduşa Armanca, Mircea Kivu and Mariana Neț, to 
mention just a few.
  #Rezist (Romania Rezista), on the other hand, 
was created as a FB group on the 8th of February, 
nine days after the start of the street protests. It has 
been an anti-corruption group in the making: although, 
on the home page, three users were announced as 
moderators, they do not fulfil their role consistently. 
Maybe, that is why, an undeclared moderator but a very 
vocal member, Alex Maranda, was recently in search of 
a genuine moderator of the discussions, as an incipient 
organizing initiative (Alex Maranda: ““We are looking 
for moderators throughout the country. We can’t go on 
without them22”; and the answer came from Corneliu 
Guşă, a new member: “I volunteer”23. Corneliu Guşă had 
only posted a few times before this conversation took 
place in April 2017. He answered the members’ need 
of organization and of ideological clarifications.
Unlike Corupţia ucide, #Rezist (Romania Rezista) 
is a small group of 3,203 members, including some 
journalists, such as Marina Constantinoiu and Moise 
Guran, artists like Tudor Chirilă, and other public figures 
from more heterogeneous backgrounds.
 On this group’s home page readers are 
presented with a code of communication that they 
should accept before becoming members proper; among 
the rules, candidates find out that they should 9_9_% post 
personal contributions, under the form of ideas, initiatives 
and actions. As to the candidates’ values and principles, 
the three declared group administrators specify that 
they accept only those who “love Romania”, that is, 
those for whom the “political colours are red, yellow 
and blue”; likewise, applicants should be correct and 
accurate towards political leaders and their statements, 
should prefer action to passivity (so as to be dignified 
“in the eyes of their sons and daughters”), and should 
“feed on ideals and hopes, not on hate and fear”). 
Netiquette rules are also mentioned here: “refrain from 
racism, xenophobia, discrimination … offences, insults, 
ad hominem attacks …, incitement to violence” and last, 
but not least, in my opinion, “avoid biased statements.”
But could the “#Rezist” members live up to 
these high expectations or lofty ideals?
 I found the answer to these questions in the 
group discussions. For instance, related to insults and 
#Rezist/Romania Rezista Facebook group header photo20
 9_8Romanian protests 2017 
Active Facebook Groups during January – February Movements
doi.org/10.23774/QUAS.RP2017.17
Author: Ruxandra Boicu
swearing, when a member posts a statement made by 
former President Ion Iliescu for the media, in which he 
wonders “who is behind the street protests”, member 
Roşu Corneliu replies: “Just you see how many of us 
will be behind your mortuary car to swear at you!”24 
 Concerning the highly stated “love for Romania”, 
here is an offensive generalization, a negative stereotype 
about Romanians, posted by member Lucia-Maria 
Popescu: 
“Romanians feel good co-existing with the 
absurd and with overturning of values …, they 
have adapted to theft, lies, and cheating …, they 
make friends with any political formation that 
offers even the slightest material advantages” 
(posted on 7 May)25.
 Moreover, can we say that the discussions 
on #Rezist are unbiased, when moderator Mihaela 
Condurache’ posted an explicit reference to her political 
adversary on the 9_th of February? She scolds her co-users: 
“I thought we’d agreed to check newcomers, 
hadn’t we? There were some suggestions of 
receiving some people into the group a few 
seconds ago and by the time I could look at their 
profiles, they had already been accepted. I’ve only 
checked one of them and he had pro PSD posts. 
Are we going to do this job properly, or not?” 
(posted on the 9_th of February)26.
Many other posts contain explicit conflictive 
replies to known or unknown adversaries as well as 
friendly references to President Iohannis, former Prime-
Minister Dacian Cioloş, etc.
At this stage, it is important to mention that, on 
Corupţia ucide, the political stage is not drawn only in 
black or white (as it was the case of #Rezist), and there 
is a wider debate and range of references to politicians 
or events that do not seem to have direct relevance for 
the January–February street movements, such as Elena 
Udrea, Traian Băsescu, or the anti-Putin protests in Russia.
What has happened with the a-political 
orientation of these groups in the meantime? 
As a #Rezist opinion leader, Lucia-Maria Popescu 
states/posts, “We should organize ourselves!27, which 
is the most explicit urge not only to joint protests, but 
also to political commitment.
In conclusion, both FB groups started their 
January–February discussions in the true spirit that 
reigned when Facebook was created, that is politically 
unbiased. Moreover, both communities pledged to host 
values and actions in the interest of all Romanian citizens. 
Yet, their discursive practices, as demonstrated above, 
have become ever more partisan; some verbal attacks 
at some Romanian political actors (more on #Rezist 
than on Corruptia ucide) have marked the adoption of 
political stands.
In addition to the online use of political 
discourse, mainly on #Rezist, Cotidianul28 published 
an article, entitled “#Rezist is becoming a political 
party”29_ where one could read that #Rezist brand has 
been registered at the State Office for Inventions and 
Trade Marks [OSIM]. There are still vivid debates on this 
FB group and in Romanian society, as a whole, about 
this controversial issue.
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Election, pp. 249_-271 in Politicking Online: 
The Transformation of Election Campaign 
Communications, edited by Costas 
Panagopoulos, 2009_, Rutgers University 
Press
19_. https://www.facebook.com/notes/
corupC89_Bia-ucide/comunicat-de-
presC483/58559_6031629_306/
20. https://www.facebook.com/groups/
romaniarezista/
21. www.ProclamatiaRomania2017.ro
22. „Ţară, țară vrem moderatori în grup, nu 
facem față.”
23. Original text: “Sunt dispus” https://www.
facebook.com/groups/romaniarezista/
permalink/485529_9_18445263/?match=-
YWxleCBtYXJhbmRhLG1hcm-
FuZGEsYWxleCw3D
24. Original text: “Să vezi ce mulți o să 
fim noi în spatele dricului tău sa-
ți aducem m.m de final! https://www.
facebook.com/groups/romaniarezista/
permalink/48538745179_2843/?comment_
id=485687348429_520&comment_
tracking=7B22tn223A22R227D
25. Original text: “Românii se simt bine în 
conviețuirea cu absurdul şi răsturnările 
valorice …, s-au adaptat furturilor, 
minciunilor şi înşelătoriei …, sunt prieteni 
cu orice formațiune politică care oferă 
avantaje materiale, fie ele chiar minimale“ 
https://www.facebook.com/luciamaria.
popescu.3?hc_ref=SEARCH&fref=nf) https://
www.facebook.com/groups/romaniarezista/
permalink/485531465111775/
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26. Original text: Parcă stabilisem că verificăm 
pe cine introducem în grup, nu? Au apărut 
câteva sugestii de introducere în grup acum 
câteva secunde şi până să intru pe profilurile 
lor, deja se acceptaseră. Unul singur l-am 
verificat şi avea postări pro PSD. Facem 
treaba asta cum trebuie sau nu?“ https://
www.facebook.com/groups/romaniarezista/
permalink/439_329_18639_8670/
27. Original text: NE ORGANIZAM! https://www.
facebook.com/luciamaria.popescu.3?hc_
ref=SEARCH
28. www.cotidianul.ro/rezist-devine-
partid-29_6759_/
29_. Original text: “#Rezist’ devine partid”
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The widespread fame acquired by the January-February 
2017 anti-corruption protests that took place in almost 
sixty Romanian cities has quickly generated Wikipedia 
pages1 in Romanian, English and German that offer 
an outline of the events, and include daily attendance 
figures.
The quick dissemination and the huge ratings 
that the Romanian protests attained worldwide are 
linked to factors that can be analysed from a socio-
anthropological, communicational and media perspective. 
The most influential international media largely reported 
about the protests: Reuters, AFP, DPA, Associated 
Press, Deutsche Welle, BBC, The Guardian, Le Monde, 
Euronews, Russia Today, The New York Times, CNN 
etc. Even CCTV (China) or Telesur (Latin American 
TV network) sent correspondents to Bucharest. The 
Romanian news channels – RTV, Antena3, B1 TV, DIGI 
24 got the biggest audience ever: at a national level the 
ratings doubled or tripled (paginademedia, 2017)2. The 
analogy with the massive demonstrations of the 19_89_ 
Romanian Revolution also brings out the fundamental 
differences in communication. Analysis and comments3 
on the #rezist movement have stressed the particularities 
of the 2017 mediatic context, which prompted different 
communication strategies. 
As sociologist Dan Jurcan (2017, p.52) notes:
“If 19_89_ was the year of the televised revolution, 
more recent protests are defined by social 
media mobilization. Televisions still serve as 
‘boomboxes’, amplifying the message”.
Nevertheless, after 28 years, humour is still 
among the favourite strategies employed by protesters, 
with notable differences in magnitude: during the 
Revolution, people ruefully chanted “We want candies 
for Christmas, not a mad leader”4, and stuck a Hitler-
moustache on Ceaușescu’s portrait, lampooning 
dictatorship in all its incarnations. Having become the 
main target of satire in both slogans and placards, 
(alongside Florin Iordache, the Minister of Justice, and 
Călin Popescu Tăriceanu, President of the Senate and 
leader of ALDE, a coalition party that barely made it past 
the 5% parliamentary electoral threshold), Liviu Dragnea 
got Stalin’s moustache and was cheerfully saluted with 
‘Harasho mustache!’5, bringing historical allusions closer 
to home and imbuing them with a particular Eastern feel. 
This is not the first time that humour has been 
employed to undermine the dominant narrative, but its 
emergence in political activism is linked to the pervasion 
of our daily urban lives by the Internet and social media. 
Recent sociological studies indicate an increase 
in street protests that make use of humour to counter 
aggression and use Facebook or Twitter to send a 
mobilizing, nonviolent message. 
“One encounters here a humorous approach 
to protesting – one that makes fun of political 
adversaries, notably PSD president Liviu Dragnea, 
with funny custom-made posters, video projections 
on buildings, puppets – as symbolic representations 
of discontent. This generation’s discovery of 
politics and protests as the preferred channel to 
interact with the political system coincides with 
current technological developments, enabling 
a leaderless, spontaneous, and all-inclusive 
movement” (Rammelt, 2017).
Humor as a form of symbolic communication 
during the February 2017 protests in Romania 
Brîndușa Armanca 
Cool moustache – Harasho, Ordinace!6
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An IRES survey7 of 9_80 subjects, 18 years of 
age and older, conducted over three days (6-8 of March 
2017) using the CATI method, with a 3.5% margin of error, 
shows the average protesters to be: young people and 
adults below 50 years of age, with average (30%) and 
high (40%) education levels, urban dwellers, working 
(76%), mainly in the private sector, or students (11%). 
Higher levels of education can partially account for 
the creativity and the abundance of positive – though 
resolutely critical – messages, through long periods of 
demonstrations in harsh winter conditions. 
Unpublished estimates indicate that between 
300 and 400 critical messages were posted during the 
protests, most of them satirical or humorous in nature, 
in various forms that could be reposted on social 
networks as pictures or clips: placards, laser projections, 
puppets, masks, costumes, slogans, and chants. Although 
the latter were spontaneous productions of a certain 
kind of enthusiasm fueled by public solidarity, their 
creators had multiple goals in mind: visibility through 
mass-media coverage, wide civic involvement and 
pressure on government officials to withdraw OUG13. 
Increased coverage by international media brought 
forth a change in tactics, as placards in English or other 
international languages (German, French) started to 
appear in Bucharest and in all major cities. Political or 
cultural contextual references increased the impact: 
Make Romania corrupt again (Bucharest), #Rezist up to 
Untold8 (Cluj-Napoca), Les Miserables (Timișoara) etc.
The use of “fair-ground props” – trumpets, 
vuvuzelas, puppets, drums, masks, music ensembles, etc. 
– served to further ridicule and undermine governmental 
authority, as officials lay hidden inside their fortress 
of power, unwilling to reach out to the street. Most 
memorable were the five giant handle-operated puppets 
depicting the five targeted officials (Dragnea, Tăriceanu, 
Grindeanu, Ponta and Iordache) in prisoner uniforms. 
In a news coverage from Bucharest dating the 20th of 
February, the correspondent of the Associated Press 
noted the dark humor and sarcasm: 
“Theatre was one of the few tools of resistance 
under the suffocating communist regime of 
Nicolae Ceausescu, with metaphors and double-
entendres taking the place of overt protests. The 
country’s post-communist political life at times 
resembles operetta, so it’s hardly surprising 
drama has permeated the protests. Protesters 
have played violins or guitars, danced or staged 
impromptu plays or dances, in a mélange of 
Romanians’ dark humour and witty sarcasm. Life-
size cut-outs of politicians from the governing 
Social Democratic Party-led alliance dressed 
as convicts have been paraded around Victory 
Square. Images of 15th-century prince Vlad the 
Impaler, who punished thieves by cutting off 
their hands, also popped up” (Mutler, 2017).
What stands out is the witty humour, usually 
rejecting obscenity and profanity in favour of allusion, 
innuendo, and elegant subversion. One of the subtler 
placards shows a message for Prime Minister Grindeanu, 
considered by many to be Liviu Dragnea’s obedient tool. 
It reads: Sorin, blink twice if you’re in need of rescue. 
Some of the more popular slogans that circulated 
throughout the country are: Noaptea ca hoții! (Like 
thieves, in the night!), PSD, ciuma rosie (PSD, the red 
plague), DNA să vină să vă ia! (DNA should come and 
take you), Altă întrebare (Next question – used 47 times 
by the former Minister of Justice, Florin Iordache, during 
the press conference), Fax you, Dragnea!, Abrogați și 
plecați! (Repeal and leave!), #rezist (resist), #văvedem 
(we see you), #neam trezit (we have awoken/nation 
awaken) were among the most commonly used hashtags. 
One notices the numerous references to literary 
works (Les Miserables, Țepeș Lord, where hast thou 
gone?9 Ion Creangă10 paid for the stolen cherries), 
cinema (No country for old thieves, Chuck Norris help 
us!, Batman is here, Live long and protest), ads (Dragnea 
– connecting people, Enjoying Corruption since 1989, 
No more Victoria’s Secrets, High Class Fashion with 
jail uniforms and handcuffs, I see smarter Cabinets at 
IKEA), IT (Error 2017!!! Democracy not found, Stop-Undo-
Delete or Ctrl+Z) or online games (Enough is enough/
Angry birds). It is also amusing to note how phrases 
made famous by recent political events were given new 
meaning, adapted to this particular context or glocalized 
(to borrow a concept from philosopher Marshal McLuhan 
and sociologist Roland Robertson), suggesting careful 
research and an increased interest in the topics of the 
day on the part of the protesters: Jesuis Mircea Marian, 
with the variation We don’t be Liviu, Make Dragnea small 
again, Jos Erdogan de Teleorman! (Down Erdogan of 
Teleorman!), When injustice becomes law, resistance 
becomes duty (Thomas Jefferson).
The presence of children and dogs in public 
squares, at separate morning events branded as ‘protests 
of the innocent’, served as a pretext for the authorities 
to take issue with the demonstrators, and also provided 
an opportunity to fight back the officials’ attempts to 
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mislead public opinion through such politically-driven 
media outlets as Antena 3, RTV, B1 TV, DC News, 
Jurnalul Național. Government officials responded poorly, 
displaying the very arrogance and lack of transparency 
they were being accused of, by trying to downplay 
the number of protesters, urging PSD supporters to 
set-up counter-protests (which took place in front of 
Cotroceni Palace, official residence of the President 
of Romania, deepening social divisions), or accusing 
foreign enemies such as George Soros, the European 
Union, multinationals, embassies, etc. of malicious plots 
against the government. 
Dragnea’s statement that American billionaire 
George Soros was funding the protests, including 
dogs, was met with dry replies, coming from the pets 
themselves. Placards showing giraffes or cats asking for 
payment, the picture of a dog displaying the following 
message: Soros, where is my money? or that of Kumo, the 
star-puppy from Piața Victoriei, have gathered thousands 
of likes on Facebook. This spontaneous and satirical 
communication strategy succeeded in undermining 
governmental conventions and the dominant narrative, 
gaining temporary control of the public arena and taking 
officials by surprise, as a recent study published on 
realclearworld.com shows:
“What makes movements successful is in fact 
creativity and the ability to easily shift tactics. 
In this way, movements stay unpredictable. 
They become difficult for opponents to break 
or contain, and they are fun for participants” 
(Popovic and Sallai, 2017).
In spite of all the insinuations made by the 
government aligned-media, which tried to discredit the 
concept of spontaneous humour, most of the placards, 
slogans, chants and posters are the anonymous creations 
of the protesters. “Romanians are born poets” was a 
PRO TV feature in the news program14 on the wittiest 
messages and banners. Copyrighters involved with the 
protests worked in plain view: an offer for professional 
posters could be found on the Art of Protest website15.
Placard at #Rezist Protests in Bucharest11
Dragnea: Connecting people placard, referencing to 
one of Nokia’s memorable campaigns12
Dog at #Rezist protests. “I feel like howling” reads 
the message on the placard13
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All these received widespread attention on the 
Internet. Many images coming from live smartphone 
streaming went viral on Facebook, and again, the 
increased pervasion of Romanian life by social media 
played an important role, as was the case with the 
Colectiv fire protests. 
According to Facebrands17, Romania had 
9_,600,000 Facebook users in January 2017, with 44,44% 
take-up, most of them under 55 years of age. The 
previously mentioned IRES study indicates that among 
those who took part in the 2017 rallies and protests, 78% 
acquired information from Facebook and TV channels, 52% 
from Facebook, and 36% from WhatsApp. Most of them (i.e. 
76%) used the smartphone as their main technical device. 
Improved access to high-speed internet, made possible 
by extended broadband signal, played an important role 
in the emancipation of urban area populations. The gap 
between city and village, between urban centre and 
provincial town, which includes access to information, has 
widened in recent years despite European development 
funding, and these differences are reflected in protest 
attendance. There were towns with only one protester, 
like Odobești18, Bârlad19_, and Onești20. Nevertheless, the 
viralisation of certain messages and pictures has expanded 
the audience well beyond special or geographical limits, 
confirming the effectiveness of social media in social 
activism and the efficiency of humour in the way events 
are perceived: 
“Humour can spread virally through the 
worldwide group in a digitally driven embodiment 
of laughter itself, cultivated in evolutionary 
terms to spread like a contagion through a 
gathering as quickly and efficiently as possible” 
(Weitz, 2016).
These messages were digitally archived 
on platforms such as www.lozinci.ro or compiled on 
www.danagont.ro. Soon after the protests ended, Curtea 
Veche Publishing published a selection of some of the 
best photographs, placards and written texts produced by 
the participants. Art critics Pavel Șușară from Bucharest 
and Dana Sarmeș from Timișoara have announced an 
exhibition of placards and protest props.” The outstanding 
inventiveness and creativity of the messages become 
a cultural construction”, argued Șușară for news.ro21. 
”Collected in a book, the photos become 
relevant snapshots for the historical year 2017, 
showing to the sceptical people that a new 
generation of citizens could protest in a different 
way comparatively to the 9_0ties: without hate, 
without grim. Next generations need this kind 
of testimonial, as a reference for a founding 
event of their history”, said Iren Arsene, general 
manager of the publishing house, for the site22.
Les Miserables placard in Bucharest’s Piaţa Victoriei16
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Although lacking in ideology and leadership, 
and concerned primarily with pressing the case for moral 
integrity, the #rezist movement (successfully labelled as 
such on Twitter by Luminița Dejeu, a resident of Cluj) 
succeeded in drawing in by contagion a massive number 
of protesters in a spectacle that circled the globe, in 
which giant renditions of the Romanian flag (the 12th of 
February) and the EU flag (the 26th of February) were 
created in Piața Victoriei, with the help of the smartphone 
flashlights. Izabela Lazăr23 from Bucharest came up with 
the idea and the technical solutions for this incredible 
happening. The anti-corruption protests in Romania were 
impressive in their massive attendance, persistence, the 
resilience of its participants until OUG13 was withdrawn, 
and also in its nonviolent and playful nature. 
“Humour facilitates outreach, mobilization, a 
sustainable culture of resistance as well as 
challenging power by engaging in the discursive 
guerrilla war with hit-and-run attacks”25.
Humour as a basis for civic activism is delightful, 
but bears certain risks: some people might think that 
things are not serious or are not taken seriously, or that 
humour does not have the power to solve important 
political issues. Here is yet another dilemma posed by 
a Swedish scholar: 
“The final dilemma: the claim that satire might 
make people disillusioned rather than encourage 
them to take action” (Sorensen, 2016, p.27).
By “practicing their trade as citizens” as 
philosopher Gabriel Liiceanu recently said during a 
speech held at the European Parliament, the symbolical 
resistance of the Romanian people has turned, during 
the final stages of the protests, to concrete civic action, 
through the drafting of Proclamation for Romania 2017+ 
(Timișoara Civică 2017)24, that originated in Timișoara as 
an addendum to the 19_9_0 Proclamation of Timișoara25 
and was brought to the attention of the governing parties. 
Article 8 states that ‘no person convicted of criminal 
offences should hold public office’. This demand has 
yet to be answered.
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3. E.g.:Liiceanu G. Retieved from http://www.
contributors.ro/editorial/mai-avem-13-ani-de-
rezistat/ Pop D. Retrieved from http://adevarul.
ro/news/eveniment/rezist-neo-activismul-fu-
2-10-1_58a085d9_5ab6550cb867cdc9_/index.
html / Cioaba/ C. Retrieved from http://www.
contributors.ro/editorial/de-ce-trebuie-sa-
rezist/
4. Vrem saloane de Crăciun/Nu conducător 
nebun!
5. From Russian ` harasho’, which, in this context, 
can be liberally translated as ‘Well done, 
moustache!’
6. http://utopiabalcanica.net/pancarte/
mistomustata.pdf
7. IRES Survey published in Revista Sinteza 
no. 38/March-April 2017, pp.11-18
8. Untold – the largest annual electronic music 
festival held in Romania organized usually 
in the summer. 
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9_. A line from Eminescu’s Scrisoarea III (Third 
Satire) in reference to the draconian anti-
theft laws passed during the reign of Vlad 
Ţepeș, known to many as Dracula. Mihai 
Eminescu, a romantic poet, is rated among 
the greatest Romanian literary figures.
10. Ion Creangă, classical Romanian writer, 
author of Amintirilor din copilărie (Childhood 
Memories) (1837-1889_)
11. Andra Tonitza  https://i1.wp.com/www.
danagont.ro/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/
andra-tonitza.jpg
12. https://diasporaro.co.uk/fotografii-de-la-
proteste-pancarte-cu-texte-inspirate/20-
proteste-romania-2017/ 
13. https://www.facebook.com/search/
top/?init=quick&q=Kumo%20the%20
Dog&tas=0.17749_464419_217453
14. http://stirileprotv.ro/stiri/actualitate/romanul-
s-a-nascut-poet-povestea-din-spatele-celor-
mai-creative-mesaje-de-pe-pancartele-
folosite-la-protest.html
15. https://www.artofprotest.ro/ 
16. http://tb.ziareromania.ro/pancarta-les-
miserables-piata-victoriei/739_6a41c1afa0a
36ba/535/0/1/85/pancarta-les-miserables-
piata-victoriei.jpg
17. http://www.facebrands.ro/blog/2017/01/9_-6-
milioane-conturi-utilizator-facebook-romania/
18. http://www.obiectivdesuceava.ro/romania/
la-odobesti-de-cateva-zile-protesteaza-
un-singur-om-astazi-au-venit-sa-l-sustina-
protestatari-din-tara/
19_. https://pressone.ro/frumosii-nebuni-ai-
micilor-orase/
20. http://www.digi24.ro/stiri/actualitate/social/
tanarul-care-a-protestat-singur-o-noapte-
intreaga-la-guvern-669_064
21. https://www.news.ro/cultura-media/
pancartele-si-recuzita-manifestantilor-pentru-
expozitia-organizata-de-pavel-susara-se-
colecteaza-la-sediul-muzeului-satului-din-
bucuresti-1
22. http://www.curteaveche.ro/rezist-proteste-
impotriva-oug-13-2017.html
23. http://revista22.ro/70261429_/follow-up-la-
dezbaterea-din-pe-despre-justiie-n-romnia-
s-a-dezbtut-i-acum.html
24. https://www.facebook.com/TimisoaraCivica/
posts/779_28028889_4863
25. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proclamation_
of_Timi%C8%9_9_oara
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Romanian civil society abroad: perspectives from Berlin
Romania’s #Rezist is not an overnight result but the tip 
of an iceberg. In the past 5 years the Romanian civil 
society has been constantly undergoing development: 
engagement, active citizenship, critical thinking, action. 
We can identify various engines of change and various 
manifestations of it, including the involvement of the 
Romanian diaspora in these civic movements. 
Protests in Berlin – an overview starting in 2012
The protests of the Romanian diaspora in Berlin 
in January-February 2017 were not the first of their kind. 
Ever since 2012, the major civic movements in Romania 
have been supported by similar efforts abroad, including 
in Germany. The reasons behind the protests were 
always aligned with the issues raised in Romania: the 
healthcare reform proposal in 2012, the Roșia Montană 
gold mining project in 2013, the voting conditions for 
Romanians living abroad for the presidential elections 
in 2014, or the tragedy in the Colectiv club in 2015. 
The manifestations in Berlin were, just as in the 
case of the ones in Romania, spontaneous outbursts 
of dissatisfaction with the way in which the Romanian 
government operates. While they all had at their core 
specific demands, the red thread of all manifestations 
was a general drive towards better governance and an 
awakening of civic engagement. 
With regards to the demands of the Romanians 
abroad protesting, these were just as varied as the 
government actions that triggered them. In 2012 the 
purpose of the demonstrations was to prevent changes 
in healthcare legislation regarding privatization of 
services. In 2013, the protests aimed to block mining work 
using cyanide in Roșia Montană. In 2014, the protesters 
demanded a better organization of the second round 
of the presidential election abroad. In 2015 the protests 
following the Colectiv club fire were a loud alarm signal 
against the way in which deeply embedded corruption 
leads to loss of lives. Lastly, in 2017, the protesters 
wanted to block abrupt and significant changes in 
the Penal Code that would absolve high-level officials 
from corruption charges or sentences, thus massively 
affecting accountability. 
Logistically, the protests in Berlin always took 
place either in front of the Romanian Embassy or in front 
of the Brandenburg Gate, two of the most important 
symbols for the Romanian diaspora in the German 
capital, sometimes including a march between these 
two places. Besides the creative banners and flags that 
people displayed, protesters also produced information 
flyers in German and English about the issue raised and 
their demands or they wrote and sang songs about 
these issues. The main idea behind all these actions 
was to make their message as appealing as possible to 
other people as well and thus to raise awareness, gain 
support and increase the pressure on the Romanian 
government.
In all of these cases, protests in Berlin followed 
the manifestations organized in Romania. They were a 
way of showing support for the protesters back home 
and at the same time a way of showing continued interest 
in public matters concerning the future development of 
Romania. The demonstrations in Berlin were also used 
as an opportunity to inform the foreign public and draw 
attention to the issues in Romania, and their relation 
to German and EU matters. The protests abroad also 
put media and political pressures on the Romanian 
government which repeatedly had to take into account 
the demands of protesters and concede. 
The profiles of protesters and group dynamics 
In terms of individuals, in 2017 the group of 
protesters in Berlin was very diverse. Whilst all social 
categories were represented, the vast majority of 
participants were students, higher education graduates, 
professionals and entrepreneurs. Interestingly enough, it 
was not only Romanian citizens that were part of the core 
group of protesters, but also Germans, Moldavians and 
other foreign citizens who either had a strong emotional 
connection to Romania or who wanted to show their 
support as the Romanian events evoked similarities 
with their own countries. All these individuals were 
connected emotionally through feelings of frustration, 
anger, hopelessness, combined with pure fear and 
concern for the future of the country, especially in the 
Romanian civil society abroad:   
perspectives from Berlin 
Alexandra Ioan and Monica Boța-Moisin 
 112Romanian protests 2017 
doi.org/10.23774/QUAS.RP2017.19_
Authors: Alexandra Ioan and Monica Boța-Moisin 
Romanian civil society abroad: perspectives from Berlin
unfortunate climate of international politics (Trump’s 
presidency in the U.S., Erdogan’s unipersonal leadership 
in Turkey, etc.). Smaller groups also started forming 
through the connection of people who knew each 
other from the previous protests, with new comers to 
Berlin. One could even say that it was an interesting 
“civic therapy” as in most cases the new comers were 
driven by emotion, disappointment with the governance 
in Romania and an instinctual need to act immediately, 
whilst the Romanians who have lived abroad longer were 
driven by rationality, a certain degree of scepticism and 
a need for concreteness in action. The transition from 
emotional reaction to expression of concrete demands 
was fast. By their second meeting in January 2017, the 
demands of the protesting group in Berlin became more 
homogenous, aligning requests with those presented 
in Piața Victoriei in Bucharest or in Timișoara. People 
had done their research, were better informed and the 
floor was open for debate.
More than ever before social media played 
an essential role both in disseminating information, 
in organizing and in connecting Romanian protesters 
worldwide. This was also the case in Berlin where 
protesters used primarily Facebook to discuss logistics 
and activities for the protests. #Rezist became a mantra, 
an element of identification, of membership to a group 
and a reminder that even when the wave of enthusiasm 
has worn off, the mission of active citizens has not yet 
been completed. 
The profile of the Romanian protester therefore 
has thus somewhat changed in the past two decades. 
People are no longer defined by a common desire 
to simply overturn a system. Le coup d`ètat est mort! 
Romanians understood that overturning is pointless 
unless a better replacement exists. The motivation 
and actions of engaged Romanians stem rather from a 
desire to build a fair and functional system, to create a 
new social and political order.
Building upon existing energies
The 2017 protests in Berlin built upon the 
previous experience and involvement of Romanians 
living there and followed the same recipe: consecutive 
gatherings, alignment with the requests of the thousands 
protesting in Romania, a call for action.
As with previous occasions, gathering publicly 
to express outrage in the face of certain governmental 
measures is a way of feeling that one is not completely 
Protesters marching in February 2017 to the Brandenburg Gate.
©Dan Perșa
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disconnected from the events at home. It is also a way of 
compensating for the limited possibilities of engagement 
in Romanian public affairs accessible from abroad, while 
also providing a sense of belonging, of community, of 
home away from home. 
Although most of the concrete demands of 
the 2017 protests (as well as of previous ones) were 
responded to, this does not eliminate a general sense 
of dissatisfaction and concern among protesters. The 
main reason for this is an awareness of the fact that 
deep, sustainable change in Romania has still not been 
achieved and also, that protests solely are not the way 
to actually achieve this. The feeling of satisfaction and 
relief that very acute crisis situations have been overcome 
is always mixed with a sense of powerlessness in the 
face of the deeply rooted issues Romania is facing – 
be it corruption, poverty, inequality, etc. 
This realization however also leads to a desire 
for civic engagement on a constant basis, even if not 
physically in the country. Whether getting involved 
with organizations addressing specific issues in 
Romania or starting new initiatives themselves, locally 
or internationally, Romanians in Berlin who took part 
in one way or another in these civic manifestations 
continue in their engagement. 
For instance, the first agreed call to action for the 
Berlin 2017 protests took the form of a video1 conveying 
the idea that protests in Berlin and in Romania are one 
voice: “Berlinul e cu voi!” (“Berlin is with you”) chanted 
the protesters. In retrospect, this video had a dual 
function: it was a statement of support and solidarity, a 
group expression of our belonging and civic engagement 
and at the same time it was a coagulating factor for the 
Romanian community in Berlin. Individuals from different 
backgrounds and with no previous connection to each 
other joined forces in creating a product of the Romanian 
diaspora. This successful exercise planted a seed: “if 
we could do this together, we can do more!”.
This seed resulted in Diaspora Civică Berlin (the 
Civic Diaspora Berlin or DCB) – an informal community 
initiated in February 2017 as a result of the protests 
-  which aims to contribute to the civic and political 
involvement of the Romanian diaspora in Berlin in current 
affairs in Romania. Structured on two fundamental pillars, 
active citizenship and community building, the actions 
and events organized and promoted by DCB are meant 
to educate, generate responsible actions and nurture 
a feeling of mutual support and the pursuit of common 
well-being among Romanians abroad and not only. The 
open sui generis organizational structure and the focus 
on transparency, inclusiveness and team effort as key 
values are at the basis of the internal organization of DCB. 
The community now meets on a regular monthly basis 
and develops various projects, workshops, discussions 
with and for civically active Romanians in Berlin.
While the energy of the protests echoed in other 
capital cities like Vienna, Brussels, Paris or London, this 
overview refers strictly to the protests in Berlin – their 
background, dynamics and constructive consequences. 
A particularity for Berlin is that an outcome of the 
recent protests was the formation of an organized civic 
informal group committed to raise the civic and political 
involvement of Romanians in diaspora. It is possible that 
Berlin is not a singular case. 
The way forward 
The 2017 protests were a renewed signal of 
the awakening of a civic conscience among Romanians 
that translates into the process of forming a strong and 
active civil society. 27 years after the fall of communism, 
Romanians start approaching their government, their 
representatives and their politicians from the position of 
a demanding citizen that wants to be taken care of rather 
than taken advantage of by the public system. Although 
this mind-set change is still work in progress, and it will 
take significant time to become institutionalized, it should 
serve as a signal for politicians and public officials that 
it is no longer business as usual. The level of scrutiny, 
critical thinking, transparency and accountability demands 
coming from Romanians, has definitely changed. Policy-
makers and decision-makers should definitely take this 
into account in their next political moves. Furthermore, the 
involvement of the diaspora in these developments is a 
clear statement that leaving the country does not mean 
a complete disruption from national internal affairs, nor a 
lack of interest. The energy mobilizing Romanians in the 
country and abroad is the same and it is the foundation 
of an active and mature civil society.  
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Endnotes / Media links
1. https://www.facebook.com/
diasporacivicaberlin2017/
videos/18532372649_16677/, 24.02.2017
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“It is not far the moment when this hot outpouring 
of soul, courage, stubbornness and tenacity in 
the defence of freedom, justice, and good will 
snatch the tumour and the evil that the PSD¹ 
and their acolytes have ill and tortured, for so 
long, the whole country“. (#rezist)
The most recent manifestations in Romania 
ware caused by the stunning comeback of PSD under 
the leadership of Liviu Dragnea, as a result of the 
Parliamentary elections in December 2016. Taking 
advantage of the incapacity of the right-wing parties 
to propose a coherent platform² and targeting groups 
that were not in their traditional electoral pool (doctors, 
professors, students) but attracted by the economic 
promises, PSD won 45,68% of votes and, after some 
stumbling caused by Klaus Iohannis’ rejection of the PSD’s 
first proposal, Sevil Shhaideh³, formed a government 
with their allies, ALDE (detached from PNL in 2014). 
The state of dissatisfaction has increased as 
PSD opponents have understood that the climb to 
power of this party would have been stopped by their 
participation in the electoral process. For example, one 
image that went viral during the protest portrays a young 
man holding a placard with the message I apologize for 
not voting. On the other hand, the feeling of returning 
to old (bad) habits was aggravated by the rush of PSD 
to implement some electoral promises which target 
especially the old people but also students. These actions 
were seen as an attempt at bribery and symbolically 
sanctioned as such⁴.     
But this is only the tip of the iceberg!
Protester message: I apologize for not voting5. 
 
Protest social movements have been a feature 
of the Romanian political scene since 2012. The very first 
protest movement within this category was triggered by 
the conflict on the health bill between Traian Băsescu6 
and Raed Arafat, at that time, Secretary of State in the 
Health Ministry, one of the most respected Romanians7, 
regardless of his foreign origin. Over 10,0008 people 
gathered to support Raed Arafat when he was forced 
to resign, but remain in the street long after he was 
reinstated. Heavily supported by the political opposition 
(USL, formed by PNL and PSD) and by traditional media 
(especially Realitatea TV and Antena3, TV stations 
hostile to Traian Băsescu) but rejecting any conflating 
of political and civil society agendas. The protesters’ 
demands covered a wide spectrum: from the general 
request for the resignation of Emil Boc9_ to particular 
feminist and ecologist causes, as well as to far-right 
Some Populist Discursive Aspects 
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nationalist ones. Brutally repressed by Gendarmerie, 
the protests were defeated eventually by the cold 
weather; the protestors were partially satisfied by Emil 
Boc’s resignation and fuelled USL’s triumphant path to 
power, from the presidential impeachment referendum 
in July, to the Parliamentary Elections in November.
In 2013, as USL failed to produce the expected 
change in the Romanian society and their leaders 
indulged themselves in reproducing the same political 
patterns used for more than 20 years, the tensions 
were reappearing. It burst into the Uniți Salvăm (United, 
we save!) movement in the autumn of 2013. The main 
theme - preventing the bill that would have facilitated 
the gold mining exploitation at Roşia Montană10 - was 
just a pretext for the protests, considering the fact that 
the subject was present in the Romanian public sphere 
for more than 15 years. Moreover, a statement made by 
Traian Băsescu in the 2009_ election campaign declaring 
his support for the restoration of mining in the area did 
not enjoy similar treatment. Shortly after the start of the 
movement, a range of concurrent themes emerged, 
some directly derivate from the main discontent (the 
anti-capitalist theme), others indirectly (the nationalist-
extremist claims). On this occasion, a new villain was 
added to the corrupt political system: traditional media, 
especially television. For the protesters, Facebook 
became the main source of quality news and the 
sole guarantor of free speech. After a month of daily 
protests, the movement diluted into weekly gatherings 
on Sunday evening and vanished shortly, leaving behind 
a revolutionary breeze and an incipient political party 
(Uniți, salvăm Bucureștiul; nowadays Uniunea Salvati 
România! – USR).
A seemingly different cause led to the outbreak 
of protests in November 2015, culminating in the 
resignation of Prime Minister Victor Ponta11: the tragic 
death of 64 young people at a rock concert brought tens 
of thousands of people into the streets under the slogan 
#corupțiaucide (#corruptionkills). For the thousands12 in 
the street, the mourning soon turned into rage, as the 
local mayor’s13 lack of interest for the safety norms and 
his permeability to corruption became obvious. 
This was the first time when the hashtag sign 
(#) appeared in the slogan, directly connecting the 
online and offline manifestations. While traditional media 
(especially Antena3) were strongly associated with the 
corrupt political system, new media’s importance grew. 
Besides being a fair and impartial reporter of the events, 
Facebook was used to build a protest community. 
Although the protesters demanded early elections, 
they settled after the resignation of Victor Ponta and 
the investiture of a new, technocrat, government led 
by Dacian Cioloș14. 
The strong foundation of these movements - 
or, to be more precise, this long-term movement with 
explosive moments15 – is based on citizens’, especially, 
young, educated, urban citizens, discontent with and 
mistrusting the established political system. Regardless of 
the trigger, all these movements have as their main reason 
the endemic corruption in Romania16 and the feeling that 
the time for debates and peaceful negotiations has past. 
With strong cultural reverberations, especially among 
the right-wing thinkers (Surugiu, 2009_, p. 68-69_), the 
populist idea of an overlaid corrupt class that stifle the 
normal, natural development of the beautiful people17 
is their discursive vector.    
Following my previous work on populism 
(Stefanel, 2015), I argue that on the #rezist and #rezistenta18 
Facebook page one might identify characteristics of the 
people: wonderful, young, energetic people, without any 
prior political implications, most of them self-employed 
or in the private sector (mostly big corporations), with 
higher education and higher expectations. They are 
the active and the aware part of the community, able to 
understand that who sleeps in democracy; wakes up in 
dictatorship19_ and willing to fight for all Romanians even 
for those captive to the PSD and their media allies20.  
Protester message: Down with the Antenae from my 
mother-in-law21
The idea of a people deeply rooted in history, 
with a past and most of all with a future that oppose a 
corrupt system that could be set aside is very common 
among protesters. Not only are ancient rulers23 called 
to support the movement, but prominent actors from 
recent history as well (We are the children of those 
fighting at the Revolution/ children of Hooligans24). 
Also, the future (mostly the future of our children) is 
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used as an argument for the protests25. The corrupt 
class is perceived to continue the practices rooted in 
Romania’s communist past, without any connection 
with the people or with its history and future. One must 
observe that the way „the people” is constructed by 
the movement is consistent with Mudde’s perspective: 
it is neither real nor all-inclusive26, but in fact a mythical 
constructed subset of the whole population” (2004, 
p.546). The heartland (in Taggart’s 19_9_6 sense of the 
term) is Romania without them.
The corrupt political class is trans-party (PNL 
and PSD, the same dirt) who have been in power for 
a quarter of century (You steal from us for a quarter of 
century), but is in quintessence is PSD, the red plague, a 
party of thieves and country traitors. Their corruption is 
not only visible in their actions, but also in their corporal 
appearance (the broken teeth of Liviu Dragnea is the 
supreme symbol of his corruption) as well as in their 
morals (the fifth marriage of Călin Popescu Tăriceanu 
is a sign of corruption).
The populist solution is radical and easy to be 
achieved. The soft part of the riots suggests that all of 
them (sometimes the entire political class, sometimes 
the Parliament, sometimes the parties that support the 
Government) should go to jail. The radicals suggest other 
methods such as hanging or impalement; obviously the 
abolition of PSD is a must, as well as new elections.
Following the work of Kaltwasser and Mudde 
(2012, p.16), I do not hurry to sanction these aggressive 
skirmishes from the democratic discourse, taking into 
account that the effects produced might be either positive 
or negative, depending on the strength of democracy. But 
I cannot fail to wonder how strong Romanian democracy 
is, how much it could resist falling for a populist discourse 
and to what extent these populist slogans represent the 
hard-core of this new political movement.  
Romanian politicians portrayed as convicts at the #rezist protests22
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Endnotes / Media links
1. PSD: Partidul Social Democrat
2. Both USR (the party that outcome from the 
2013 movements) and the new PNL (formed 
by the unification of PNL and a part of PDL, 
their old political enemy) were supporting 
Dacian Ciolos, the former technocrat Prime 
Minister, although he was not directly 
affiliated with neither one of these parties 
and he announced that he will vote with one 
party at the Chamber of Deputies and with 
another at the Senate. To complicate the 
picture, both parties deny any post-elections 
cooperation with the other in the event of 
winning the elections.  
3. Woman, Muslim and a close collaborator of 
Liviu Dragnea, three features that made her 
the Public Enemy number one for a while.
4. For example, students that received free 
railroad transportation, used this right to 
come in Bucharest to protest against the 
Government. 
5. https://www.andreirosu.org/wp-content/
uploads/2017/02/IMG_9_866-1.jpg
6. President of Romania, at that time
7. Cf. IMAS survey 17-26 February 2012, 76,1% 
of Romanians trusted Raed Arafat www.
cotidianul.ro IMAS survey: Raed Atafat and 
Mihai, the King of Romania, in trust top. 
07.03.2012 (last read in 29_th of April 2017) 
8. Police estimations
9_. the Prime Minister of Romania, close 
collaborator of Traian Băsescu
10. a village in the traditional Transylvanian area
11. Former president of PSD and challenger of 
Klaus Iohannis in the Presidential Elections 
in 2014. After unexpectedly winning the 
election, Klaus Iohannis was constrained 
by the Constitution to keep Victor Ponta in 
office as Prime Minister.
12. More than 35,000 people 
13. Cristian Popescu Piedone, the mayor of the 
4th District in Bucharest, were the Colectiv 
Club was located.
14. Former minister of agriculture, former 
European Commissary of Agriculture
15. 100 days from the 31st of January, people are 
still protesting in front of the Government; 
additionally, there is a strong online 
movement which in the meantime turned 
from #rezist to #insist, continuing to maintain 
the original claims and demands of the 
#rezist protests
16. The everyday corruption as well as the 
heavily mediated top-politics one
17. A placard said: They try to bury us. They 
didn’t know we are seeds (English, in original)
18. https://www.facebook.com/groups/
REZISTAMPANALACAPAT/?fref=ts 
19_. English, in original
20. Reference to the 19_9_0 movement against Ion 
Iliescu and FSN (the nowadays PSD
21. Down with the Antenae (reference to Antena1 
and 3, television stations seen as part of 
the corrupt system) from my mother-in-law 
(reference to the fact that old people voted 
for PSD because of Antena3’s discourse)
22. https://media.dcnews.ro/image/201702/
w670/protest_viral_imagine_ponta_
tariceanu_iordache_dragnea_50407100.jpg 
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23. Not very democratic ones (Vlad the Impaler, 
for example, well known for his brief 
judgments followed by the impaling of the 
perpetrator)
24. Reference to the 19_9_0s movement against 
Ion Iliescu and the FSN (the nowadays PSD)
25. The idea of continuity is imbued in the 
slogan Ce nu au reusit parinții mei pentru 
mine, reușesc eu pentru copiii mei –What my 
parents did not succed for me, I will succed 
for my children.
26. Those voting for PSD are part of the 
corruption.
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Romania is one of the most backward states in the EU; 
around a half of the population is still living in rural areas 
although the country went through a process of forced 
urbanisation during the pre-19_9_0s industrialisation boom 
(Antonescu & Popa, 2012). The gap between the urban 
and rural areas is widening every year, with income 
disparities and educational opportunities diminishing 
drastically for the latter. The country’s struggle to 
recruit primary and secondary teachers for countryside 
schools is well documented as is its alarming decrease 
of its gross enrolment ratio (close to its 19_89_ numbers 
according to the World Bank) and the appallingly small 
government expenditure on education (only 3% of GDP, 
at 4.9_% in the rest of Europe – European Commission, 
2016). Romania’s clan culture where allegiances and 
loyalties play an important role (see Bortun & Cheregi 
article here) and strong influence of the church – in 
my view another factor of corruption in the country – 
contribute to this widening divide. 
A telling reflection of this divide is to be found in 
the type of media Romanians have access to, consume 
and trust. Television is still by far the most popular (9_7% 
of the population, followed by radio and internet – 
Zenith Media, 2015) “and it takes the lion share of the 
advertising pie (about two thirds) amounting to a total of 
337 million euro in 2008” (Ulmanu, n.d). The leader of 
the segment, Antena3, lost recently the crown in favour 
of Romania TV (the latter came second to Antena1 on 
New Year’s Eve night of 2016 with an audience of nearly 
850,000 and a share of voice of 10%). 
Romania is also a land of media moguls who 
“are not interested in encouraging people to 
form their own opinion, much less in promoting 
free, unbiased reporting. On the contrary, in the 
19_9_0s they founded their own TV channels and 
newspapers in order to do politics and business 
and become rich, powerful and influential” 
(Eurotopics, 2016). 
When the #rezist protests started in Bucharest, 
the television stations like Antena3, Romania TV and 
B1TV issued a wave of reports grossly misrepresenting 
the protests and misinforming their audience. Their 
headlines made references to an attempted coup d’etat 
and linked the protests with those from #colectiv in 
2014. Moreover, they insinuated that the protesters were 
violent, that their aim was to overturn the Government 
legitimately installed after the 2016 December elections 
and that they were paid by George Soros, the Hungarian 
billionaire, and other enemies of the state (Pantazi, 2017). 
The effects are visible: Romania’s freedom of 
the press ranking, at least according to Freedom House, 
is only partly free and in decline from previous years. 
In recent years, many of the media moguls 
have been sent to prison for corruption (Eurotopics, 
2016), including Antena3’s Dan Voiculescu who is 
currently serving a ten-years sentence for money 
laundering. Sebastian Ghita on the other hand, the 
owner of Romania TV, who is currently being prosecuted 
“in various proceedings involving money laundering, 
unauthorised use of confidential information, blackmail, 
bribes, influence peddling, and driving without a license” 
disappeared in December 2016 “despite being under 
judicial control, with a bail of 13 million Euros and a ban 
on leaving the country” (Giurgeanu, 2017).
And although the oligarchs are behind bars, the 
advertisers continue to use their stations to promote their 
clients. They did so all too gladly when the tabloid-style 
and often ridiculed  OTV closed1 and they migrated to 
Antena3 and Romania TV and they continued to do so 
when the National Audio-visual Council, a governmental 
body whose mission is to “ensure that Romania’s TV 
and radio stations operate in an environment of free 
speech, responsibility and competitiveness” (Consiliul 
National al Audientei – CNA) fined Antena3 and Romania 
TV in excess of 100,000 Euros for disinformation over 
the years (64,000 euros for Antena3 for 2015 and 2016 
alone – Puisor, 2017). 
Save Our News (S.O.N) 
Or Why is Fake News War Everybody’s War 
Raluca Feher 
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So we, Frontline Club Bucharest2, decided to 
write a petition asking media buyers to stop buying 
advertising on the TV stations that are deliberately 
manipulating and lying to the public. 
In well-established democracies the people 
fought for their rights, sometimes blood was shed to 
gain them. No one gave them nothing just because. 
Romanians are not used to do this. So, we, at Frontline 
Club, wanted to give an example, to show hope to the 
people, to show them that there are things one can do, 
other than going out in the streets and protesting. We 
felt that going at the root of evil, money, and cutting 
the funding of these stations and invest it instead into 
independent media outlets and initiatives such as 
RISE Project, Dela0.ro, Casa Jurnalistului, Pressone.
ro, EuroActiv, Rfi Romania,  Blacksea.eu, Centrul de 
Investigatii Media, CRJI, Tolo.ro, etransmedia.ro, 
VICE, Dilema Veche, Romania Curata, EpochTimes, 
paginademedia.ro would allow restore the informational 
balance in the country.
The point we made was that these TV stations 
were used to push the agenda and interests of corrupt 
individuals which are entangled with different political 
parties. By buying advertising on these stations, 
advertisers, we argued, were endorsing a failed state 
and with it policies that, instead of working to benefit 
the development of the country, were pursuing the 
interests of particular individuals.
The combination of propaganda and 
manipulation on TV and the policies promoted by 
the politicians kept the people in Romania poor and 
uneducated while working against a real and fair market. 
Financing these institutions, we suggested, should be 
against the interest of the companies who try to do 
honest business in Romania. It simply does not make 
any sense for a company to finance a failed market.
We suggested that advertisers and their 
clients should fund independent media outlets instead. 
This would not only harm the stations mentioned but 
would enable the advertisers themselves to dissociate 
themselves from the corrupt political class and their 
subservient television stations. By breaking up ties with 
these stations, the advertisers would help the Romanian 
society as a whole.
Among the factors influencing our decision to 
launch the petition were:
• the lack of response from the CNA in the 
cases strictly related to the #rezist protests; 
• Laura Corina Georgescu’s, the head 
of the CNA, being investigated for 
several charges of corruption;
• the appointment of the CNA members 
is political and therefore our belief that 
they are put under pressure by the 
party/coalition appointing them; and
• our firm belief that the hate speech promoted 
by Antena3 and Romania TV in particular 
was dividing Romania’s population and 
turning people against one another 
We sent the petition to journalists on the 24th 
of January3, to iQads.ro, the most important site for the 
Romanian advertising community, and to hotnews.ro, an 
independent news portal. iQads.ro started a campaign, 
asking advertisers and advertising experts to talk about 
ethics in brand communication. Geeks for Democracy, 
#rezist and other internet groups organised boycotts of 
the brands that still paid to advertise on Antena3 and 
Romania TV.
We also contacted the International Advertising 
Association (IAA), the Romanian Association of Advertising 
Agencies (Uniunea Agentiilor de Publicitate din Romania 
- UAPR) and Art Directors Club (ADC) proposing a 
partnership for the initiative. They all refused us insisting 
that advertising and the media content offered by TV 
stations have nothing in common. 
The petition was met with a lot of enthusiasm 
by the people in the street; some of them tried to reach 
us and help promoting our views. At the time of writing 
this article (the 17th of June 2017), the petition on our 
own Facebook page had received 50 comments and 
810 shares. While there are certainly more comments, 
mentions and shares to our petition, they are beyond our 
own channels and tracking ability. The comments received 
however showed to us that our readers and followers 
were paying attention; while some made suggestions to 
contact institutions in Romania or address the boards of 
directors and/or shareholders of the companies advertising 
on the television stations we were targeting others were 
questioning the idea of an independent media in Romania. 
Unlike our online followers, Antena3 and 
Romania TV on the other hand, targeted us directly, 
both as a group and myself as an individual. Besides 
being called names and called out as “members of the 
Soros army”, we were accused to incite others to infringe 
on their freedom of speech. 
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Catalin Tolontan, a renowned Romanian journalist, 
opposed our initiative indicating on numerous occasions 
that boycotting Antena3 and Romania TV and connecting 
the journalistic content broadcast by the stations with the 
brands advertising on them was immoral (Baciu, 2017). 
Even presented with similar actions in other parts of the 
world (for example in January over 800 brands in US cut 
theirs advertising budgets at Breitbart News – Dumenco, 
2017), Tolontan continued to accuse us of aiming to 
restricting the freedom of speech of the two stations.
In the short term, our petition and appeal were 
partly successful as many brands withdrew their advertising 
from the two stations. However, none indicated that the 
cutting of their budgets was related to Frontline’s petition 
or any other boycott call coming from the protesters 
directly. Moreover, none of the funds withdrawn were 
redirected as we suggested to independent media 
outlets and initiatives. 
On the 7th of February, between 70 and 80 
brands were not advertising anymore on Antena3 and 
RomaniaTV (Obae, 2017). The trend continued until almost 
70% of brands left those stations. 
The success was short-lived as only a month 
later, at the end of March, the brands that had initially 
withdrawn were now slowly returning despite the fact that 
nothing had changed in the way these two televisions 
were going about doing journalism (Bunea, 2017).
Defeatists said that the advertisers felt in 
January that more money can be made by playing the 
#rezist card but none of them were truly ethical in their 
decision to cut budgets from Antena3 and Romania 
TV. They might have been right. Recently Blue Air, a 
low-cost airline operator servicing Romania, launched 
an advertising campaign branding their airplane with a 
#rezist message5. Additionally, as the protests dwindled, 
Vodafone, Dedeman, Interbrew, and other big spenders, 
returned in the commercial breaks at Antena3 and 
Romania TV (iQads, 2017).
There are a couple of explanations for this 
behaviour: 
• financial – brands insisted that the two 
stations enabled them to reach a target 
audience of important and relevant to 
them, that could not be reached otherwise 
and whose size they could not ignore 
• political – some of the corporations 
(or their staff such as Raiffeisen’s CEO, 
Steven van Groeningen) identified to 
have supported the protests are said 
to have been side-lined by Romanian 
state and were pressured to “behave” 
Blue Air campaign #Rezist Coruptiei din Romania (Resist to Romania’s corruption). 
Image reproduced from Romania Libera4
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• social pressure – as the protests in 
the street dwindled and the attention 
they received diminished, people were 
willing to move on and come back 
to the comfort of the status quo.
So, to draw a line, the Frontline Club petition 
only half-worked. The boycott of televisions was the 
only part appealing to advertisers while the financing of 
independent media escaped conveniently their “To Do” 
list. One could argue that having a neutral, balanced, 
uncorrupted media is not perceived either as important 
or as a problem that corporations could help solve.
Sadly, boycotts can only work in the short term 
and can only be used as emergency measures. Enabling 
and building a clean media environment needs a long-
term strategy, resources and commitment. 
Three months later, the CNA went back to its 
dormant stage. Antena3 and Romania TV are back 
to their January best behaviours (disinformation and 
misrepresentation that is) and their advertisers are 
back in full force. Although everyone is talking about 
fake news in Romania, people either do not know how 
to fight them efficiently or do not care. 
The appeal to ethics is not working. Activism 
can raise awareness but it appears ill equipped to stop 
these and other corrupt practices entirely. Romania’s 
only solution is to have an educated nation regardless 
of where they live and what media they consume. But 
for this we need to build institutions, which under current 
political climate is impossible. So, although activism is 
powerless, it is for now our only tool. And with it, we 
will continue seek ways to educate the people and 
fight the system.
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Endnotes/ Media links
1. OTV’s programming was often under scrutiny 
for its tabloid-style and sensationalism and 
thus often ridiculed and also avoided by the 
big advertising spenders; Romania TV uses 
a similar programming strategy however it 
enjoys a rather steady advertising revenue 
2. Frontline Club Bucharest is the Romanian 
branch of Frontline Club London, one of 
the most respected institutions in the UK 
promoting freedom of speech and supporting 
independent media. Frontline Club Bucharest 
opened in February 2014.  
3. https://www.facebook.com/
FrontlineClubBucharest/photos/
a.69_6122400411279_.1073741829_. 
69_3244644032388/ 1323180867705426/?ty
pe=3&theater
4. http://romanialibera.ro/economie/companii/
compania-blue-air-isi-face-publicitate-cu-
imaginea-unui-avion-pictat-cu-sigla---
rezist-448571
5. http://romanialibera.ro/economie/companii/
compania-blue-air-isi-face-publicitate-cu-
imaginea-unui-avion-pictat-cu-sigla---
rezist-448571
6. Raluca Feher's photo is credited to Harper`s 
Bazaar/Alex Galmeanu
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On the 18th of January 2017, the Romanian Government 
tried to approve two executive orders1,2,3:
1. National Collective Pardon Law;
2. Changes to the Criminal Law4. 
They were in fact meant to release from prison 
individuals convicted of corruption and would allow 
further thefts from public funds. Some of the worst effects 
of these executive orders, if applied, would have been:
1. Pardon Law⁵:
• The sentence to be reduced by half for any 
convicted felon over the age of 60 or parent 
of a child under the age of 5, no matter the 
felony: whether murder, rape, child abuse, 
crimes against humanity or corruption etc.
• The pardon would have also been extended 
to include even those not currently 
executing their sentence in prison.
2. Changes to the Criminal Law⁶:
• Public servants can perpetrate any abuse 
in service, if the value is below 200,000 
RON (cca. 44,000 EUR) (for each individual 
act) it is not considered a crime.
• A public servant can be prosecuted only 
if there is a complaint from the victim. For 
instance, in the case of an abuse made by a 
mayor, the victim can be the City Hall which 
is represented by the mayor, therefore the 
mayor should make a self-denunciation. 
Furthermore, the complaint should be 
made within 6 months thus blocking any 
criminal investigation prior to that.
• The punishment for such crimes was to 
be reduced from 2 - 7 years (as initially 
stipulated) to 6 months - 3 years.
Abuse of Power with Executive Orders
The Government can approve at any moment 
Executive Orders (called “ordonanta de urgenta”, 
hereby referred as OUG) that may alter the subject of 
almost any law. OUGs are, by nature, extraordinary laws 
adopted in extraordinary situations when regulation 
cannot be postponed. They enable the Government 
(the administrative power in Romania) to legislate, an 
attribute and responsibility constitutionally residing with 
the Parliament. It is their extraordinary nature that grants 
OUGs a power equal to any law and they therefore 
come into effect from the time they are published in the 
Official Monitor ( Monitorul Oficial - a public information 
vehicle detailing all passed legislative changes); even if 
an executive order were to be featured only for some 
minutes, its effects would be immediate.
The European Commission for Democracy 
Through Law (Venice Commission) has already stated 
that many abuses are made in Romania by using OUGs 
in situations that do not present nor require any urgency: 
hundreds of emergency ordinances are approved 
every year⁷.
One of such cases is OUG 55/28.08.2014 which 
granted 45 days to any mayor to leave the political party 
that helped him win the elections and join another party. 
Of course, the order was declared unconstitutional three 
months later8 but while it was in effect many mayors 
switched parties joining mostly the party in power9_, thus 
facing no consequences. And this happened just before 
the Presidential election campaign in 2014.
With OUG13 and OUG14 (which repealed 
OUG13), the Government attempted a similar kind of 
abuse, whose consequences however would have 
been much more severe.
The Story of a Coup d’etat 
against the Rule of Law 
Tiberiu Pfiszter  
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Using Obvious Lies as Reasons
The main reason invoked for passing the Pardon 
Law was that Romania would have to pay 80 million 
EUR / year following a decision of the European Court 
of Human Rights (ECHR) accusing the Romanian state 
of bad conditions in prisons. It is obvious that this is a 
lie because:
• such a decision does not exist and ECHR 
has declared no intention to issue one;
• pardoning those not executing their 
sentence in prison has absolutely 
no effect on prison conditions. 
As for the changes proposed to the Criminal Law, 
the reasoning promoted referred to the requirements 
of the Constitutional Court, requirements that were 
much simpler and require fewer changes than the 
actual project11.
Ignoring other Institutions of the State
There were several official positions and 
declarations from other institutions that should have 
banned these two laws:
• On the 18th of January 2017 the President 
Klaus Werner Iohannis, attended the 
Government meeting and was promised 
by the Prime Minister Sorin Grindeanu that 
the OUG would not be approved overnight 
or without prior notice and debate.
• The Superior Council of Magistrates (CSM) 
gave negative notices for the OUG12 ,13. In any 
matter relating to justice and criminal law, it is 
mandatory to request the opinion of the CSM. 
It has only consultative value but having it is 
a must and acting against it must be justified. 
The fact that the negative notices were given 
and subsequently ignored demonstrates the 
opinion of the rule of law among governors.
• The National Anticorruption Directorate 
made a very comprehensive announcement 
explaining all the disadvantages for the 
justice system the OUG13 could bring, 
including the amount of money that would 
be lost should the OUG take effect14.
Ignoring Safeguarding Measures
Any Pardon Law requires active social measures 
ensure that the released prisoners will not break the 
law again thus making the pardon useless. Previous 
collective pardons showed that about 60% of the released 
prisoners reoffend and will go back to prison within 6 
months of their release. But there were no measures 
taken nor even planned to prevent this. Therefore, one 
effect of these OUGs would have been to sanction an 
increase in illegal actions and activities. 
Ignoring Public Opinion
OUG13 was put up for public debate by the 
Ministry of Justice on the 26th of January, only after large 
protests opposing it occurred15 in all major cities across 
Romania. During the debate that took place on the 30th 
of January most of the people present there asked the 
Minister of Justice to repeal OUG13 or at least submit it 
for substantial changes to be made16 and send it to the 
Parliament to be voted on as regular law.
Year Number of OUG10
2000 29_7
2001 19_5
2002 209_
2003 127
2004 142
2005 209_
2006 136
2007 157
2008 229_
2009_ 111
2010 131
2011 9_9_
2012 9_5
2013 9_9_
2014 9_4
2015 66
2016 9_9_
Table 1. Number of Executive ordinances adopted 
annually in Romania during 2000 – 2016
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In addition, many experts gave public statements 
explaining the disadvantages of OUG13 and their affiliated 
proposed laws17 and mass media quoted them. Although 
there were no reasonable arguments to sustain it, the 
Government went ahead and issued the Ordinance.
What happened?
On the 31st of January 2017, the Government 
approved the changes to the Criminal Law via an executive 
order18. The cabinet led by Sorin Grindeanu met to approve 
the 2017 budget project at 19_:40, when they unexpectedly 
introduced OUG13 on the meeting’s agenda and adopted 
it. The final text of the executive order was made public 
only after the Government meeting has ended, around 
22:00. OUG13 was then published in the Official Monitor 
at around 01:00 on the 1st of February. The only caveat 
included by the Government was the text of the OUG 
stated that the changes come into effect within ten days.
The Pardon Law was sent to the Parliament.
As a result we, the citizens of Romania, went 
out to protest and joined what have now become the 
largest peaceful protests in Romania19_, since 19_89_. At 
the time of writing (April 2017), the protests have been 
going on for more than 70 days and are still taking place 
in 67 cities across Romania. Romanian citizens all over 
Europe also joined the protests20. There was no political 
involvement in these protests; it was a civic movement to 
protect justice and the rule of law. The number of people 
protesting simultaneously reached up to 600,000 on the 
5th of February. We also made memorable acts like the 
pictures of Romanian21 and EU flags22 formed by tens of 
thousands of people. The people asked for a set of eight 
measures – The Proclamation Romania 2017+23 - to be 
considered by politicians in order to ensure the safety 
of the rule of law and democracy.
In the end, OUG13 was repealed. But those 
members of the Parliament who are supporting the 
Government are continuing to attempt to issue laws 
against the Rule of Law24 or against Democracy. Some 
even said protesters should be imprisoned25 or shot26.
What should be done?
As active measures we would suggest Romania 
should:
• Keep the Cooperation and Verification 
Mechanism for Romania until there is no 
doubt about the good intentions of the 
Parliament and Government regarding justice.
• The EU should also consult with citizens’ 
representatives when taking any decision 
regarding Romania. The current Government 
and their supporting alliance have clearly 
proven that they cannot be trusted.
• Ask and support Romania in its efforts to 
change the definition of the executive order, 
and how it can be used. The European 
Council should bring the report of the Venice 
Commission to the next step and ask specific 
measures to limit the use of executive 
orders. In addition, a team of international 
legislative experts can be formed to advise 
the Romanian Parliament and the Romanian 
Government on the measures and changes 
in the legislation that should be taken.
• Ask and support Romania to ban convicted 
felons from taking public positions in 
institutions including any state department 
positions. As long as felons (convicted or 
accused; Romania’s Parliament for instance 
has several convicted felons including Liviu 
Dragnea, the President of the Chamber of 
Deputies) are making the law, the attacks 
against the Rule of Law will continue. The 
Rule of Law is a critical principle of any 
democratic nation. Albania adopted a 
law, No. 138 / 201527, on this matter as an 
effort to eliminate corruption as part of the 
preparations to join the European Union. 
There are also other states in Europe but 
also in the world that have such laws28. A 
directive of the European Union on this 
matter would be an excellent method to 
ensure the rule of law in all member states.
European Union’s Position
The first statement by the European Parliament 
was made on the 2nd of February 2017, one day after 
OUG13 was published. Even though there were many 
voices such as Frans Timmermans’ (Vice-President 
of the European Commission) or Esteban Gonzales 
Pons’ (leader of the European People’s Party grouping 
in the European parliament) accusing the Romanian 
Government of bad will and acts against the Rule of 
Law, Josef Weidenholzer asked on behalf of the Group 
of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats 
(to which the Romanian Social Democrat Party - PSD - 
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belongs), for the debate to be continued in the Committee 
on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) and 
even a fact finding mission to be organized before any 
conclusion is drawn29_. 
Some of the Romanian Members of the 
European Parliament decided to plan a people’s visit 
to the European Parliament that would also include the 
debate at LIBE committee, especially people who took 
to the streets, as the main actors in the events that took 
place. They also suggested somebody from the street 
should speak during the debate.
The general feeling before the debate took 
place was that the Social Democrat Party - PSD - is 
trying to cover up their corruption with lies and were 
supported in this with the help of their colleagues from 
other countries, especially from S&D group. The feeling 
became fact when the following happened30:
• Protesters were not accepted  
on the list of speakers.
• During the debate the chairman, Claude 
Moraes (member of S&D group), allowed 
people to applaud after the speech of 
Tudorel Toader - the new Minister of 
Justice - but tried to ban applauses after 
other speeches. He also allowed Tudorel 
Toader to exceed his time by 5 minutes.
• Tudorel Toader said some ridiculous 
lies, such as that the only reason why 
people protested was the fact that the 
law was changed during the night.
The positive aspect of the visit was that we, the 
protesters, had the chance to talk to some Members 
of the European Parliament and present them the truth 
and our demands. And the feedback we had was very 
positive31. A short flashmob was also organized in front 
of the European Parliament to show once again the 
solidarity of the Romanian people with the European 
Union32.
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I can say I am the perfect example of a simple 
Romanian citizen. After graduating university I started 
my career as a software developer and went through 
several position in several companies until I got to 
be co-founder of a small IT company. Even-though I 
had always supported democracy, I was not much of 
an activist previous to 2017; even more, one month 
before protests began in Romania I could not see 
myself as leading a protest. But in the evening of 
17th of January, when I found out what the actual 
Romanian government wants to do, there was a 
break point in my mind and I said I must do something 
to stop such abuses. Therefore, in the same day I 
organized an event on Facebook and by the next day 
there were 300 people protesting in the centre of 
Timișoara. The number of people protesting increased 
exponentially, so 18 days later there were more than 
30,000 people protesting in Timișoara - the largest 
protest since December 19_89_. It was a very hard work 
that demanded me, and to the organically formed 
team, to be dedicated 24/7. Protests were not the 
only action we organized. There were letters sent to 
politicians, participation on meetings and debates 
and coordination with other cities in Romania. After 
this, the Government and the Parliament rejected the 
infamous OUG13, a law that was supposed to allow 
corrupted people to do whatever they want without 
any significant legal consequence. It was a partial 
victory, as the people who tried to issue this law are 
still there and for sure they will try again. So, we will 
not stop here. But the most important victory was 
that people in the entire country got to be united for 
the same purpose, no matter of age, religion, political 
colour, skin colour, the region where they live or any 
other aspects which usually tend to divide people.
f tiberiu.pfiszter
 138Romanian protests 2017
doi.org/10.23774/QUAS.RP2017.23
Author: Dinu-Gabriel Munteanu   
Beyond #Rezist: the surreal challenges facing Romania’s new civic MPs
Beyond #Rezist: the Surreal Challenges 
facing Romania’s new civic MPs 
Dinu-Gabriel Munteanu   
‘“#Rezist! The Poetry”. There are almost 50 
contemporary poets who contributed to this 
volume. Do you understand what this means, 
esteemed colleagues? [It means] that the events 
at the beginning of this year, in Government, in 
Parliament and especially in the [streets and] 
markets of Romania have already entered 
into folklore and history, with an unusual 
speed. […] When I say you should fear this it is 
because you need to accept one thing: sooner 
or later, the truth comes out. Sooner or later, 
people will know you as you are in reality.” 
Mihai Goțiu, MP; fragments of a parliamentary 
address, the 14th of March 20171
“One can hardly describe the derision and the flouting 
of rules, laws, Opposition members, people in the 
street, common sense and democracy. Hardly will you 
ever encounter more self-sufficiency, disproportion, 
immodesty … snobbery”. One month after the #rezist 
crisis, these are the words used by Mihai Goțiu, MP, to 
describe the first chamber of the Romanian Parliament 
(of which he is currently Vice President). Longtime 
investigative journalist, writer and civic activist, Goțiu 
belongs to a minority of 43 MPs, all of whom won 
their mandate as candidates of the new, civically-
informed Union for the Salvation of Romania party (USR) 
(December 2016).
USR was at the forefront, indeed it was the 
central and only mouthpiece of official parliamentary 
protests during the #rezist campaign: 
“We have ten days to stop the greatest fraud 
in the history of Romania. We protest, we 
boycott, we put forward a no-confidence 
motion, we petition [various] institutions, we 
sue the Government” said party founder 
Nicuşor Dan on the 1st of February.2
USR MPs were even prepared to resign their 
newly-held positions, as long as “this gesture would force 
a snap election … But we need to think long and hard 
whether there is any shame left in this [PSD] majority“3.
What USR did during the crucial days of early 
February was simple, symbolic and effective. Having 
joined the protesters on the streets of the country, they 
returned to Parliament dressed in black (as a sign of 
mourning) and carried signs reading “SHAME ON YOU!“ 
and “THIEVES!“. They followed their PSD colleagues 
around the building, eventually leading to boisterously 
surreal scenes. USR deputy Cristian Ghinea reported 
‘live’ on Facebook how 
[PSD MP] Şerban Nicolae threatened us, [visibly] 
nervous. He rose during the BPR committee 
and said that a number of citizens are behaving 
reprehensibly. … I replied saying that those citizens 
are in fact MPs and that it was he who behaved 
like a hooligan. [Senate President] Tăriceanu then 
lectures us on political culture. [USR President] 
Nicuşor Dan intervenes saying ‘I fully agree with 
my colleagues, you are all THIEVES’; Tăriceanu 
hysterical, scandal, PSD members look faint. 
‘You’re a scumbag’ is shouted at us. Circus. All 
civilised pretentions discarded by [these] crooks.4 
Five days later, under tremendous public pressure 
and with USR MPs staging a sit-in protest in Parliament, 
OUG13 was famously repealed. At one moment during 
the MPs’ ‘occupation’, an exhausted Mihai Goțiu was 
filmed with his eyes closed by a PSD colleague who 
immediately made the clip public. Goțiu apologised to 
the country and donated his week’s salary to a children’s 
hospital charity, adding that “after having spent five days 
and fight nights awake to make sure PSD doesn’t pull any 
other tricks in Parliament, one of them filmed me when I 
closed my eyes, for a few moments … If this is the price 
I have to pay … I accept”.5
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Mihai Gotiu allegedly asleep, screenshot Antena36 
The link between USR and the #rezist 
phenomenon, and indeed between USR and earlier 
civic successes, from Roşia Montană’s #unitisalvam 
victory to Iaşi’s successful civil society lobbying for 
the reinstatement of an entire linden tree alignment in 
the historical city centre of Romania’s second largest 
city (Iaşul Iubeşte Teii Campaign)7, runs much deeper 
than the February crisis. Many figures in the USR are 
themselves former activists, writers, academics or young 
professionals, some of whom recently returned from 
successful careers or education abroad. Having initiated 
the Iaşi linden tree reinstatement campaign myself while 
studying for a PhD in Nottingham, I remember how 
Mihai Goțiu, then writing for the anti-corruption portal 
România Curată, ensured that our struggle received 
the coverage it needed in order to remain visible on 
the national media landscape8. Sometimes it is hard to 
reconcile these deeply familiar aspects with the new 
political language, challenges, and compromises lying 
ahead. 
In an environment where the quality of the 
political discourse is far from normal — Andrei Pleşu aptly 
described it as “either hypocritical, either aggressive, 
either tongue-in-cheek, either lying, either electoral, in 
any case a discourse that lacks elementary components 
such as authentic conviction and grammar”9_ —USR’s 
presence is inherently idiosyncratic. It holds little sway 
over settling (or indeed blocking) legislative matters 
or governmental policy, both of which are dominated 
by the monolithic PSD majority. What USR reflects, or 
rather what the noble plight of the USR MPs represents, 
is the most difficult yet crucial step towards the political 
crystallization of Romania’s young civic awareness. In the 
words of USR MP Tudor Benga, a young entrepreneur 
and former Columbia University student, “the Romania 
of 2012-2016 allowed me to see all that is good and 
beautiful in this country, and all that is evil and abject” 
(Benga, n.d., para. 6). 
During USR’s first months of parliamentary 
service, it became evident that “miserable attacks10 
from adversaries, disappointments, insomnia, black 
days”11 will replace the relative security, or at least social 
familiarity of coming together with like-minded peers and 
engaging in journalistic, social media or street activism. 
My own civic campaigns in Iaşi pre-date USR, though it 
is eqally true that our actions received (media, logistic, 
legal, moral) help and inspiration from people who are 
now USR members. Yet for many of us, the idea of going 
into ‘politics’ is deeply disturbing. Too long have national 
politicians been associated in the minds of ordinary 
Romanians with corruption, incompetence, nepotism and 
intellectual or economic fraud. Too many, yet probably 
not enough senior figures of the establishment, including 
two former Prime Ministers, as well as cabinet ministers, 
MPs and dozens of mayors have faced recent public 
prosecution for corruption, abuse of office and similar 
offenses12.
One of the very reasons our own environmental 
and heritage protection campaigns in Iaşi were successful 
was the fact that we were able to explicitly and completely 
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distance ourselves from any political colouring. While 
this deprived the Iaşi movement of a certain long-
term ‘strategic’ sustainability (once we had won our 
battle, an anti-climactic feeling settled in) and limited 
our ability to capitalize on our success nationally, it 
allowed for a complete freedom of speech, including 
on national television and in the press, as well as a total 
discursive decentralization and grass-rooted approach 
to campaigning.
Although non-political in this sense, pre-USR 
movements such as the one I helped lead in Iaşi needed 
to become adept at deflecting and debunking all sorts 
of politically-informed attacks, fending off propaganda 
and partisan skulduggery almost every day. At one 
point, the PSD-controlled municipality attempted to 
‘infiltrate’ one of our ‘Iaşul Iubeşte Teii’ rallies in order 
to direct the public’s attention from our demands for 
legal accountability following the linden tree disaster to 
the Roşia Montană (#unitisalvam) national controversy, 
despite the latter being a huge problem for the central 
PSD government! In fact, the entire media circus born out 
of these Stalinist theatrics helped our cause considerably, 
and demonstrated how adept local career politicians 
are at shooting themselves in the foot when dealing 
with new ‘threats’ such as those represented by our 
civic initiative groups (see also Munteanu, 2015b, pp. 
3-4). In essence, the #rezist phenomenon was arguably 
an exponential increase, or perhaps an explosion of 
hundreds of such communities, most of them digitally 
literate, young and experienced in one form or another 
of online articulated activism. 
It is also true that USR is, or at least tried, to 
position itself as a highly pragmatic party of national 
(and moral) unity, welcoming adherents of all ideological 
inclinations amongst its ranks. USR founder Nicuşor Dan, 
a former academic and formidable civic activist, whose 
legal actions against Bucharest’s notorious networks of 
real estate developers and corrupt public authorities 
achieved significant results in the last decade, made 
it clear in his campaign that “both conservatives and 
progressives” will find a place in his party, whose overall 
mission is to tackle Romania’s fundamental issues around 
large-scale corruption, public administration reform, 
education, health, and the economy13. 
However, the challenges facing these new MPs 
remain enormous, almost Sisyphean. Despite the largest 
public demonstrations in post-Revolutionary Romania 
bolstering their mandate, and despite the forceful repeal 
of the infamous OUG13, mainstream politicians continue 
in their efforts to reign in the country’s judicial powers, 
and are even now aiming to modify individual laws 
governing pardoning, sentencing, the definition of conflict 
of interest, etc. In other words, “if it didn’t work out with 
OUG13, they now engage in a piecemeal approach to 
changing various aspects of the Penal Code”14. There 
exists an almost inexplicable feeling of aloofness and 
irreversibility to the entire process: “with an amazing 
serenity, I am told by a PSD senator … that soon we’ll 
have on our hands another legislative project that (s)
he thinks will revolt citizens”15.
This is not to say that USR’s mission is 
an impossible one. The very fact that deeply anti-
establishment figures such as Mihai Goțiu, or credible 
members of the Romanian academic and professional 
diaspora (such as Dr Cosette Chichirău, who returned 
from a position in the US financial industry to win a 
parliamentary seat in her Iaşi constituency) were given a 
public voice in a democratically-representative high-level 
Romanian political forum is an enormous achievement. 
However things progress, it seems true that “what USR 
already achieved is an extraordinary step forward in 
changing the face of politics, but also of mentalities and 
of the Romanian society; [it has] proven that the political 
blockade can be breached; a huge political experience 
is already accumulated … with its effect to be noticed 
in the coming years; we saw how vulnerable in fact 
the entire system is, and how weak, and cowardly, and 
unprepared are the people behind it”16.  
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Romania commemorates its 140th anniversary of 
independence from the Ottoman Empire this year and 
its tenth anniversary as a member of the European Union.1 
An even more notable coming-of-age moment may merit 
celebration now that the country’s civil society appeares 
to have reached a critical mass, recording what seems 
to be a game-changing victory and marks its birth as an 
apparently mature force in the democratization process. 
These qualifying words suggest an uncertainty 
in characterizing the events of the first four months of 
2017 and their meaning, and judgments about Romanian 
society’s evolution. This is not because of any inherent 
cynicism or pessimism on the part of this writer, or his 
embrace of the general Kantian notion that “Out of the 
crooked timer of humanity, no straight thing was ever 
made.”  Instead, given this beautiful and long-suffering 
nation’s pattern of progress and regression, regression 
and progress and regression once again, it is highly 
recommended that assessments be always informed 
by its history. Make no mistake, the events in question 
were in no way prosaic.  But, they beg the question 
whether Romania has truly become a full-fledged, 
lasting liberal democracy or has only gingerly stepped 
into its vestibule, still subject to being vacuumed out by 
the ever-strong illiberal and anti-democratic force of a 
political establishment living in a time warp of retrograde 
values and attitudes.
A real civil society, with muscles to prove it?
For almost three weeks in January 2017, 
hundreds of thousands of young and old protesters 
from all strata of society nightly crowded city streets, 
persistently and peacefully yet passionately opposing 
the anti-anti-corruption emergency law – Emergency 
Ordinance no. 13 (OUG13) - concocted by the new 
government of Prime Minister Sorin Grindeanu and his 
puppeteer, Liviu Dragnea, who heads the controlling 
Social Democratic Party (PSD).  
Grindeanu signaled he intended to change the 
law only days after he took the oath of office on the 4th 
of January, sparking the protests, and announced the 
new emergency law decriminalizing some corruption 
offenses 27 days later. He was forced to withdraw it 
a mere four days following the law’s announcement.2  
Representing the country’s legendarily corrupt 
and regressive political elites – “rats” and “thieves” as 
Romanian demonstrators labeled the PSD lawmakers and 
other unscrupulous politicians – the new government 
demonstrated a perverse rationality. It attempted to 
decriminalize some acts of corruption in a country where 
the fight against inveterate venality among the political 
elites is a test of democratization and liberalization, 
consistently harped on about by the European Union, 
and one that has finally made significant if insufficient 
strides in the last few years? As the successful chief 
prosecutor of the National Anti-Corruption Department 
(DNA), Laura Codruța Kövesi, declared the day after the 
government adopted the new law: it “will render the 
anti-corruption fight irrelevant”3. 
There are other countries in the region, of 
course, where politicians formulate self-serving laws, 
the most recent and glaring examples being Hungary 
and Serbia. However, there is a particular cynicism, 
intensity and frequency in Romania. It is no surprise 
that the country is ranked as the fifth most corrupt in the 
EU by Transparency International, trailing only Bulgaria, 
Greece and Italy, and on par with Hungary 4. 
That said, there is an element of brutishness 
to the political elites’ baseness of action, while never 
admitting political or economic self-interest, adopting 
what Thomas Mann so elegantly called “pious greediness” 
in his 19_01 book, Buddenbrooks: Verfall einer Familie. 
After all, how many democracies attempt to specify abuse 
of office as the PSD government sought to do with its 
“under $48,000” threshold? You are not corrupt unless 
you steal, embezzle, bribe and so on, a great deal of 
money; however, if you moderate your dishonest behavior 
you are sufficiently virtuous to be law abiding.  Strictly 
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speaking, in this formulation of corruption in office, if 
you cause financial damages under that threshold you 
are - nearly, perhaps even with some other minor faults 
- the embodiment of canonized Mother Theresa. The 
disingenuous claim by the Grindeanu government that 
the emergency law was intended to ease overcrowding 
in the prisons obscured the real reason for its creation. 
The unspoken justification is to safe-guard the 
not-so-saintly PSD leader, Dragnea, from indictement. 
He is being investigated for abuse of office adding 
up to around $26,000. The law’s announcement was 
meant to be the first gambit in what many suspected 
were to be additional attempts to retroactively change 
the criminal law to ultimately pardon Dragnea who was 
convicted of fraud in the 2012 parliamentary election 
and now serves a two-year suspended sentence, thus 
ineligible by law to hold the prime ministership for which 
he lusts. The Romanians were not fooled and were 
determined to proceed with the anti-corruption battles 
and demanded their democracy adhere to real liberal 
values.  “In a democracy, thieves are in jail,” read one 
of their placards.
A victory with a cautionary note
Forcing the law’s revocation was the biggest 
victory scored by any of the country’s mass protests 
meant to check abuses of power since the fall of 
communism in late 19_89_; the resignation in 2015 of Prime 
Minister Victor Ponta ranks second. Ponta was indicted 
for corruption that same year, was more recently found 
to have plagiarized his Ph.D. dissertation, and is again 
under DNA investigation for criminal offenses.5
What was most impressive was the movement’s 
tenacity and numbers. Hundreds of thousands of 
Romanians continued to crowd the streets of major cities 
even after the law was withdrawn, partly in response to 
Grindeanu’s announcement on the 2nd of February 2017 
that the government would re-word the emergency law 
and this time send it to Parliament for approval. Protests 
continued into March 2017, people chanting, “We want 
justice, not corruption!” and demanding the resignation 
of the PSD government.
The fact that with their nightly protests 
Romanians also gave tacit support to government 
institutions such as the DNA and the President’s office 
is a significant departure from the past. The DNA is 
trusted for its success in bringing a handful of high-
profile politicians and businessmen to justice - those 
who exerted themselves to match the Mephistophelian 
achievements of Haiti’s François Duvalier and the 
Philippines’ Ferdinand Marcos. And the presidency is 
now respected for the rectitude Klaus Iohannis brought 
to the office when he took his oath in 2015, after 
defeating Ponta and thus avoiding what some called the 
Putinization of Romania. These two institutions joined 
the short list of most trusted government organizations, 
headed by the consistently respected Army, Church, 
and Gendarmeries, according to polls taken by the 
Bucharest-based INSCOP Research firm in the last 
two years6.Furthermore, in a rare display of principled 
behavior, a handful of PSD members and government 
officials resigned in protest over the emergency law, 
including the Minister of Justice Florin Iordache7. They 
did so after they witnessed the unprecedented force 
displayed by civil society, in itself a promising sign of a 
change in the relationship between it and government. 
It also kicked off some infighting in the PSD, jockeying 
for power and other posturing, like Ponta’s threatened 
resignation from the party.  
As expected, the PSD government’s setback 
suffered in February did not derail its goal to neuter 
the anti-corruption system. A PSD-introduced law 
designed to pardon some who are convicted of corruption 
(Legea Gratierii), including officials, is (at the time of 
this writing) being considered by Parliament. And the 
new Minister of Justice Tudorel Toader, a member of 
the country’s Constitutional Court until his elevation 
to minister at the end of February 2017, promised to 
formulate a proposal to alter the criminal code and did 
so in early April8. He also ignited a controversy when 
he signaled his intention to “evaluate” Kövesi’s work 
and that of Romania’s Prosecutor General, Augustin 
Lazar, who like the DNA prosecutor has taken the anti-
corruption fight seriously and initiated an investigation 
into how the emergency law was adopted by the 
government. This kind of pressure on the prosecutors 
is suspect in a country where the independence of 
the judiciary remains aspirational to those who are 
democracy-minded. To make matters worse, on the 27th 
of February 2017, Romania’s Constitutional Court issued 
a contentious decision that signalled, in part, that there 
is a constitutional conflict between the prosecutors 
and the government, which alone “can establish if it’s 
appropriate to adopt an emergency ordinance,” that 
in turn “can only be censored through parliamentary 
oversight”9_. Senate President Calin Popescu Tariceanu, 
head of the PSD partner party, ALDE, was quick to 
conclude the anti-corruption prosecutors’ investigation 
of the government represented an act of corruption and 
an abuse of power10.
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Civil society’s initial victory quickly degenerated 
into a specifically Romanian denouement. What quickly 
followed the revocation of the emergency was a string of 
conspiracy theories to explain what happened and why. 
These theories ranged from multinational companies 
being the organizers of the protests, to Germany and 
George Soros encouraging Romanians go into the 
streets, to the Romanian Information Service (SRI) 
organizing the protests to damage President Iohannis.11 
Their purposes were to distract Romanians from the 
crass political muscle flexing by Dragnea and the 
Grindeanu-led government, and to discredit civil society. 
There is no evidence the tactic worked. The accusatory 
finger-pointing and political posturing and manipulation 
continued throughout March 2017. The war of words that 
erupted between politicians and against government 
officials like Kövesi and Lazar intensified, and there 
were calls for their firing and Dragnea’s and Grindeanu’s 
resignation. The PSD-government showed no intention 
to leave the path it set for itself but it paid the price of 
creating more internal dissension that reached a certain 
peak when Justice Minister Toader issued his decision 
not to fire Kövesi and Lazar 12. 
The indefatigable sniping and guerilla tactics 
of the PSD and its partner, the Alliance of Liberals and 
Democrats (ALDE) against the DNA continues. In April 
2017, for example, Tariceanu accused the DNA of being 
a “kind of political police”13. If we consider the cumulative 
meaning of the events of the first quarter of 2017, it is 
clear that civil society’s fight is not over. 
 Here is a cautionary note to those who are 
inclined to rush to conclusions about civil society’s 
ability to imminently take charge of the country and 
complete the democratization process begun in 19_89_. 
While this civil society includes many more citizens and 
non-governmental organizations than twenty or even 
ten years ago, there is a significant part of the public 
that has not yet joined it. The majority of the roughly 19_ 
million plus Romanian citizens may have either silently 
cared about the anti-corruption fight, or were entirely 
disinterested, preoccupied as they are with the daily 
problems of surviving on some of the lowest wages in 
the European Union. Many backed the PSD for a variety 
of reasons, including ignorance, a lack of liberal values, 
and self-interest. Thus, a very small segment of the public 
– a few hundred souls – actually openly demonstrated 
in support of the PSD government. 
Time to be a normal rather than a “unique democracy”
Romanians are tired of living in a “unique 
democracy,” as former post-19_89_ President Ion Iliescu 
(19_89_-19_9_6, 2000-2004) labeled the country under 
his administration. A former communist official, Iliescu 
and the Democratic National Salvation Front, the PSD’s 
progenitor, set up an illiberal and corrupt political 
machinery. After the European Court of Human Rights 
in 2014 criticised Romania for failing to prosecute 
individuals responsible for “crimes against humanity 
committed against …civilians in the tortuous transitional 
period to democracy,” Iliescu was indicted in Romania in 
2015 for his policies that allegedly killed several people 
and wounded up to 1,000 during protests in 19_9_0-
19_9_214. Reverting to his old communist ways of always 
blaming “the other guy,” Iliescu accused President Klaus 
Iohannis in early February 2017 of “inciting the street and 
provoking this anarchy”15.. Others of the same mindset 
joined in the verbal combat and blamed or derided the 
protesters. Ion Ţiriac, a tennis superstar in the 19_70s, a 
banker and one of the richest men in Romania, blamed 
the protesters for causing trouble, saying that if he had 
to choose between a thief and a stupid person, “I prefer 
the thief”16.
By contrast, Iohannis, elected in 2014 in an 
early sign of liberal democratic civil society’s growing 
significance, hit the proverbial nail on the head when 
he said, “People have a right to be outraged as a gang 
of politicians facing criminal problems want to change 
the legislation and weaken the rule of law.” He labeled 
the day the government issues its emergency law, “a 
day of mourning for the rule of law…and for the fight 
against corruption”17.
It was a sentiment shared by the European Union, 
which warned Romania not to regress in its fight against 
corruption. European Commission President Jean-Claude 
Juncker declared, “The fight against corruption needs to 
be advanced, not undone”18. Unfortunately, the European 
Commission’s Vice-President, Frans Timmermans, 
alerted the European Parliament that his commission is 
abandoning the publication of a “naming and shaming” 
report on corruption in the EU in 2016, which had focused 
on only eight member states, Romania among them. 
Carl Dolan, Director of Transparency International EU, 
opined, “The gap between the rhetoric from President 
Juncker and Vice-President Timmermans and the reality 
on the ground is striking. Now, more than ever, we need 
a strong and visible commitment to tackling corruption. 
Rising populism and the weakening of the rule of law 
across Europe requires concrete action from the EU 
on fighting corruption”19_. Indeed. Romanians know this.
 Social responsibility is not native to Romania and 
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its political elites and, therefore, Dragnea and the PSD 
are not likely to discard the great dishonorable political 
motivator that is self-interest. They will continue seeking 
to keep the country at least just a little bit corrupt. Unlike 
its progenitor in the immediate post-communist period, 
the PSD and its leadership now have what appears to 
be a formidable opponent in the country’s galvanized 
civil society. In the coming years, it will have to grow in 
size and repeatedly prove that it is sufficiently mature 
and resolute to resist and continue the battle against 
corruption and a democracy based on liberal values. 
That is the hope and promise of the events in the first 
quarter of 2017 and, therefore, this visionary, democratic 
civil society merits respect and support. Its success is 
paramount if Romania is to truly join the democratic world, 
and important for the unity of a European Union already 
threatened by illiberalism. It is also consequential to the 
sustained viability of the country’s political and military 
relationship with the United States, which has military 
bases in the country, and for the ability of the country 
and its NATO partners to resist Russian expansionism. 
The title of Romania’s national anthem - 
Deșteaptă-te, române/Wake up, Romanian - written in 
1848, before the establishment of a unitary state in 1866, 
eliminated altogether by the communist regime and then 
re-adopted after 19_89_, has more meaning than ever 
before. The country is free from any foreign subjugation 
and influence, and in charge of its own destiny and it 
appears that Romanians are indeed waking up and 
battling to ensure they leave their children a future that 
is democratic and informed by a liberal culture, which 
does not include tolerating a corrupt political elite.  
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Resist? Resist! Why and How?
What Resist as a movement needs to keep in mind is 
the fact that we are in the midst of a historic structural 
transition from the capitalist world-system in which we 
have lived for some 500 years to one of two successor 
systems.
From time immemorial, persons who feel 
oppressed and/or ignored by the powerful have resisted 
those in authority. Such resistance often changed things, 
but only sometimes. Whether one considers the cause 
of the resisters to be virtuous depends on one’s values 
and one’s priorities.
In the United States, over the past half-century, 
there emerged a latent resistance to what was seen 
as oppression by “elites” who enacted changes in 
social practices offensive to certain religious groups 
and ignored rural populations and persons whose 
standards of living were declining. At first, resistance 
took the path of withdrawal from social involvement. 
Then it took a more political form, finally taking on the 
name of Tea Party.
The Tea Party began to have some electoral 
successes. But it was dispersed and without a clear 
strategy. Donald Trump saw the problem and his 
opportunity. He offered himself as a unifying leader of 
this right wing “populism” and catapulted the movement 
into political power.
What Trump understood is that there was no 
conflict between leading a movement against the so-
called Establishment and seeking power in the state 
via the Republican Party. On the contrary, the only 
way he could achieve his maleficent objectives was to 
combine the two.
The fact that he succeeded in the world’s 
strongest military power heartened like-minded groups 
all across the world, who proceeded to pursue similar 
paths with steadily increasing numbers of adherents.
Trump’s success is still to this day not understood 
by the majority of leaders of both U.S. mainstream parties 
who search for signs that he will become what they call 
“presidential.” That is to say, they want him to abandon 
his role as the leader of a movement and confine himself 
to being the president and leader of a political party.
They seize upon any small sign that he will do 
this. When he softens his rhetoric for a moment (as he 
did in his 28th of February speech to Congress), they do 
not understand that this is precisely the deceptive tactic 
of a movement leader. Instead, they feel encouraged or 
hopeful. But he will never give up his role as movement 
leader because the moment that he did this he would 
lose real power.
In the past year, faced with the reality of Trump’s 
success, a counter-movement has emerged in the United 
States (and elsewhere) that has taken on the name of 
Resist. The participants understood that the only thing 
that can possibly contain and eventually defeat Trumpism 
is a social movement that stands for different values and 
different priorities. This is the “why” of Resist. What is 
more difficult is the “how” of Resist.
The Resist movement has grown with remarkable 
rapidity into something impressive enough that the 
mainstream press has begun to report its existence. 
This is the reason that Trump constantly inveighs against 
the press. Publicity nourishes a movement, and he is 
doing what he can do to crush the counter-movement.
The problem with Resist is that it is still at the 
stage where its many activities are dispersed and without 
a clear strategy or at least not a strategy they have yet 
adopted. Nor is there any unifying figure who is able 
at this point to do what Trump did with the Tea Party.
Resist has engaged in manifold different 
actions. They have held marches, challenged local 
congressional representatives in their public meetings, 
created sanctuaries for persons menaced with state-
ordered expulsions, interfered with transport facilities, 
published denunciations, signed petitions, and created 
local collectives that meet together both studying and 
deciding upon further local actions. Resist has been 
able to turn many ordinary persons into militants for 
the first time in their lives.
Resist however has a few dangers before it. More 
and more participants will be arrested and jailed. Being 
a militant is strenuous and after a while many people tire 
of it. And they need successes, little or big, to maintain 
their spirits. No one can guarantee that Resist will not 
fade away. It took the Tea Party decades before they got 
to where they are today. It may take Resist equally long.
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Resist? Resist! Why and How?
What Resist as a movement needs to keep in 
mind is the fact that we are in the midst of a historic 
structural transition from the capitalist world-system 
in which we have lived for some 500 years to one of 
two successor systems — a non-capitalist system that 
preserves all of the worst features of capitalism (hierarchy, 
exploitation, and polarization) and its opposite, a system 
that is relatively democratic and egalitarian. I call this 
the struggle between the spirit of Davos and the spirit 
of Porto Alegre.
We are living in the chaotic, confusing situation 
of transition. This has two implications for our collective 
strategy. In the short run (say, up to three years), we 
must remember that we all live in the short run. We 
all wish to survive. We all need food and shelter. Any 
movement that hopes to flourish must help people 
survive by supporting anything that minimizes the pain 
of those who are suffering.
But in the middle run (say 20-40 years), 
minimizing the pain changes nothing. We need to 
concentrate on our struggle with those who represent 
the spirit of Davos. There is no compromise. There is no 
“reformed” version of capitalism that can be constructed.
So the “how” of Resist is clear. We need 
collectively more clarity about what is happening, more 
decisive moral choice, and more sagacious political 
strategies. This does not automatically come about. 
We have to construct the combination. We know that 
another world is possible, yes, but we must also be 
aware that it is not inevitable.
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